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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ROMANIAN WRITER'S VIEWS ON TRANSYLVANIAN MINORITIES DISTURBING

Budapest VALOSAG in Hungarian No 10, Oct 82 pp 95-105

[Article by Gyorgy Szaraz, senior staff editor of ELET ES IRODALOM: "On a Curious Book"]

[Text] In April of this year, a book was published under the auspices of the /Sport and Tourism Publishing House/ of Bucharest. It is an inexpensive mass publication costing a mere 8 lei, and according to the appendix, the manuscript authorization is dated March 15, 1982. The volume contains four studies, the fourth of which provides its title: 'Cuvint despre Transilvania/. Difficult to translate accurately, its verbatim meaning is /Speech/--but here it is more in the sense of a sermon--/About Transylvania/.

The author, /Ion Lancranjan/, is a 54 year-old prose writer born in Transylvania. Before the publication of his volume, he expressed his views in the April 11, 1982 literary supplement of the youth magazine /Scinteia Tineretului/: "...in this book I spoke and speak in the name of neighborliness and brotherhood within the country. Neighborliness and brotherhood are only possible where there is mutual respect and honor, where truth and justice are appreciated."

The impact of the book transcended borders; certain of its references produced shock and unease within Hungarian public opinion and elsewhere it stimulated the interests of sensation seekers. At the same time, Rumanian reviews hailed the volume with almost unanimous enthusiasm. This also merits attention. Here I will deal only with certain portions of the title work /in the spirit of the above-quoted statement/. The author's view of history and reasoning could be the subject of a larger study; in the following I will refer to them only when necessary from a contextual viewpoint.

The author begins with a confession. Transylvania--he says--does not simply represent his native land but rather a "great and undying love", "a stormy, dramatic past" and especially the "great forebearer", the Rumanian peasant who was one with the land where he sinned, "was crucified, hanged and broken on the wheel", "was resurrected in the stories, legends, songs and dirges", who "in a natural progression was first Dacian, then

Roman and finally Rumanian" and whose attire, lifestyle "religion free from excesses" are all unquestionable proof of "antiquity and true nobility". In the background against the enduring "peasant hearth" is the landscape on which "the tear is heavier and saltier"--Transylvania, "the deeply booming conch within which the soul of the country resounds, bursts into song or seethes wrathfully", the "firebird" which takes wing "from the age of Gelu" "above the dreams of Mihai Viteazul", then "fans its wings above the flames of Horea's revolution" and "sounds the notes of the horn of Havas" in 1848...

Myth and reality blend in the text, and although the reader may find them anachronistic, it would be a shame to smile at these pathetic exaggerations. The literary past of East Central Europe is full of this kind of exaggeration. We too might well consider the "tragic" and "enduring" village of Dezso Szabo and also the truisms, the banal literature, the former generalized pseudo-objective textbooks according to which "the proud bearing, dignified movements and colorful attire" of the Hungarian "immediately reveal a true noble type". And surely we must consider the Evil that originates from the myths: "Soil-bound roots", "the truth of blood and earth".

The rich and tragic past of Transylvania has always produced an abundance of romanticism and myths. In one of the novels of the Saxon writer Adolf Meschendorfer, published in 1935, a Rumanian priest, a Hungarian doctor and a Saxon teacher are drinking wine under the stars sometime before 1914. The priest is dreaming about Rumanian youth which "the new age will rise to the heavens and the people will pour by the untold thousands from the mountains and dark forests...and the youth matured to manhood will rule from the Tisza to the Black Sea." In the soul of the doctor, "centuries-old wounds surface, a nation breaks its chains and faces the world in a blinding light...but a windstorm thunders across the plain and the people originating from Asia again regress into solitude within the heart of Europe". The Saxon does not daydream: "You, my Hungarian and Rumanian brothers, would still be immature today without the Germans...we are the teachers of nations; Europe communicates to you through us." The scene is schematic and complete: it evokes banal romantic dream worlds which nevertheless shaped destinies and history despite each other. The Saxon writer speaks not with Nazi "superior knowledge" but with the self-pity of a "cultural missionary", and in reality is as romantic a soul as the other two.

But Lancranjan, as he puts it, does not wish to descend "the slope of exaggeration" and would not dream of idealizing. He adds that self-restraint does not mean any sort of "pseudo-internationalism" or "neo-cosmopolitanism" to him, and currying favor from "any kind of vile domestic or foreign riff-raff" would never even occur to him. "Those who are similar to them should seek their favor, but not I!"--he snaps in sudden anger, and then calms down. Yes, there is "poetic zeal", there is "emotional reasoning", and he knows that he lives in a socialist country where "the nationalities have equal rights". After this, there follows an enigmatic passage about a "new irredentism" appearing in "refined and insidious forms" which fan old conflicts and play into the hands of the

imperialists, hurting the interests of the Rumanian people as well as those of the nationalities living with them." Then the author again loses his temper, perhaps because of his own words: "Only those can question the constant existence of this nation on this blessed land who are accustomed to living in perpetually base circumstances not only with us, but with the entire world which they deceived so many times by presenting themselves as something they never were or never will be."

After a time, he again changes to a more objective tone. Transylvania--he states--was always the scene of fierce social and national struggles; nevertheless "over the course of time, the natural social unity became evermore strengthened" in the lower strata of the different nationalities, "first among the peasants, later among the workers". It is advisable to nurture "this positive seed of the past--he says--"and remain true to the ancient Rumanian heritage of tolerance". But "the noble sentiments of one nation towards another mean nothing" if "an answer based on mutuality" is not sought, because--he adds--there are those who "speak of unity and brotherhood face to face, but brandish the knife of treachery behind their backs."

One is almost led to think that some South American emigre publication which fell into Lancranjan's hands aroused his justifiable anger.

Except that after this, surprising things follow.

Lancranjan states that "the present times along with their social and political differences resemble, to a certain extent, the period following the First World War, especially after 1930, when almost the same absurd slogans were voiced and when the finger was continually pointed at Transylvania." So that there should be no doubt as to what is being said, he acknowledges: "...the political system of present-day Hungary totally differs from that of the past; contemporary Hungary is a socialist country, as is Rumania." I am forced to quote the text which immediately follows in its entirety: "It is precisely for this reason that these words heard at an important forum in Budapest in 1966 sound strange: /'The Treaty of Trianon was an imperialist dictate which dismembered Hungary and awarded Transylvania to Rumania'/ and this totally untrue and more than unfounded notion is again repeated at the Helsinki Conference by the same speaker: /'In our century after the futile sacrifices of the First World War the territory of Hungary was reduced to one-third of its former size'--thereby alluding not only to Rumania but also to other countries, and implying that Hungary--'Great Hungary' or 'Thousand Year-Old Hungary'--at one time ruled foreign territories whose nationalities--Rumanian, Slovakian, Croatian and Czech--outnumbered the Hungarian population proper."

Somewhat further, the author calls pre-1918 Hungary an "artificially configured state". Of course, if a one-thousand year-old state configuration could be qualified as artificial even without the sarcastic quotation marks, it is difficult to guess what he considers natural in the course of history. And in contrast to essential matters, it must also

appear as provocation--the more so because blunders /stemming from obvious ignorance/ occur abundantly in this writing--to mention that the author lists the Czechs among the one-time nationalities but forgets to include the Serbians and Germans.

More importantly, on the basis of the reference to Helsinki, it turns out that the "speaker" is Janos Kadar, the General Secretary of the MSzMP. And since Lancranjan's train of thought leaves no doubt, it is worth verifying his quotes. So I searched through the press archives for the first one, that is, at the time, only for the official "translation" of the text quoted in Rumanian, since /the factual statements do not contain any untruths/. But in the material from the year 1966 I did not find /this/ sentence. That is, I found something in two different places which were vaguely similar. It is worth citing both. The first: On August 1, 1966, Janos Kadar expressed his views to correspondent of the UPI, the American press agency. To the question--"Does the Hungarian People's Republic have any sort of territorial difficulties?"--he gave the following answer: "The kinds of problems you encounter in the present-day foreign policy situation of the United States which, in many respects, are not at all enviable, are interesting. This calls to mind that after World War I, Wilson, then president of the United States, was the chief instigator of the imperialist dictates of Versailles and Trianon which dismembered the territory of Hungary...The goal of the 'territorial arrangements' of the imperialists was always to steal, to sow discord between nations, to divide nations and to set them against each other. However, we communists struggle so that once and for all this will become impossible for the imperialists." The other statement was heard at truly an /important forum/ in 1966--the IXth Congress of the MSzMP: "Nationalism and chauvinism are not unknown in Hungary. For centuries out home and people were oppressed by foreigners while the Hungarian ruling class oppressed the nationalities living on the territory of the country. The imperialist dictate of Trianon following the First World War served as a pretext for the ruling classes to incite nationalistic and chauvinistic passions and hatred among neighboring peoples to the limit."

Now let us examine Lancranjan's second quote. /This/ statement was truly heard at the closing session of the European Security Conference in 1975. It does not even matter that the sentence was taken out of context, since here "the speaker" is also disclosing /facts/. Still, I feel that a more extensive quote is necessary, primarily because of Lancranjan's reasoning. Thus, Janos Kadar said the following: "We are participating in this historically significant conference as the delegates of the Hungarian people who having founded a state, lived for 1100 years in the vicinity of the Duna and Tisza in the center of Europe; thus both our past and future are equally linked to the destiny of the peoples who live here. It is our conviction that the foremost desire of all European peoples is peace. Perhaps this is even more intense in the case of the Hungarian people who lived for centuries where armies crossed paths and who made innumerable sacrifices in order to survive and protect its state in the face of the threat of extinction. /In our century, after the futile sacrifices of the First World War the territory of Hungary was reduced to

one-third of its former size/; in the Second World War, because of the sins of its rulers, its blood was shed on the wrong side, eight percent of its adult population was lost and the country lay in ruins." So this is it. But as long as we are here, I will quote the passage further: "We have deduced the necessary lessons from our history. It can be understood by everyone that the peace, security, friendship and cooperation of the peoples of Europe do not merely represent empty words to the socialist Hungarian People's Republic, but rather a long-term policy founded on solid principles and grave historical experience."

Janos Kadar truly spoke of the dictate of Trianon and I believe there is no reason to disagree with Lenin who labeled the Versailles peace as merciless force against weak nations. But at that certain Helsinki Conference, Janos Kadar said other things which obviously escaped Lancranjan's attention: "The respect for and the practical assertion of the regulating principles concerning the relations of states--such as sovereign equality, restraint from the use of force, the inviolability of borders and the other basic principles--are in the interests of the 35 different participating states and ensure peace. With their observance, we could do away with war and armed conflicts in our part of the world. The Hungarian People's Republic is prepared to consistently uphold these principles."

Before we continue with Lancranjan any further, let us establish that the exact knowledge of historical facts, the /responsible/ citing of past events is /not a program of action/. But an arbitrary view of history, the combination of fact and myth, distorted actualization are dangerous even if they do not follow the assignments for the present.

Lancranjan further pursues his train of thought of the basis of two "quoted" sentences--one which never existed and one which was taken out of context. "Naively", he declares: "All foreign and domestic Hungarian revisional demands sound strange, since history has passed judgment on this complicated and tragic question." After this, he produces a Hungarian "racist propaganda writing", the work of a certain Csaba Ducso entitled /Without Mercy/. He does not disclose the place of publication, the year and the publisher. The nature of this booklet is never revealed. Is it a novel? A play? We can only speculate that it was intended as spiritual nourishment for leventes [members of a paramilitary youth organization] sometime during the Horth- years. That is, Lancranjan quotes "levente of Torda"--written with a lower case letter l and thus not a Christian name--who says the following: "I will kill every Rumanian who crosses my path. I will kill them all...I will put the entire nation to the sword and poison the wells. I will not even spare the unweaned babes."

I attempted to find out about Csaba Ducso, but I found no trace of him in any encyclopedia or handbook of literary history, not even in the old ones. Lancranjan calls him an "ordinary writer". However, we must be cautious: Even the ordinary writer is a writer! Thus the Rumanian reader could rightly believe that Csaba Ducso represents some sort of /average/ in Hungarian /literature/. So that there is no misunderstanding, I have

no doubt that Csaba Ducso and his work did exist. It certainly did exist, along with a multitude of others. I have an extensive collection from the pre-1945 era of the "works" of /Hungarian and Rumanian/ "Csaba Docsos" written in strangely identical tones. I could also present Lancranjan with an attractive bouquet of this and that for, let us say, the sake of balance. But what for?

Still, what is the connection between Csaba Ducso and the Helsinki Conference? We will shortly see.

For a moment, Lancranjan appears to be magnanimous. He dismisses Csaba Ducso thus: "All this, it is true, belongs to the past; its burial is more than necessary." However the tone becomes harsher at once: "But it is impossible to truly and finally do this while things are continually being upset in a certain way and from a certain perspective, without brutality, through the use of 'modern' language appropriate today. But even then they didn't arrive at /Without Mercy/ immediately." I will pause here because it is best to be careful. The "'even then'/" suggests /"now too"/ to the reader. Thus it is a parallel which raises Csaba Ducso, albeit only when given the opportunity, to the level of a conceptual-political force by present-day standards. Let us look further: "Then too, the publicists, those common or elite mercenaries of chauvinism, were the first to enter on stage; after this, the so-called historians who unearth dead theses marched forward...The politicians, the representatives of the most reactionary circles, advanced in the wake of the publicists and historians--strictly speaking, beside them, but not exactly leading them" and finally "the 'leventes' and the 'ragged guard' [guerrillas] stomped ominously onto the stage, shooting and dismembering, hanging and disemboweling...burning houses and churches, erasing Rumanian names from the gravestones, ripping open pregnant women with boyonets and impaling infants on their points; they harnessed men to the plow instead of animals and cut off the ears and tongues of others."

Let us not forget: /"even then"/. Thus, the publicist /of today/ who thinks differently about certain things, the historian /of today/ who on scholarly questions has a different opinion, the politician /of today/ who does not express his views to Lancranjan's liking paves the way for the murderers /of tomorrow/. I would like /not/ to be indignant. I would like to misunderstand the unmistakable. And most importantly, I would like to understand what Lancranjan wants. Or is it better to understand?

The listed atrocities must be dealt with separately. Does Lancranjan know how one who reads all this believeingly will think about good neighborliness and brotherly cooperation? I know. While reading his impassioned description, I recalled a childhood memory: Gyorgy Gracza's turn-of-the-century, illustrated history of the war of independence [1848]. Everything is there as if Lancranjan would have paged through it to find inspiration: lanced infants, men harnessed to the plow, mutilated women. But in these scenes, of course, Rumanians are inflicting all this upon Hungarians.

In truth, there was a "ragged guard" as there was an "iron guard". But the levantes did not stab anyone with a bayonet, because they did not have bayonets, nor did they participate in any sort of invasion. They were youths who drilled with wooden rifles and who were subjected to compulsory preliminary military training by a militaristic system. Thus, they were something like the /strajers/ during the time of the Rumanian royal dictatorship, the "snetries of the nation", who likewise did not run anyone through with a bayonet because they too were children trained in chauvinism and mysticism. And in truth there were atrocities in Northern Transylvania in 1940; blood was shed as it so often had been in that truly tragic land. But the apocalyptical visions of horror are false and strongly biased; untruths reside in the generalizations which stem from the sad facts: "They tortured and killed by the tens and hundreds throughout the entire territory of Northern Transylvania as in the time of the barbarian invasions, if not even more horribly."

Lancranjan repeatedly mentions fetuses cut out from their mothers' bellies, and then declares: it is impossible to forget if things are perpetually disrupted. However, something is not quite right with this logic. 1848 reminds him of the Hungarian volley at Mihalcfalva, but he does not recall Zalatna; and if perchance I happen to remember, he will obviously list me in the ranks of the "agitators". What does he really want? He counts the victims of Facsad who were blown apart by Hungarian bombs in November of 1918; should I do likewise with the peasants of Korostarkany who were mowed down by Rumanian machine guns in April of 1919? If he says Ipp, should I answer Szarazajta? Should we exhume the dead and set their bloody reflections against each other nearly 150 years later?

Titus Popovici who in his /Strainul/ recorded the brutality of the Maniu Guards in Transylvania said the following: "For me, those who were capable of committing such acts are not Rumanians but a separate subspecies which must be exterminated...as a Communist Rumanian writer, I considered and consider it my task to expose Rumanian fascism and those who desecrated the Rumanian name." Well, perhaps Lancranjan does not know that in 1907, the year of the Rumanian peasant uprising, the year when 14,000 Moldavian and Muntenian peasants were murdered, General Gigartu gave the same command to his troops almost word for word that the General of Ujvidek, Feketehalmy-Czeydner did 34 years later: I don't want to see prisoners, only dead! But he must be aware that in the winter of 1941-42, the machine guns of Gendarme Colonel Isopescu rattled on the banks of the Southern Bug almost at the same time as those of Gendarme Captain Marton Zoldi in the vicinity of the baths of Ujvidek. The victims were not counted by the "tens" neither there nor here. However, that certain "crime balance" which Lancranjan indignantly rejects is also only possible for myself one way: not considering the machine gunners and bullet sprayers separately as the representatives of either the Rumanian or Hungarian "races", but rather /both/ as members of the "subspecies" mentioned by Popovici.

Who would know or deny that in certain questions there are conflicts between the Rumanian and Hungarian views of history? These are mirrored in the various scholarly publications, the discussions at conferences and

filter through into the educational literature. But the disputed questions are scientific questions to which we can expect answers only from science. However, it is also a very understandable paradox that the more tightly the history of two peoples is connected, the more tension and argument arises and the further they are from each other, the greater the possibility for harmony.

Historical consciousness is an integral part of national self-knowledge and socialist patriotism. In this sense, it is obviously also a political matter. But is it wise to make science the "servant" of /forced/ political matters, according to the formula of medieval theological thinking? Gyula Laszlo's theory of the twofold settlement [of Hungary]--also alluded to by Lancranjan--is a scientific theory today at the level of a hypothesis. If it proves to be false, we will not be any less happy, nor will our worth decrease. If it proves to be true, we will be happy due to some sort of amusing pride, but it would not occur to either myself or any other sane person to sue for the return of historical Hungary on this basis.

Lancranjan casts back into the distant past for cultural and political nationalism, racial imperialism, ethnic separatism and denationalization, and going back centuries, he accuses the Magyars of all these sins. Historical presence is also filtered into his system of reasoning as a count for indictment: certain peoples, he says, wandered about in the world "in their search for ever richer booty". Since they were vagrant and rootless, these people forced their way into the chronicles, while those inhabiting the same place ever since the beginning of time, those who embodied "the unity of soul and land", had no need of being immortalized in this way. The following is also reminiscent of naive provocation: "In the history of other peoples there are facts which prove" that they became Christian "through an administrative route", "in unison", "by the order of kings". One may suspect that he is not alluding to Clovis' Franks, Mieszko's Poles or St. Vladimir's Kievan Russians; yet the subject matter becomes truly evident only when he states that "when the Magyars penetrated Transylvania, the Rumanians had long been Christians" and therefore "the question of who civilized whom is disputable".

We learn from Lancranjan that the number of Magyars "at the time of their settlement in Pannonia was not too large", besides which "the Germans at the Lechfeld River /(sic!)/ around 955 as well as the Tartars at the Sajó in 1241 destroyed a great many of them"; for this reason, as a result of their own weakness, they sent "Saxons and Szeklers" instead of themselves "as colonizers" to break apart the unified body of the Rumanian nation on this and the far side of the Carpathians. Of course, it is a different matter that these resolute and cunning medieval colonizers were at the same time primitive wildmen; after all, the German Bishop Otto of Freising "describes the inhabitants of the Pannonian plain...as nomads"; this eloquently testifies "to how the Magyars lived in their home on the plains, not in the tenth but in the twelfth century" and also to the fact that the Rumanians, who "from an administrative point of view preserved certain forms of Roman organization...lived on a higher level than the

Magyars". Consequently, it is not surprising that "the massive penetration of the Magyar element" into Transylvania occurred only after a newer defeat at Mohacs when--as Lancranjan remarks elsewhere--Hungary ceased to exist and "became a Turkish sultanate".

Should I engage in dispute? Should I state that in 1225 Andras II already expelled the "colonizing" Teutonic knights who, according to papal bulls and documents, were called into the country in the face of Cuman attacks from beyond the Carpathians fourteen years earlier? Or should I try to indulge Lancranjan with quotes from Byzantine chronicles in exchange for Otto of Freising? But why? After all, each people has its own Otto of Freising. The relics and evidence of Transylvanian Magyar culture, however, are there for Lancranjan to see. Should I state the obvious? That culture is in perpetual flux, that all peoples are simultaneously donors and recipients, that the more we receive the more we can pass on to others? That all peoples tailor what they receive to themselves and contribute from their own into what they pass on? Why?

Sometimes I feel that even Lancranjan himself does not know what he is trying to prove. First he mentions a "uniform psychological profile", but later he emphasizes that notable character of "the Transylvanian Rumanian temperament" since "the two- and three-fold Magyar oppression has especially developed" their "persistence and determination, their fantastic endurance and their ability to listen"--thus, all those qualities for which apparently they had no use in the face of Boyars and Cosokojs [?], Spahi lords and PHanariot despots.

Lancranjan's accusation spans centuries: "The new arrivals" expropriated the land of the Rumanians and "through religious zealotry and denationalization, they deprived them of their national leaders". But--he adds--"the occupation and accumulation of new territories did not produce unity; the usurped territory was in constant need of protection."

Yes, the territory had to be defended--against Cumans, Pechengs, the Oghuz and the Tartars, the Turks and imperial mercenaries. And since all the ethnic groups of the medieval state were not sufficient to populate the territory within its natural boundaries, it was necessary to have a settlement policy--"colonization", as Lancranjan calls it--not against certain ethnic groups but for the benefit of the whole. The Saxon or Italian did not receive his privileges as a Saxon or an Italian but as an artisan or a merchant. However, the Rumanian lesser nobleman immigrating from the Havasfold did not occupy his royally granted estate in the vicinity of Hunyad as a oppressed minority but as a landowner with full rights; his accompanying serfs however, were excluded from the nobility just as the Slav or Magyar serfs. The eighteenth century Hungarian nobleman who resisted Vienna did not become a popular national hero of freedom, but as an oppressor he was neither a nationalist nor a "denationalizer". The urbanials from the time testify as to how gladly they accepted the Rumanians of Moldavia and Havasfold, who were fleeing from even greater poverty and were thus less demanding, in place of their Hungarian serfs. Lancranjan writes: "For a long time, Rumanians did not

have the right to settle in cities", and the reader becomes indignant. But he does not learn that Hungarians were not allowed to settle in Saxon cities either, and at the time of the resettlement of the depopulated Banat, only Serbians and Rumanians were admitted along with the German colonists, not Hungarians.

In the age of reform, the struggle against Austria was already proceeding on a national basis, and this time period simultaneously corresponds to "the expropriation" of the ethnic past. In referring to the /Hungarian/ nobility, the adjective acquired a nationalistic meaning: a spiritual-political linkage to the Hungarian people was demanded of the Hungarian nobility. At the level of the lesser nobility, this remained meaningless for a long time. In 1843, a friend of George Barit wrote: the Rumanian noble of the village "who does not speak a word of Hungarian nevertheless says /'Jeu is nyemnyis ungur'/. That is, he is a Hungarian noble. The nationalistic ideas of the age animated the letter writer, and he did not realize that the lesser nobility living at the level of the peasants was not denying its nationality but merely thinking according to logic several centuries old.

The Hungarian national awakening created its own legends about its bright and exclusively Hungarian "ancestors". The people of Arpad of the Leopard were no longer a fleeing tribe pursued by Pechenegs, but proud conquerors, and their one thousand year-old history was exclusively the history of /Hungarian/ arms, /Hungarian/ glory and /Hungarian/ suffering. Not only did it deny the rights of the awakening nationalities but also disavowed their till then common history. Despite all this, however, they created their own separate historical system of argument, in places differing from the other only in its implications. The Hun-Magyar kinship was accepted on both sides, but while on one it was the reason for some sort of awareness of superiority, on the other it became evidence of "Asiatic savagery". A paradoxical situation developed in the first half of the nineteenth century: The Hungarian people, still represented by its nobility, wished to lay /sole/ claim to the country when, in reality, this was no longer possible. This intent gave birth to the idea of artificial language assimilation, the concept of a "political nation" and the impatience with regard to the nationalities. But the power was still in the hands of Vienna; only in 1867 were the means for Magyarization given to the politicians of the Ausgleich. After this, the period of "Hungarian crimes" followed which lasted until 1918. If we approach this policy not from its intent but from the viewpoint of probability, we can understand its necessary failure.

Lancranjan, speaking of the era of dulaism, states that "the cruelest known period" of the Hungarian nationalities policy "was the time between 1867 and 1918"--and he happens to be correct. ONLY, according to him, the "aggression lasting over several hundred years" intensified to such an extent that "the policy of exterminating all 'foreign elements' went out of control". I have no intention of defending the criminal nationalities policy of the time, but the word "exterminate" evokes images of the Armenian or Indian massacres of that period. However, the crippling system operated not only with regard to the nationalities. 48.4 percent

of the Hungarian agricultural population of historical Hungary were servants or day-laborers' the figure was 33.6 percent among the Slovaks and 31.5 percent among the Rumanians. Of course, naturally for the sake of accuracy, it must also be mentioned that the /landowning/ Hungarian peasants--as a whole--were in a significantly better position than their counterparts in the nationalities. But the figures still reflect that it was not a case of one people oppressing the others, but of one historical class oppressing them all. Lancranjan complains about the driving out of Rumanians into America, and it is obvious that he does not even consider familiarizing himself with the statistical data. In fact, the percentage of those who "staggered out" is greatest among the Slovaks, followed by the Hungarians and then the Rumanians.

Consequently, it is not surprising that Lancranjan characterizes the /fact/ that the Rumanian monarchy fought a war of an imperialist nature between 1916 and 1918 as a /thesis/ which has "for years operated against the truth, is contrivedly scientific" and in addition "is allegedly Marxist". From his writing we would believe that during the First World War, Czarist Russia and the Monarchy formed an alliance to partition Rumania. Namely, he reports that the Czar "wanted all of Moldavia up to the Carpathians" and Austria-Hungary would have received Transylvania and the Banat in addition to Oltenia and Muntenia. Should I mention the well-known fact that the First World War was fought for imperialist goals on both sides? Should I continue with something that Lancranjan obviously also knows well: that Czarist Russia was fighting /against/ the Monarchy and did not /demand/ territory from Rumania, but rather /promised/ territory in the secret treaty of August 16, 1916--not only Transylvania but the entire Hungarian area east of the Tisza and also the Serb-populated Voivodina? Should I mention that in January 1919, with the reversal of the situation, the Monarchy offered to intervene against the Soviets for "world civilization" and naturally in the hope of obtaining Russian territory?

It seems Lancranjan is a bit prejudiced in favor of the Rumanian Monarchy. He quotes the resolution of the meeting at Gyulafehervar on December 1, 1918 in its entirety including paragraph III.1 which ensures instruction in the mother tongue, autonomy and self-administration for the nationalities. He is a little bit mannered when he comments: "If we were to assert that the assurance of rights and obligations has occurred to 100 percent, we would be exaggerating to the point of idealization." But he quickly adds: "Hungarian-language newspapers appeared...schools existed and the freedom to use the mother tongue was not curtailed in any way." Perhaps Lancranjan does not know that in the January 1, 1920 law sanctioning the resolution of Gyulafehervar, there is already no trace of that certain paragraph III.1. And perhaps neither does he know that already in 1930 the Hungarian university of Kolozsvar no longer exists, there is no Hungarian-language state secondary school or teacher's college, that within ten years 472 denominational schools were closed and that not one high school remained in the Szekelyfold. Perhaps he does not know about decree number 98405/1926 of the Ministry of Education regarding the mother tongue of the child according to which "the statements of the parents cannot be taken into consideration, but rather, they are subject to strict scrutiny". But he must know about the most unfriendly signs which hung in offices in

the nationality regions and which it was advisable to take seriously: /Speak only in Rumanian!/ And I cannot decide whether or not he knows the most important fact: how splendidly the logic of the magic circles was realized at that time. That the unwise nationalities policy angered Hungarian public opinion and reinforced the nationalist-chauvinist irrendentist propaganda of the Horthy regime; intense irritation here lead to newer anti-minorities measures there which again only intensified irritation here.

I think Secretary-General Nicolae Ceausescu was not thinking of Lancranjan-type ideas when he said the following at the plenary session of the RCP Central Committee in June of this year: "...we honor and respect the glorious past rich with work and struggle--all that was good and good for our people's progress over several centuries. At the same time, we can definitely and clearly see those actions and situations which were not suitable to the spirit of our people; especially when speaking of national pride and socialist patriotism, this in no way should be interpreted as meant against any nation or particular nationality."

I have no right to speak /for/ the Rumanian Hungarian nationality nor do I believe there is a need for this. But the /politics/ of Lancranjan's /historical/ reasoning are truly clarified in his views regarding nationalities. I quote: "...it is not possible to put an equal sign between the situation of the Transylvanian Rumanians under Hungarian and Austrian occupation and the situation of the Rumanian Hungarians after the unification and naturally, their situation today. The 'minority fate' of the Transylvanian Hungarians did not begin after the 1918 unification as they claimed and still claim today, but much earlier, at about the time they entered Transylvania where a native majority population existed...on the basis of the mentioned equal sign, the implication is false and provoking: if an equal sign could be put between the situation of the Transylvanian Rumanians under occupation and the situation of the Transylvanian (thus Rumanian) Hungarians after 1918, it would mean that the Hungarians living in Rumania yesterday, after 1918 (and today) have the right to fight for the separation of Transylvania from Rumania."

Before making any comment, I quote a passage from the end of the study completing the train of thought: "If a Rumanian citizen presecutes another because he is of a different nationality, he is operating against the fundamental laws of the country, breaking with its most ancient customs, trampling upon humanity and closing his inner road which leads to total human realization. Naturally, the same thing happens when a citizen of the Hungarian, German or Jewish ethnic groups quarrels with another only because he is Rumanian and loves his country; but in these cases the complications are more numerous. This is because this conduct assumes animosity and the defamation of that country in which you live and work."

Well, then very briefly: In the first passage, Lancranjan does something I would not do; with respect to nationalities policy, he places an equal sign between the Rumania of old and that of today. He further claims that insofar as a Rumanian Hungarian condemns the nationalities policies

of /both/ Austria-Hungary and the Rumanian Monarchy, because of the use of the equal sign, he could be accused of a crime against the state. But the second passage is no less amazing: according to this, the citizen of Rumanian nationality who manifests his impatience toward the nationalities might be condemned for an /ethical offence/; if, however, a citizen of another nationality would dare to judge the views of a patriotic Rumanian--Lancranjan, perhaps?--this would count as a /cimre/, if not as treason. But something else lurks in this historical reasoning: that the "latecomers" who were in addition "occupiers", in truth cannot have the /right/ to equal rights, even if their existence on the land could be traced back many centuries. Their equality before the law can at best depend on the magnanimity of the "native majority". That is, even in his equality, he is only a second-class citizen. I do not claim that Lancranjan says this, but even unintentionally his logic steers the reader's thinking in this direction. However, Nicolae Ceausescu established /without discrimination/: "In our country, independent of their nationalities, all citizens have identical rights and obligations." Further, "whoever attempts to break down the cooperation and unity of the citizens of our country in one or another way has inevitably entered the service of the enemies of the country and the builders of socialism."

In Lancranjan's work, we can read the following about the time between 1948 and 1958: "The 'growing class struggle' was truly acute when it was practiced on the backs of the Rumanians, and where the chauvinist and neo-chauvinist Hungarian elements were at the helm of state and party organizations and, naturally, the office of state security." At the same time--let us read further--"the rights insured for the cohabiting nationalities were strictly observed." No matter how I look at it, this certainly means that during the first decades of the building of socialism in Rumania, a chauvinist Hungarian minority in possession of the usurped key positions persecuted and oppressed the Rumanian majority--just as their ancestors had done for centuries--and are obviously responsible for the mistakes and crimes of the time; simultaneously they made sure privileged positions were assured for their own kind.

This is a painful matter. Especially, when I think of the death of Bela Jozsa who died at Szamosfalva at the hands of the gendarmes investigating Hungarians and Terez Ocsko who was beaten to death in the cellar of the Siguaranta and Andor Bernath executed in Ribnit and the death of Doftana prison, Janos Herbak. Were the numbers of "neo-nationalist oppressors" in 1948 decreased by these? And is it truly possible that Lancranjan does not know what the Maniu Guards did in Northern Transylvania in the fall of 1944? Doesn't he know that the successive governments of Generals Sanatescu and Radescu and the names of Maniu, Bratianu and Titel Petrescu represented prolonged terror to the minorities? That this was also a reason they joined the RCP en masse, which was internationalist and offered a program free of chauvinism? From this it follows that the Hungarian nationality was present in the party and state apparatuses in fairly large numbers relative to its proportion, and this truly was a source of tension. Obviously, functionaries from the Rumanian as well as the Hungarian nationalities could be found who not only erred along

with the leadership of that time, but who also abused the authority they were entrusted with. But to raise this to the level of the /norm/ only with respect to Hungarians is hardly fair.

The opinions of Lancranjan are astonishing: The Rumanians were "patient and indulgent, excessively patient and indulgent..." toward the nationalities. Not only a minority opinion but also a longing for discriminatory laws lurks in the word /"excessively"/. Could I be exaggerating? Let us continue further. Lancranjan steps into the present directly from the age of the "growing class struggle". Then--he says,-- "the necessary and mandatory balance was surpassed" or rather, the nationalities received more than they should have, and today "it is due to this that, for example, the Rumanian Hungarians have more publications in terms of press and book titles than we Rumanians have." At least he adds "naturally in proportion to the Rumanian Hungarian population." The Rumanian reader, if he is not sufficiently well informed, perhaps might even believe him and become indignant, especially if in the meantime he remembers Csaba Ducso and the children run through by bayonets. In his anger, perhaps he might not even consider that the allegation, even if it were true, suggests roughly the following sort of "justice": if Lancranjan has, for example, ten books on his shelf, it is proper that the Hungarian have no more than one.

The trouble, Lancranjan says after this, is not that the minority has rights but that "as soon as we fulfill the demands and requests, they immediately proliferate further." The rhetorical question which follows is already demagogic: "...but, if they were to ask us in the most democratic manner possible to shoulder our rivers onto our backs and move from this country, then what should we Rumanians do? Should we fulfill this request too, or what should we do?"

To my eyes, Lancranjan represents something that it would be well to transcend quickly. I fear that he would declare the lines of Attila Jozsef--/The battle that our ancestors fought is dissolved into peace by memory/--to also be an experiment in the "creation of artificial balance". He has no desire to unravel the Gordian Knot of "common worries" with gentle patience; instead he espouses the solution of Alexander the Great. He says that Transylvania was not and will never be the "Switzerland of cantons" because "this could only be the ideal of those who have entered into an eternal pact with turmoil and aggression." Not only in reference to Transylvania, I say that the Switzerland of cantons was hardly if ever the dream of the spiteful. Because if something is symbolized--and I think Lancranjan means it as a symbol--it is peace among races, not turmoil. But I fear that socialist Rumania does not represent an ideal to him either. If I look at his writing in its entirety, I can only deduce that his ideal is some kind of ethocratic state whose power lies not in the /demos/ which depends on the harmony among peoples of different classes and types, but rather the /etnos/, the unity of the "pure-blooded race", in which there is no room for the /strain/, the outsider. Thus, it is not based on inclusion but on exclusion.

In my childhood I too saw the /common/ history in only one way: through the horrifying pictures in Gyorgy Gracza's book. What Ipp and Ordogkut were for Lancranjan, Zalatna, Nagyenyed and Korostarkany were for me. But I grew up and in the meantime realized that not all of us are "stately and of noble bearing". I believe I did not become a worse Hungarian for this. But I do not like writings in which it appears that I was born into a nation crippled in body and soul.

Lancranjan demands unconditional understanding, unconditional respect and unconditional capitulation from me. I should not know the names of Bethlen and Bocskai, the two Bolyais, Misztotfalusi and Korosi Csoma. I should forget about the grave of Szenci Molnar at the Hazsongard, I should not know Zagon and the turreted churches, I should deny that Varad was the city of the Holnap and of Ady, I should write Dozsa as Doja and Erzsebet Szilagyi as Elisabeta Salajan, and I should also say Miercurea Ciuc instead of Csikszereda, even when speaking Hungarian, and I should stare with an unfeeling heart at the spring on the hill at Fejeregyhaz. This would be the price for his friendship and patience. According to him, this would be "good neighborliness". Why doesn't he believe what he affirms in writing? Just because I call the river Maros, it still remains Mures, the Aranyos remains Aries and the Szamos remains Somes to him. Perhaps he even resents that I know the names he holds proud--of villages, mountains, people--and that I respect the emotions attached to these names, although he certainly has no need of my respect. But nevertheless, I like the world of the Miorita, the dirges and the ballads. I like the quiet European tone of his countryman Lucian Blaga, and the Mezősegy represents not only Zsigmond Kemeny and Andras Suto to me, but also Pavel Dan who died young--and I will not be the lesser or a worse Hungarian for this.

I am sorry that he does not understand.

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DIFFERENT ETHNIC CULTURES IN SLOVAKIA DISCUSSED

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[Article by Vladimir Cerevka, Slovak Deputy Minister of Culture:
"Development of Nationality Cultures in Slovakia"]

[Text] Culture occupies a significant and irreplaceable position in our social life. It guides us in our daily living even when we are perhaps unaware of it. It is a strong and effective means for the education of contemporary man, the builder of socialist reality and a communist future. That the party and our whole society give most careful consideration to its further development, is evidenced by numerous party documents, conclusions of the congresses of the CPCZ. Following these conclusions, following the principles of the cultural policy of our party, we are achieving daily many positive and concrete results in the development of our socialist culture and our art.

We often speak about the Czechoslovak cultural context, about the development of the culture of nations and nationalities. The culture of our nations and nationalities has its specifics, its traditions, and at the same time creates a whole which is based on a unity of ideological targets and has uniform outlines of a new, socialist culture, especially since the time when the position of the nationalities improved as a result of the federalization of the Czechoslovak state.

The constitutional law of 1968, treating the position of the nationalities, guarantees their comprehensive development in the economic, social, political and cultural fields. It is true that the equal standing of nationalities in our country was also practically realized before the adoption of this law. In past decades, we have after all witnessed an all-round development, which is directed toward a progressive equalization, mutual rapprochement and international unification of our nations and nationalities.

Socialist society has created favorable conditions for the active contribution of nationalities to the enrichment of the whole society's cultural life. National cultures form an integral part of the Czechoslovak cultural context. In the period of building socialism in Czechoslovakia, they have achieved a positive development and they participate significantly in the formation of the socialist profile of the members of their nationalities. The socialist

character of the nationalities has consolidated and their all-encompassing bond with the Czech and Slovak nations has deepened. The international cohesion within the whole Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has strengthened. This, however, does not mean that certain relics of the past have not survived to some extent, something we are trying to overcome by way of intensive educational activity, by way of utilizing everything which brings our nations and nationalities closer.

Citizens of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationality, living mainly in Slovakia, have also joined in the work of building the developed socialist society. They consciously strive for their national and cultural development, fully assisted by our cultural policy. They represent an integral part of the Czechoslovak socialist society, and consequently of Czechoslovak socialist culture. Socialist culture purposefully guides the education of man, striving for the realization of these ideological and esthetic goals which are suitable for the communist ideal. Socialist cultures develop on a social ideological basis. They solve their separate problems in their own ways, but from the point of view of the same world outlook. The closeness of vital tasks and goals irrespective of individual differences of national experience creates a historical inevitability of mutual understanding and identification. The process of rapprochement and mutual enrichment between various national and nationality cultures must be understood as an expression of their economic, societal and social relations.

Not even in the past were differences in historical conditions, levels and contents of cultures an impediment to finding a common language, in exchanging spiritual values. All the more so in the new societal conditions, there are no hermetically closed cultures, but the experiences of each national culture are penetrating another culture, transforming themselves and joining the national experience. Socialism widens the bodies of these national cultures, which acquire the ability not only to adopt the experience of other cultures, but also to enrich them with own values. The culture of each nation and nationality, irrespective of its own size, has obtained the right to exist to the fullest and has obtained the right to be an integral part of Czechoslovak socialist culture.

In the report of CPSL Central Committee, presented by J. Lenart at the CPSL congress in March 1981, it is moreover pointed out: "We attribute fundamental importance to the process of rapprochement and mutual enrichment of the cultures of our two fraternal nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, and to the development of the cultural life of the Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities. We will continue to support and develop these tendencies to the greatest extent."

Many facts prove that in the whole period of building socialism in our country there have been created the most favorable conditions for an all-round development of the culture of nationalities living in the CSSR, in the spirit of Lenin's nationality policy. In creating these conditions, our party has been able to lean on the rich experiences of the CPSU, which has consistently carried out Lenin's nationality policy in building the multinational Soviet society, assuring economic and cultural development of all the nations and nationalities.

V. I. Lenin in his works written before the October Revolution declared himself for an international culture and against the slogan of a homogeneous "national culture," because, as historical experience shows, under this broad slogan nationalists, clerics and others have always felt cozy. Lenin elevated the concept of the "international culture of democracy and the world workers movement." By this, however, he did not have in mind a nonnational, but a supranational culture. A national culture carries specific features of national character, but the basic features of this character are not always the unique property of a nation. In concrete historical conditions they spring into being, develop and change into new qualities. In his work, "Critical Remarks on the National Question," V. I. Lenin made clear that international culture is not nonnational. He talked about two national cultures in each national culture, about the presence of elements (also undeveloped) of a democratic and socialist culture binding with these elements the very essence of international culture.

In Lenin's works from the period after the October Revolution we find emphasis on the necessity of unity, integration of workers of various nationalities in uniform organizations, their unification, solidarity and overcoming of nationalistic barriers which hamper mutual rapprochement and mutual understanding. Lenin's thought on organic unity presupposes the thought about the equality of nations and at the same time rules out any privilege. V. I. Lenin emphasized the unity binding socialist nations, pointing out the strength of internationalism. He also paid great attention to the all-round development of nations and their cultures. Thus in the history of the Soviet Union it was possible to create new economic, social and political foundations for the development of nations and national cultures.

The CPCZ has always paid great attention to the practical solution of national relations. Let us recall in this regard the thought set forth at the CPCZ Congress: "The successes which we have been achieving in the field of nationality policy, the degree of unity and international fraternity obtained between the Czechs and Slovaks and the nationalities living on our land, belong to the most significant achievements of our revolutionary workers movement, the struggle of our party and people."

According to the most recent data, 580,000 Hungarian and 48,000 Ukrainian nationals live in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The overwhelming majority of these live in Slovakia. In regard to distribution, the greatest density of inhabitants of Hungarian nationality is found in the districts of Dunajská Streda, Komárno and Nové Zámky, and of inhabitants of Ukrainian nationality, in the districts of Humenné and Svidník. These are the most complete data which convey the results of the 1980 population census (these results also give data about the inhabitants of Polish and German nationalities; the development of their culture, however, will not be discussed here). These are dry numbers, but with a closer look we can see that behind these figures hides a great richness and development of creative forces of the members of the nationalities, which in the period of building the developed socialist society have found and continue to find in Czechoslovakia a real motherland.

Our look at the contemporary development of the cultures of the Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities will not be historical. This does not mean that these cultures do not have their histories. On the contrary, they have their rich cultural traditions. Thus, for example, even a quick look at the past shows that Ukrainians who live mostly in eastern Slovakia, could build and develop their contemporary culture on the base of their cultural and educational heritage from the 19th century, represented by the important personalities of such revivalists as A. Duchnovic, A. Pavlovic, and others. Rich folk art represents an important foundation of this development. The culture of the Ukrainians living in the CSSR was developing in the period of the bourgeois republic in complex conditions, thus besides others, the language problem remained unresolved for a long time. The formation and development of the socialist Ukrainian culture proceeded at first in a difficult struggle against the bourgeois-nationalist elements and church clergy--a heritage left behind by the past. Moreover, it was necessary to overcome the relatively low educational and cultural level that resulted from the former social systems, which left perceptible traces mainly in the life of national minorities. Not less complicated was the development of the Hungarian nationality's culture, which after the year 1918 found itself in a situation of language conflict. In the past decades, which were marked by a unique period of development of the whole Czechoslovak culture, the development of the cultures of the Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities has achieved results that can be compared only with the history of nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union. The party and state authorities deserve full credit for the development of these cultures. Cultural unions--CSEMADOK [Cultural-Social Association of Hungarians in the CSSR] and the Cultural Union of the Ukrainian Workers in the CSSR--are organizations directly governed by the SSR Ministry of Culture and their chief role consists in organizing and guiding the cultural life of the Hungarian and Ukrainian working people. The cultural development of these nationalities is supported by professional artistic bodies--the Hungarian regional theater in Komarne and the Ukrainian national theater in Presov, the Hungarian "Young Hearts" song and dance assembly and the Poddukliansky Ukrainian Folk Assembly in Presov, the Museum of Ukrainian Culture in Svidnik, publishing houses (Madach and SPN, the section of Ukrainian literature), broadcasting stations, Hungarian and Ukrainian presses in Slovakia, numerous amateur theater groups and occupational artistic activity groups, Ukrainian and Hungarian sections of the Union of Slovak Writers and so on.

The Hungarian and Ukrainian professional theaters have thus been satisfying the specific interests and needs of the national cultural life already for three decades. Both national theaters through developing nationality culture play an important role in the raising of original dramatic activity. Thanks to rich and continuous touring activity, these theaters give the inhabitants of the most remote regions access to the dramatic art in their native language.

One of the most obvious proofs of the cultural life of nationalities is the development of nationality literatures. The cultural policy of the CPCZ creates for each of the nationality literatures the political, organizational, institutional and artistic conditions for all-round development. At the same

time it guides their development in such a way so as to have them become active instruments for education oriented toward socialist awareness, internationalism and patriotism. Nationality literatures thus become an integral part of the socialist culture of the nations of Czechoslovakia, also playing an important social consciousness-raising function in the nationality organism of the individual ethnic groups.

The contemporary progress of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationality literature in Czechoslovakia is the result of the development of historical, political and social relations. Not until the conditions of socialist Czechoslovakia could these literatures fully develop their creative ambitions and become an open expression of the sensibility and thought of the Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities. Hungarian nationality literature has at present the most favorable conditions of all-round development due to the existence of such an institutional base as the Madach publishing house in Bratislava, which publishes the original work of Hungarian authors. The ideological and political growth of Hungarian nationality writers is taken care of by the Hungarian section of the Union of Slovak Writers, which has over 30 members. Between the third and fourth congresses of the Union of Slovak Writers, 119 titles have been published in Slovakia. The authors of these were 28 Hungarian registered members of the Union of Slovak Writers and 31 non-organized authors. These works are prose, fables and dramatic works, as well as works of literary criticism, politics and technical literature. Recent publication of the anthology of poetry under the title MUZNY VEK was an important act in bringing Hungarian nationality literature to Slovak readers. The literary monthly IRODALMI SZELME, published by the Madach house, offers wide publishing possibilities to Hungarian writers.

Ukrainian literature in the CSSR began to develop intensively even in the first years after the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army. Ukrainian authors drew from the progressive traditions of Ukrainian and Slovak literatures. This literature showed a great boom chiefly in the 50's and 60's, but in the past decade it achieved no less impressive results. Its publishing base is represented by the Ukrainian Literature Section of the Slovak Educational Publishers in Presov, which provides for the publication of the original works of Ukrainian authors in artistic, dramatic, literary and popular-science fields. Yearly, 10-15 titles are published (besides textbooks). Ukrainian authors are given adequate publishing space in the literary periodicals DRUZNO VPERED and NOVE ZITTA. Ukrainian writers in Slovakia are organized in the Ukrainian Section of the Union of Slovak Writers, which currently has 20 members. Ukrainian nationality literature builds on its own progressive traditions, richly drawing from the traditions of the Ukrainian and Soviet literary production and thematically corresponds with contemporary tendencies of Slovak and Czech literature. Readers can learn about Ukrainian literary life in a brief but clear book published by the SLOVENSKY SPISOVATEL publishers (1981) under the title UKRAJINSKA LITERATURA V CSSR, and about the work of individual authors in the anthology of Ukrainian literature RANO POD KARPATAMI, which is in preparation.

Recently pieces from the output of Hungarian and Ukrainian writers have been appearing in our literary periodicals more often. In nationality literary

periodicals, on the other hand, we come across samples of Czech and Slovak literature. This is certainly good and useful, since besides a deeper mutual understanding, an effective fraternal international coexistence of our nations and nationalities can thus be assured.

National literatures today perform an important cultural and political mission. Literary works whose ideological and esthetic level have an elevating tendency are a true reflection of the dynamics of the life of nationalities, their improving living and cultural level and their active role in the building of socialist Czechoslovakia. They form an important part of the whole Czechoslovak literature and Czechoslovak art, an art, for which the 16th CPCZ Congress stated the following goals: to react to the main problems of the present, to fight for socialist morality, to present contemporary man in his work and struggle, to educate this man in the spirit of patriotism and internationalism.

Perhaps the most common evidences of cultural activity are various forms of occupational artistic activity. They allow a continual return to the inexhaustible sources of folk art. They allow a further development of this art, which is characterized by unusual and unique beauty. Thus its presence in our life enriches us, has an impact on the national sensitivity and plays an important educational function.

The primary work of the groups of occupational artistic activity are yearly reviews, competitions, festivals and celebrations of Hungarian and Ukrainian culture. Hungarian working people participate in such competitions as PODDUNAJSKA JAR, a competitive review of children's theater groups, of groups of small dramatic forms, and interpretations of poetry and prose. Then there are the yearly JOKAIHO DNI in Komarne--a competitive review of artistic recitals and a review of theatrical groups; all-Slovak competitions in the field of Hungarian folklore. The most important event is the annual cultural celebration of Hungarian working people in Gombasek, which is a survey of the best collectives of occupational artistic activity and of interpreters of folk art and the artistic word. The cultural union of Ukrainian workers is the organizer of such events as the festival of drama and the artistic word in Medzilaborcie, the festival of Ukrainian folklore and group singing in in Kamienka and finally the annual traditional celebrations of the culture of Ukrainian workers in Svidnik. These are magnificent reviews of the work of numerous groups and individuals, which bring closer the beauty of folk art to our contemporaries.

The educational act has an important place in the development of culture and the educational level of the citizens of Ukrainian and Hungarian nationality. Grammar schools and high schools (gymnasias) with Hungarian and Ukrainian as the languages of instruction, and the Hungarian sections of the Teachers College in Presov, make possible education in the native language. These schools are fully supported by appropriate textbooks in the Hungarian and Ukrainian languages.

We have already mentioned that nationality culture is viewed as an organic part of our whole socialist culture. Its mission is to aid actively in the

education of contemporary man. This means that just as now, nationality culture in the future will play an important role in the system of ideological and educational activity. The means of its further development must be tightly bound with the application of Marxism-Leninism, with efforts for further growth of socialist awareness of the working people, animated by the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. In the report of the CPCZ Presidium, "About the Chief Tasks of the Ideological Work after the 15th CPCZ Congress" (26 October 1972) the following is emphasized: "To guarantee unity between our nations and nationalities, to secure the strength of our socialist state, and to develop Czechoslovak socialist patriotism, a mutually sensitive attitude toward the needs of each nation and nationality and full respect for equality are of extreme importance. Mutual understanding and tolerance are greatly needed in solving such sensitive problems as nationality. One should not fall into needless distrust based on narrowminded reasons or mutual recriminations over nationalism or chauvinism, but neither should one fail to notice that nationalist and chauvinist prejudices are still alive..." In the realization of cultural policy, in further development of cultural and educational activity, in creative artistic experience and in editorial work it will be necessary to bear these things in mind.

Regarding further ways of developing the nationality culture, the conclusions of the CPCZ and CPSL congresses are fully valid, which signifies that new quality, clear ideological intent and creation of such values as will help to realize the goals in the education of harmoniously and comprehensively developed socialist man are expected from this culture. In the culture of nationalities the target is the "development of active participation of the working people and youth in the creation of its values," as it is pointed out by the resolution of the CPSL Congress (1981). Thus the target is that the working people of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationality must not be just the recipients, but must be active coauthors of the socialist culture.

Socialist reality creates new value concepts which did not exist before. In the socialist reality, pride of the revolutionary past does not disappear. The Hungarian and Ukrainian proletariat also has this past. There is a pride of that which is created in our reality as well. The sense of all-national socialist pride, which is interchangeable with national pride, forms and consolidates itself. National pride in the socialist society cannot be closed unto itself, separated from vital problems of other nations and nationalities, cannot be antithetical to the sense of socialist internationalism and patriotism.

Active participation of our nations and nationalities not only in the economic strengthening of our country in the spirit of the goals stated by the CPCZ, but also in the creation of cultural and artistic values, is one of the clear signs of the superiority of the socialist societal order. It is an expression of Leninist national and cultural policy, which is put into effect by the Communist Party.

12270

CSO: 2400/69

JAKES SPEECH TO THE SEVENTH PLENUM

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Nov 82 p 3

[Report by Milos Jakes, CPCZ Presidium Member and Secretary, to Seventh Plenum or one CPCZ Central Committee]

[Text] Despite many shortcomings, reports submitted to this plenum on the fulfillment of the social and economic program of the party approved by the 16th CPCZ Congress confirm its correctness and foresight in higher exactingness. Along with this, there is the fact that we are realizing our goals in a period where the complicated struggle between capitalism and socialism, between the forces of war and peace, goes on. Under pressure from the United States, there has been increased discrimination against the socialist countries in the economic sphere.

All this has only one objective, to weaken the unity of the socialist community, make it impossible for us to implement the real aim of the 16th Congress, disrupt our socialist system and complicate the situation in the country. The financial and credit blockade is part of the political and military objectives of the United States. It is expressed primarily in worsening credit terms for the CEMA countries on the international money markets, shortening of repayment deadlines, lowering Western banks' deposits in the socialist countries in order to cause them payment difficulties, as well as abusing their dependence on imports from the capitalist states. This approach is in sharp conflict with the principles of peaceful cooperation in the sphere of economic relations anchored in the Helsinki Final Act.

These questions had already been addressed by Comrade Strougal at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, and this year these tendencies have become more pronounced.

The strength of the socialist economy has been able to cope with the significantly more demanding conditions, as demonstrated by the results achieved. We have succeeded in forging ahead in the fulfillment of the conclusions of the 16th Congress. The goals of the state plan have basically been met in maintaining the achieved standard of living and social certainty, in ensuring a balance in external relations, and lowering the indebtedness in free currencies. We appreciate the important contribution toward this goal by worker initiative and the fulfillment of pledges made in honor of

important anniversaries and events, such as the congresses of the ROH [Revolutionary Trade Union Movement] and the SSM [Socialist Youth Union].

The goals of the plan for 1983 continue to follow these objectives and ensure renewed dynamism in the national economy. In this effort, we must better utilize our great economic potential, overcome shortcomings more rapidly, and strive more consistently for higher effectiveness in production, economy and quality in labor, and a transition of the national economy to intensive development.

During the past 2 years, we have taken the first steps in this direction. We have raised the level of the valorization process, managed to do with lower volumes of fuels and energy, saved more than 10 percent in propellants, and we will reach the prescribed goals in meeting the program of rationalization in energy, fuels and metals consumption, while reducing the high cost of transport. In capital investment construction, we strove to meet the demands of the 16th CPCZ Congress of lowering the excessive number of unfinished construction projects, avoiding the dispersion of efforts and assets, resisting pressures to make investments where existing capacities have not been fully utilized. From this point of view, we have made capital investment construction more realistic by increasingly subordinating it to the needs of structural changes, modernization and reconstruction. While we have succeeded in reducing unfinished construction, we have not always managed to adhere to planned construction deadlines, reduce the growth of investment outlays and observe the projected parameters. We must significantly improve the planning and concrete management of the whole investment process, and harmonize the volume and structure in delivering completed construction work and technology. We must concentrate design, production, construction and installation capacities on projects important to our society, thus preventing delays.

We view critically the fact that the share of practical application of science and technology in the results achieved is still too small. Consequently, as already stated, we plan to discuss these questions at one of the future Central Committee sessions.

In accord with the conclusions of the 16th Congress, there was continued progress in economic, scientific and technological cooperation with the CEMA countries, notably the USSR.

With regard to foreign trade, the export plan for the socialist countries was generally surpassed. The export plan for the free currency areas was not fulfilled. Nevertheless, we expect a lower level of free currency indebtedness than originally anticipated.

This, however, was achieved not through overfulfillment in exports but rather through central regulation of imports. In addition to sales difficulties stemming from the crisis situation in the capitalist economy and discriminatory measures against us, there are still shortcomings in quality, technical level, product assortment, services, spare-part deliveries, inadequate

preparedness, and insufficient ability to adapt production to the demands of the market, as well as shortcomings in the performance of the foreign-trade sector. Experiences of the import commission of the CPCZ Presidium show that we must resist tendencies to import from the capitalist countries products which are not essential or which can be imported from the socialist countries or even manufactured at home. We cannot be satisfied with the fact that requests for such imports are often marked by ignorance of the production capability of the socialist countries or underestimation of our own. The best way, however, is to raise the export capability of our economy so that we can better ensure import needs.

Our national economy experienced a rise in average wages in many sectors, especially mining, where we have realized important wage-policy measures.

The results achieved enabled us to generally ensure the stability of the internal market, despite problems in goods assortment caused by shortcomings in production, structural changes in demand and, in some cases, inordinate purchases by our citizens.

We have advanced in meeting the party's social program in housing construction, even though its overall capacity to satisfy demand is still lagging. Progress in the sphere of education and culture continued.

We have insisted on the need for conservation. The first steps were taken in meeting the savings plan in the sphere of propellants, the use of official vehicles, lowering the numbers of administrative personnel and other types of overhead, travel expenses and the cost of advertising. In this respect, we must continue to proceed consistently. We must approach more aggressively the reduction of indirect costs and overhead which in some branches represent as much as 30 percent of production costs, especially the cost of administration.

In spite of the fact that the fulfillment of the party's socioeconomic program was accompanied by many objective difficulties and inherent shortcomings, and even though we had to resort to nonrecurrent opportunities, including the use of needed reserves, we can say that our economy is stabilized and that it is not in a crisis situation, as Western propaganda attempts to prove. In the spirit of the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress and in unity with the CEMA countries, especially the USSR, we are forging ahead in the building of an advanced socialist society. There is no unemployment or social uncertainty here such as we see in the capitalist countries. Despite price adjustments in certain products, in large measure compensated by wage and social measures, individual income continues to rise. In retail price policy, we proceed according to the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress.

The achievement of positive results was also helped by the application of the improved system of targeted planned management in our national economy, even though this has not yet been consistently realized everywhere. With respect to emphasis on social priorities, it was necessary--along with the application of economic instruments--to centrally limit certain input, such as the

consumption of fuels, propellants and some raw materials.

The CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat focused priority attention on the fulfillment of the tasks of the party's socioeconomic program. Tasks related to its fulfillment in the spirit of the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress, overcoming of difficulties and shortcomings, and resolution of newly emerging problems, constituted the major portion of these organs' deliberations. Much attention was also devoted to cadre work and the strengthening of individual sectors by politically and professionally qualified people. Since the 16th CPCZ Congress, there have been cadre changes in the positions of 18 percent of deputy ministers, 15 percent of VHJ [economic production unit] general directors, and 15 percent of general directors in the foreign-trade organizations.

We must commend the efforts of party organs and organizations, especially the kraj and district committees which has a positive impact on task fulfillment through their performance in political, organizational and cadre affairs. They organized a unified approach of party, state, economic, trade union, youth and other organizations, and assisted in the development of worker initiatives. We should also note with appreciation that the kraj and district committees stood firm against unjustified changes in the plan as proposed by certain VHJs and enterprises. The CPCZ Presidium decision that these committees deal with changes in the plan which, for serious reasons, had to be implemented by 15 October, contributed to the fact that many of these changes were not made at all and the enterprises are fulfilling the plan nevertheless. The attention of party organs was also directed at controls of the fulfillment of the internal plan where there are still great opportunities and reserves. Over 20 percent of industrial enterprises are not meeting the plan this year. This requires that many plant committees and basic organizations apply more consistently and without formalism their right of control.

As to the ministries and the economic sphere of management, higher exactingness and effectiveness of managerial and organizational functions at all levels, as repeatedly called for by Comrade Gustav Husak, are still applied too slowly in practice.

Government decisions have not always been transmitted rapidly to the addresses, which resulted in their belated and inconsistent implementation. To this, we should add the fact that some branches and VHJs react slowly, insufficiently organize and control implementation of their own decisions and do not draw appropriate conclusions in cases of nonfulfillment. In the interest of rhythm in production, we must resolve more concretely emerging material and sales problems in production, further strengthen producer-customer relations, make decisions more flexibly, and adapt product assortment to the needs and changes in production wherever it becomes technically obsolete or where sufficient demand for it has not been ensured.

Adopted approaches and results achieved still do not reflect the generally recognized necessity of intensification, savings, effectiveness and quality in production, the need for better utilization of fixed assets and labor,

the necessity to produce from available raw materials, energy and other materials more and higher quality products, ensure faster application of scientific and technological discoveries in practice, especially micro-electronics, modernization of products and technology, higher adaptability of production, and sufficient flexibility in fulfillment of deliveries for export and the internal market. The problem is illustrated, for example, by recurrent requests that as a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the tasks set by the plan, there be higher allocations of raw materials, energy and other materials, capital investment, foreign currencies, labor force and wage funds. Often such efforts, sometimes supported even by party organizations, take up more time than would searching for opportunities and ways, including the mobilization of people, to fulfill the planned tasks. Such approaches by many leading economic officials were encountered again during the preparation of the 1983 plan. This must change; we can no longer pass the responsibility for the resolution of problems from one branch, VKhJ, enterprise or plant to another, we must rather actively cooperate and jointly seek the most effective ways and means for their resolution. Such are the essential prerequisites for successful realization of the 1983 tasks and for the fulfillment of the conclusions of the 16th CPSU Congress and the law on the Seventh 5-Year Plan.

It is important that the process of intensification be firmly managed in order to avoid taking necessary measures only when forced to do so by circumstances, to proceed purposefully and with sufficient flexibility and operational know-how with respect to problems which emerge in the course of plan fulfillment. Only such an approach can produce the appropriate impact. Each one of us must act with the knowledge that the struggle for savings, constant reduction in the consumption of raw materials, energy and other materials in production and in individual products, is not some passing manifestation of deficit and distress operations, but that this represents the legality and logic of intensive development of the economy and the raising of its effectiveness.

This was clearly expressed at the 26th CPSU Congress by L.I. Brezhnev when he said: "The spine of economic policy is represented by a seemingly simple and common consideration--a caring and thrifty attitude toward collective property and the art of full and purposeful utilization of everything we have. On this, we must focus the initiative of worker collectives and party activity among the masses. To this, we must also direct technical and capital investment policy, as well as the system of indicators for planning and accounting."

Lowering the raw-material and energy input in our national economy represents an objective necessity which stems from our economic conditions and in which we can change nothing. It is important, however, for their better utilization to adopt suitable effective measures. We also need a more convincing propaganda campaign to contribute to this goal and to help encourage the thinking and behavior of people toward a search for and insistence on ways for our economy's transition to intensive development.

In practical realization of intensification, there is a vital role for workers in the preproduction stages--in design, construction, preparation

of technology and organization of production, since intensification of modernization and high quality of production, in short, greater effectiveness, must be based primarily on the preproduction stages. This naturally also applies to production proper. We are convinced that in this sector we have tens of thousands of capable people in the ranks of the technical intelligentsia. Senior economic officials, as well as party and trade union organizations must devote priority attention to the development of their initiative, to rewarding according to practical results and contribution, to support such forms as the complex rationalization brigades, the innovators and inventors movement and the effort toward rapid realization of the most suitable resolution of any given problem. It is precisely here that we find the direct link between science and production. Therefore, the work of party organizations during the preproduction stages must be of priority interest to party organs.

The effectiveness of the effort toward a higher level of the valorization process is connected with the quality of norms and standards where we cannot be satisfied with the current state of affairs, since these are the basic instruments of economical utilization of materials, energy, fixed assets and work force.

We placed great emphasis at the party congress on raising the quality and technical level of products, on the processes of innovation because this is the main direction for better valorizing our products on foreign markets, and satisfying our own needs in production and on the internal market.

The current state of affairs shows that despite certain improvement, the share of products of high technical level, quality and modern design among most products is still too low. We can no longer be reconciled with this. It is not by chance that the CPCZ Presidium and the CSSR Government adopted measures toward higher quality input and output control, as well as an improved position for controllers. The purpose of these measures is to see to it that no poor-quality products get past plant gates. This is one criterion applicable to all types of production. Relying on the hope that what we do not sell on the capitalist markets we can use in trade with the socialist countries or on the internal market, is wrong and must be met with determined resistance in both management and party organs.

We must proceed more aggressively in the realization of the state targeted programs adopted by the government, e.g., savings in fuels, energy and metals, as well as better use of secondary raw materials.

Pressures to insist on economy are also enhanced by a planned and targeted movement of wholesale prices of raw materials and energy, the effects of which in the great majority of enterprises must be softened in production. An assessment undertaken of the fulfillment of targeted programs shows that prescribed objectives were reached primarily through the utilization of those reserves which can be mobilized rapidly. We must devote more attention, however, to measures which ensure lasting savings. We cannot be satisfied with the fact that many capital-investment operations prescribed by the state targeted program are insufficiently prepared or the branches are slow

in their implementation. This is a shortsighted approach. The same applies to fulfillment of the savings program in the use of metals and secondary raw materials. As to savings in the heating of public buildings, offices and homes, it is desirable to establish more rapidly prerequisites for the installation of consumption meters and improve the insulation properties of buildings, especially in new construction.

The social screening process of savings in fuels and energy, which is getting under way according to the terms of a CPCZ Presidium, government and ROH directive, is to contribute not only to the task fulfillment in this area but also to developing the initiative toward surpassing the tasks adopted at the ROH congress, i.e., to achieve at least 0.5 percent higher savings than those set forth in the state plan. Everyone must start with the fact that the quantity of fuels and energy will continue to be limited and that the best way to ensure progress in the national economy through an adequate supply of energy is its better valorization and simultaneously precise fulfillment of the program of nuclear power plant construction within the prescribed time limits and in the required quality, especially the introduction into operations of the blocks in Jaslovske Bohunice and Dukovany. These are projects of great public significance and delay in putting them into operation would cause grave complications in keeping the national economy properly supplied. We cannot, therefore, accept the fact that the approach of certain suppliers in production, construction and installation fails to respond to this urgency. These problems cannot be solved through recurrent targeted premiums for repeated failure to meet deadlines, we must rather find the necessary sense of responsibility among senior officials to do everything possible to meet the time specifications.

Intensification of the national economy, the needed structural changes and proper use of science and technology cannot do, as was pointed out at the 16th CPCZ Congress, without close cooperation with the socialist countries, notably the USSR, without gradual integration of our respective economies and application of a unified economic policy. This is the best way to achieve effectiveness and reduce our dependence on the developed capitalist countries in certain important spheres of production. The CPCZ Presidium devotes constant attention to these problems. We actively participate in the preparation of the CEMA countries' consultations at the highest level on economic problems. In the same manner, the CPCZ Presidium assessed Comrade Husak's visits to the USSR and other CEMA countries. Measures have been adopted toward a more activist approach to these problems and toward elaboration of proposals for further progress in this cooperation. Their preparation and realization requires initiative and a creative approach by production enterprises, branches, as well as the State Planning Commission.

At the same time, we are beginning work on the preparation of the Eighth 5-Year Plan and the long-term outlook for the development of our economy. Their quality elaboration demands active participation and close cooperation of the State Planning Commission, the Federal Ministry for Technological and Investment Development, other branches, as well as the Academy of Sciences, and close coordination with the socialist countries, especially the USSR.

With respect to the preparation of the plan for 1984, the State Planning Commission must ensure an approach which will allow enough time for discussion in work collectives and make possible the application of counterplanning, which we consider very important. It will be necessary to give much thought to the approach through which we will assure the work collectives of the certainty that their initiative will be properly appreciated and will not turn against them.

Broad application of counterplanning is a new experience and expression of the initiative of work collectives, enterprises and plants, related to the improved system of planned management in the national economy.

It is an effective form of participation in the struggle for higher effectiveness and quality, for better use of fixed assets, the labor force, raw materials, energy and other materials, for a speedier application of achievements in science, technology, the innovators and inventors movement, and modernization processes. It is, therefore, essential to create good conditions for the application of these initiatives.

What was said at the 16th CPCZ Congress is still valid, namely that progress and better quality in the standard of living do not respond to our wishes but rather to the creation of values. No society can distribute more than it produces. It is impossible to live long on what we possess right now, and we do not wish to and will not live in debt. The only way is increased formation of resources. What we produce, we must distribute sensibly and use in a manner which, in addition to satisfying people's needs, will purposefully ensure further development in the national economy, all of society, as well as in the defense of the homeland.

The living standard will correspond to the results of our labors, expressed in the growth of national revenue. In order to maintain the present standard, we had to reduce the share of capital investment in national revenue. On the other hand, in 1983 we will have to expend considerable free-currency means for repayment of previously accepted credit and the interest on it. For this reason, it is necessary to achieve the planned formation of national revenue and adhere to the direction and proportions of its use. This requires us to ensure that the structure of production and services correspond to these needs, to avoid production which would be consigned to storage. In short, there is a simple equation which applies to our efforts--in order to maintain the living standard, we must henceforth work better and more effectively and under better management than heretofore.

Therefore, due to the limited dynamism of volume growth in wage means, we must adhere to the principle that reward for labor be most closely linked with increased labor productivity, effectiveness, thrift and production quality. This demands that we resolutely overcome egalitarian tendencies, and that the living standard of every worker correspond to his contribution to the fulfillment of given tasks. This presupposes higher quality setting of norms, better organization of labor and within the achieved wage means, in harmony with exceeding planned tasks and reducing the number of employees which, as we know, has not yet been sufficiently applied, raising wages only

for those who produce effective, high-quality results. We should also make better use of the brigade method of rewarding.

Applying the socialist principle--to each according to the amount and quality of his work--will not be free of conflict with those who act as parasites and live off the labor of others, or those who have various types of unearned income. This struggle must be waged daily primarily by economic management, with active support of the party, the ROH, SSM and the communications media. This is a question of socialist justice and we are convinced that we will be supported in this effort by the overwhelming majority of the working people and honest citizens. The negative phenomena related to speculation, corruption and parasitism were dealt with by the government, as well as the CPCZ Presidium, and measures were adopted to make use consistently of all legal means and moral persuasion in the struggle for their elimination. In this connection, the CPCZ Presidium charged party organs and organizations with the responsibility of placing themselves at the head of this struggle.

As we emphasized at the 16th CPCZ Congress, we do not plan for the sake of the plan, nor do we produce for the sake of production, our principal goal is to satisfy the needs of our people and ensure the progress of socialism and its defense.

Our priority interest is always supplying the population with food and consumer goods. It is for this reason that it is so important to achieve success in industrial goods production, agricultural production and the related production of foodstuffs, with the aim of further strengthening our self-sufficiency. The problem is not always raw materials and adequate capacities, it is also a matter of the ability to manage them better and produce goods in which the public is interested.

People will understand shortcomings stemming from objective causes as, for example, a poor harvest, but they rightfully criticize the tolerance without appropriate consequences of disorder and irresponsible approaches of certain workers to the fulfillment of their tasks. This cannot be permitted by party organizations and management organs, and they must quickly adopt remedial measures.

If we assess the results achieved in relation to our capabilities, we must conclude that they could have been better. Not all the difficulties can be blamed solely on objective reasons, especially the situation in the world. It is with this in mind that we are submitting the proposed plan for 1983.

As already stated, our own shortcomings bear a good deal of the blame. This refers especially to the level of planning and management, and the use of science and technology. Management organs from top to bottom cannot be satisfied merely with adopting resolutions, instead they must firmly insist on their realization, energetically organize their fulfillment, control them consistently, and draw appropriate conclusions from nonfulfillment within the prescribed time limits. Overcoming subjective shortcomings and resolution of problems on which we must focus our attention is in our own hands. It enables us to confront the negative impact of external factors and leads

toward application of the strategic policy line of the party more consistently into practical life.

We have found it necessary for party organs to demand from senior economic officials and party members a truly partisan approach to ensuring given tasks, and to insist that they be much more exigent in assessing results and drawing conclusions from infringements of state and planning discipline.

Even the best plans cannot provide a guarantee that the prescribed tasks will be met. For this it is necessary to mobilize and attract people, to increase our mass political and organizational endeavors.

An irreplaceable source of fulfillment and overfulfillment of tasks is informal socialist competition, the movement of brigades of socialist labor, as well as other forms of worker initiative, and the application and wide dissemination of the best experiences. In this connection, we wish to say a word of appreciation for the contribution of the ROH and SSM in lending support to the nascent initiative of the Central Bohemian and West Slovak krajs to exceed planned tasks, the initiative of the North Moravian Karj to use savings for an extra day's production, the efforts of collective farmers and employees of State Farms in the East Bohemian Kraj to exceed milk deliveries, the joint socialist pledges in capital investment construction, the effort toward a more effective linkage of science with production in Prague, as well as the competition being developed in honor of the 35th anniversary of the February victory of the working people.

The exacting nature of the intensification tasks in the national economy by means of applying science, technology and socialist economic integration, can only be compared with past implementation of such programs as industrialization and collectivization. Party experiences from that period are instructive and worth emulating, albeit under different conditions. It is a question of applying a targeted frontal approach, a matter of everyday struggle of the party, state and economic organs, the ROH and the SSM, backed by propaganda on behalf of effectiveness, higher quality, mobilization of people, and development of their initiative toward fulfillment and overfulfillment of their given tasks. It is a matter of determined overcoming of shortcomings, eliminating sloth, self-satisfaction, lack of discipline, parochialism in branches, alibis for nonfulfillment of tasks, it is a matter of fighting for society's interests and needs. In this respect, the party organs and organizations must play the leading role. Toward this end, we need the contribution of a demanding, critical and self-critical course of the annual membership meetings and party conferences, and effective participation of all communists in the struggle for the achievement of prescribed goals.

9496

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ANDROPOV QUOTED IN CALL FOR BETTER WORKER'S LOT

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 2 Dec 82 pp 1,2

[Report by L. Abraham, member of the presidium of the CPSL Central Committee and chairman of the Slovak Trade Union Council, at the CPSL Central Committee meeting: "Intensifying Cooperation"]

[Text] Recent meetings and conferences of basic trade union organizations which took up the results of fulfillment of plan quotas, collective agreements and socialist commitments and also statewide conferences of brigades of socialist labor [BSP] repeatedly confirmed that our workers understand the requirement for comprehensive growth of efficiency of the national economy which is the basic requirement for maintaining the living standard achieved by our workers and consolidating their social security.

Therefore, we are emphasizing and, together with the SSR Government, are asking for the closest possible cooperation among state, economic and trade union bodies at all levels of management, especially in the VHJs [economic production units], enterprises and plants.

At the SOR [Slovak Trade Union Council] plenary session in October of this year we approved joint procedures of the SSR Government and the SOR, state, economic and trade union bodies for ensuring the tasks of the Seventh 5-Year Plan. Before that, there were joint meetings where a broad spectrum of questions concerning the economic and social development of Slovakia were discussed. The results and experiences of cooperation thus far lead us to the conclusion that joint discussions and procedures of the SSR with the SOR are forming conditions for purposeful collaboration and cooperation between state, economic and trade union bodies at all levels of management. We also agreed on the fact that a permanent program of these joint discussions must also include matters of concern for workers, safety and health protection on the job, the working and living environment, transportation of workers to their jobs, plant eating facilities and the provision of health and other services.

The URO [Central Trade Union Council] also considers this kind of cooperation of unions with state and economic bodies as an effective means of raising the level and effectiveness of union work. Mutual cooperation must, however, be as specific and explicit as possible. Specific goals of this cooperation, uniform procedures, specifically

directed responsibility and joint procedures and measures that are binding, together with a method of high demands are fundamental conditions for extending, intensifying and improving mutual collaboration and cooperation in production as well as in comprehensive concern for workers.

Communists in the SOR support the executive plan for development of Slovakia's economy in 1983. At the next plenary session of the SOR, we will submit a proposal for adoption of the position agreed on. In it, we will commit ourselves to giving special attention in particular to the development of creative work initiative and participation of workers in management.

In the SOR position, we will repeat our request that managing state bodies of VHJs and industrial management of enterprises and plants create the necessary conditions for intensifying worker participation in management. This year again there was no broader participation of workers in preparation of the plan for the next year. We call attention to the fact that the principles of internal enterprise khozraschet, counterplanning and participation of workers in the creation, execution and supervision of plan fulfillment are slow in being applied.

We cannot, after all, be indifferent to a whole range of repeated critical comments of workers about inadequate conditions for uninterrupted and high-quality work, which include particularly lack of preparation for production, irregular flow of materials, raw materials and semifinished goods, and shortages of spare parts, tools and equipment. For some years now, responsible management personnel have not been responsive to workers' criticism. Also important are critical voices about the organization of extra shifts on Saturdays and Sundays and overtime when often the smooth flow of production on normal workdays is not provided. At the Slovak congress of trade unions, our Comrade Hoffmann properly called attention to the fact that unions in Slovakia gave greater attention to scientific-technical developments and scientific-technical intelligence. We fully support the decision of the party Central Committee that a meeting devoted to these issues be held as soon as possible.

In the interest of maintaining the workers' current standard of living, we ask for systematic resolution of the continuing material and organizational problems in supplying the population with food products and other items of everyday use. Supplying the domestic market has taken a falling, worsening turn. We should take note of developments in housing construction and the assignment of newly built apartments. How many of them are given to workers? There is a lag in modernizing our housing assets.

The draft plan does not call for any kind of extensive wage provisions in 1983. Here too, pursuant to the SOR position, we remind our government that the earnings of some of our workers have not kept up with current living expenses and that in particular the required differential is not being given.

Real wages of workers are falling in construction, on state properties, in domestic trade, in motor vehicle transportation as well as in the local economy. All this is worth thinking about by our Central Committee.

Following the sense of the 10th All-Union Congress we will extend the creative efforts of workers in honor of the 35th anniversary of the February Victory. Trade union bodies and organizations fully align themselves behind the main goals of society in monitoring conservation of fuels and energy as organized on the basis of the decision of the Presidium of the party Central Committee. After all, this is carrying out the initiative of the 10th All-Union Congress to achieve a savings of one-half a percent.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yuri Andropov, in his program declaration at the Central Committee meeting said, among other things, that increasing the activity of workers is the current most important task of party committees, Soviet bodies, trade unions and Komsomols. He emphasized that success depends on purposeful collective work of the Central Committee, on the ability to concentrate the activity of party, state, economic and trade union bodies and all worker collectives on the key issues.

This fact is correspondingly emphasized also in the resolutions of the Seventh Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee and in the closing remarks of its general secretary, Comrade Gustav Husak. We must adapt to current demanding conditions and intensify the implementation of the leading role of the party and its right of control. Only in this way is it possible to carry out the worker policies of the Communist Party.

8491

CSO: 2400/82

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ANTIAIRCRAFT ROCKET LAUNCH EXERCISE DETAILED

East Berlin AR--ARMEERUNDSCHAU in German No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 1 Oct 82)
pp 60-65

[Article by Lt Col Karl-Heinz Otto: "Launch! A Ground Forces Air Defense Rocket Races Toward Its Target--Lt Col Karl-Heinz Otto Describes All That Is Needed Before It Rises Skyward"]

[Text] Almost effortlessly the Gazik off-road vehicle climbs the dried out sunken road up to the command post. On the dumping area the antiaircraft rocket regiment has spread out. Combat training--say the orders of the regimental commander. A dress rehearsal before the inspection.

There is still one week's time until then. The regiment resembles an anthill. Over here a few summer flowers are quickly set in the earth, over there a curb is painted white. . . Well, alright, the colonel thinks, in the end our state of training, our combat readiness is being evaluated.

To be sure, everyone has used the last months well. A great deal of energy, attentiveness and industrious study were needed ahead of time to grasp the electronic circuits, to train hands and brains. They were increasingly able to blend the many complex units of heavy equipment and their combat technology into a troublefree run through. From week to week the practical training results had stabilized. In fact, during the last training sessions with the entire complex, they had attained their stated objective of demonstrating repeatable results in combat training at any given time.

Still, even given the stability in mastering skills, this final self-check was important. It had to summon up the nerves and energies of the specialists once more, concentrate on the essentials. Without these efforts, great performances are unimaginable.

"To the technical battery!" the colonel orders his driver. "We'll start there." The commander can see from afar that the mechanics have developed their assembly, fueling and testing technique into a technologically smooth run, that the preparation of the antiaircraft rocket is in full progress. "I'll follow a rocket from station to station and observe the mechanics closely," he thinks.

With practiced motions, carefully and rapidly, the soldiers pull the heavy lengthy missiles out of their containers, fit them with wings and stabilizers. A fitter is already hanging the rocket on strong steel hawsers. The crane operator lifts the heavy projectile onto the retaining flanges of a special transport vehicle.

At the other stations the colonel observes how the soldiers apply pyrotechnics, fill the rocket's tanks with fuel and compressed air. They are fighting against time: the stopwatches and the watchful glances of the trainers cannot be deceived. Even more attention is paid to the quality of the actions than to following prescribed times exactly. Finally, the rocket is hooked up to the check and test station. For the last time on the ground all the on-board systems are checked: the electrical and electronic, the hydraulic and the pneumatic. Now it is essential to measure and check with the accuracy of a watchmaker. When the colonel leaves the comrades at the technical battery, he knows he can rely on them. The meticulously prepared and tested antiaircraft rockets will find their target without fail.

"To headquarters," the commander tells the driver. He is interested in the training of the radar operators. He has the driver stop at one of the imposing looking radar location stations, with its widespread rotating antennae. These observation stations are the "eyes and ears" of the commander. With their assistance the well-trained radar operators are the first to discover enemy aircraft, helicopters and other missiles. They can monitor the air space for a distance of more than 100 kms with their radar stations. The soldiers cannot allow a single mistake, not the slightest inattentiveness. To a crucial extent it depends on their skill, on their uninterrupted alertness whether enemy aircraft, with their deadly load of bombs or rockets, could possibly approach our troops unnoticed or not.

The regimental commander observes the calm and concentrated work of the radar operators for a long time. Aircraft are recognizable as tiny bright spots of light on the screens of the panoramic equipment. One target is moving particularly fast. Faster than sound. "New target. Group target with four aircraft. Azimuth 270, distance 150 . . . --Target setting. Target zero eight at 190--85," the operator's voice reports in a monotone. The operators relay number after number in this way into the microphone. They do not notice that the colonel has left. He closes the door of the radar station, certain in the knowledge: 'No target can escape my operators. They are in full command of their technology.' The radar locating troops at the scanning stations will always identify aerial targets in time, it says in their competitive programs.

The journey continues to the antiaircraft rocket batteries, the colonel did not have to give his driver the order. These firing units decide the battle with the enemy in the air. The batteries contain extremely complex technology: rocket guidance stations and launch ramps, the latter loaded with the antiaircraft rockets.

The launch ramp teams carry out a practice loading for the commander. A transport loading vehicle has been driven up close to the launching ramp. Skilfully, a mechanic extends the job on the special crane. Quickly, other soldiers attach the traverse to the body of the rocket, and then comes the order "Lift the rocket!" To the exact millimeter it is set down on one of the launching rails of the ramp. The traverse is unhooked and the release is rapidly moved away. The transport vehicle is already driving back to the limber site. "A very good time," the commander had asked for a stopwatch and praises the precision work of the team.

Final stage: the rocket guidance station, the "heart" of the complex. The operators sit in front of the electronic screens with attentive faces. They constantly watch the needles in the tolerance fields of instrument scales, changing color codes from indicator lights and illuminated warning boards. A red signal flashes: "Target indication!" Instantly the operators switch their attention from the control instruments to the screens. Controlled electronically, the antennae of the guidance station swing to a point in space where an "enemy" aircraft is located, approaching our troops at high speed. The electromagnetic impulses are reflected from the aircraft. On the screens the operators see a green radar echo. This point is brought into alignment with an aiming mark. "Target locked in!" calls out operator #1. Now the target is being tracked automatically by the rocket guidance station. It cannot escape. The next report is coming through. "Target in destruction zone!" The battery commander presses the launch button. . . . But everything remains quiet. This launch of an antiaircraft rocket is a simulation.

Pressing the launch button was the final link in a long chain of connected operations. None of them was secondary, none more important than any other. The anti-aircraft rocket complex is a weapons system that only works when each combatant--whether he is in the technical battery, at headquarters, in the scanning stations or in the antiaircraft rocket batteries--performs his tasks conscientiously and reliably. In previous firings they have proved their ability: hits with the first rocket. Grades of A and B.

While the commander was watching over the shoulders of his soldiers and NCOs in the hours just past, he was also filled with energy and confidence. "Actually, the inspectors could save their time and omit their visit. Our regiment is combat-ready," he says with a laugh to his driver, as their Gazik returns to the barracks.

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CSO: 2300/105

'PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE' CONDUCTED BY SOLIDARITY ANALYZED

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 11, Nov 82 pp 34-40

/Article by Col Professor Dr Habilitatus Leslaw Wojtasik: "Psychological Warfare by Underground Solidarity"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in source/

/Text/ The strategic aim of the leadership of the underground Solidarity is to bring about a confrontation with the legal authorities. This is to result in either the overthrow or a modification of socialism in our country in such a manner as to shape the state in accordance with the concept formulated in the resolutions of the Union's first national congress. In the program discussions under way in the illegal publications of underground Solidarity varied concepts for accomplishing this aim are presented. The discussants are in accord on one thing--only confrontation with the legal authorities can be accepted as a tactic of action by the underground Union.

The implementation of such a confrontational program requires creating a particular and favorable social atmosphere. It must be an atmosphere of excitement, discontent and general social destabilization as expressed in negative public moods. In this connection--in the opinion of the extremal leadership of Solidarity--all kinds of propaganda and psychological activities should be undertaken in order to cause such a situation.

Such a program of action is simply indispensable considering that the legal authorities do everything (of course, within the limits of political reasonableness) to bring about the country's social and economic stabilization and strengthen law and order in the interest of public calm. Such is the program of action of the party and government and it is being consistently implemented as regards all institutions of the state. Of course, in a crisis situation it is difficult to solve rapidly all the urgent social problems.

The stabilization of public life in Poland is inconvenient to the leadership of the underground Solidarity, since it decisively conflicts with its confrontational aims. Hence, they attempt to act so as to complicate, retard and, wherever possible, impede the process of stabilization. This aim is to be chiefly accomplished through the destabilization and inflammation of public moods by means of various activities bearing the earmarks of psychological warfare. This is the kind of war that the underground Solidarity has declared against the party and the legal authorities. However, it is the public in particular that suffers

the consequences of this war, being upset by various demonstrations and psychological measures causing a feeling of being threatened. These are the direct consequences.

Psychological warfare by the underground Solidarity also delays the process of the country's social and economic stabilization, intensifies public moods and undermines trust in Poland as a partner to international agreements. This, above all, is the aim of the extremists under the banner of Solidarity.

The events at the end of August and during September provided an excellent illustration of the fundamental premises of the underground Solidarity's psychological warfare. However, the situation was exceptional.

The extremist activists leading the underground failed to organize on a mass scale manifestations and strikes last May. Their scope and intensity were definitely smaller than planned. This made the leadership of the underground Solidarity apprehensive about losing the support of that part of the public which had committed itself in favor of the Union and accepted its illegal activities. It thus became urgently necessary to organize a spectacular action that would demonstrate to the entire public that Solidarity functions and operates in illegal structures. Of course, to avoid another failure, the action had to be thoroughly organized. Hence, the preparations for the August demonstrations began already toward the end of July. The Provisional Coordinating Commission /TKK/ at that time announced its appeal for the organization of "peaceful" demonstrations on 31 August. It was then, too, that the propaganda machine of Radio Free Europe started operating in support of the illegal domestic centers. The psychological warfare against the nation and state was conducted quite intensely.

There was one other important reason. At its session on 21 July the Parliament declared a platform for national agreement in the form of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth /PRON/. This presented a major threat to the confrontational plans of the underground Solidarity, since it provided and still provides a real possibility for stabilizing the situation in this country on the basis of a national consensus. It was thus necessary to inflame the public mood and initiate propaganda distorting the Parliament's intentions and discrediting the authorities before the court of public opinion. This was an important reason for intensifying psychological warfare to the maximum possible degree.

Main Directions

The principal directions of the propaganda of the underground Solidarity coincide with those of the Western radio stations broadcasting programs in the Polish language, especially the RFE. The propaganda activities of these two organizations are mutually complementary and mutually supportive. Never before in the history of postwar Poland had the foreign and domestic anti-socialist centers operated in such a symbiosis.

The principal direction in which all the information activities of the underground Solidarity are focused is /the creation and intensification among the public of

the feeling that Poland is an occupied country/. Exploiting the fact that German occupation has left as yet unerasable memories among the older generation, the political underground attempts to equate Hitlerite occupation with the current martial law in Poland. This is chiefly done by using a particular vocabulary (the occupation, the underground, concentration camps, Fascist, collaborator) and providing an information service that produces the impression that absolute terror reigns in Poland. This is a perfidious and amoral technique, but it is in accord with propaganda activities employed in psychological warfare.

Another direction of action is /disinformation with the object of inflaming the public mood and sowing unrest/. The situation in our country is slowly stabilizing. This is best proved by the consistent and far-reaching curtailment of the rigors of martial law. Work in plants and institutions is returning to normal. This is definitely not to the taste of the leaders and wire-pullers of the Polish political underground. Hence, the objective of its propaganda centers is to provide diversionary information consisting in the disinformation of their audience with the object of stimulating and maintaining unrest. This objective is promoted by providing news on incessant tensions in various regions of the country, on the ongoing organization of the underground Solidarity. Fabricated information on repressions and persecutions, written in a blood-chilling style, is being disseminated. All this serves to keep alive moods of anxiety and uncertainty about the future, with the object of complicating the stabilization of the domestic situation.

An important place in the underground Solidarity's psychological warfare is occupied by /individual and collective psychological terror and pressure/. Persons committed in favor of socialism in Poland who publicly declare their commitment as well as party activists and officials of the government receive various "death sentences" or written warnings. Such warnings also are transmitted by the telephone. Various insulting signs often are painted on the doors of their dwellings. Illegal flyers recommend to Solidarity activists the preparation of "lists of collaborators," which is a version of the well-known proscription lists. More refined techniques also are employed, such as active boycott of actors and other members of opinion-generating milieux. These actions are conducted in a typically street-thug manner that is fairly often quite drastic.

The propaganda and information activities conducted by the underground Solidarity as part of its psychological warfare indirectly implement the important task of /demonstrating the constant presence of the Union in the nation's socio-political life/. This goal is best assisted by spectacular actions which attract public attention, perturb people and involve them emotionally. Such a function is best exercised by manipulated street demonstrations on the occasion of various anniversaries, and on no occasion at all as well. In such cases the leaders of the underground Solidarity do not expect the political effect to be commensurately large. What matters is the psychological effect, the demonstration of the presence and strength of Solidarity. Appropriate manipulations serve to launch the thesis of the public's mass support for the actions of the underground Solidarity.

Such are the main aims of this psychological warfare, implemented in various ways. The attack is selectively directed against the social and occupational-professional groups that constitute or should constitute the pillar of law and order.

Attack on the Forces of Law and Order

The underground Solidarity aims particularly important attacks against the ZOMO and the Security Service. Any means to this end is good, and lies accompany nonsense and ridiculous fabrications. On analyzing the material dealing with this topic (which is particularly extensive), definite objectives of this propaganda can be discerned as a pattern, because all the "information" concerns the following "problems":

- special training of the ZOMO in "the art of torture";
- indiscriminate and brutal nature of action of the ZOMO's detachments;
- the application of special means to encourage ZOMO personnel to act brutally;
- the repulsive character of the individual member of the ZOMO.

It is precisely these "problems" that the various publications of the underground Solidarity "work on" ad nauseam on resorting to evident lies. All the pertinent "information" is so designed as to contain a high emotional charge as well as an element of cruelty outside the bounds of normal human behavior.

In TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE (No 18, 1982) we find the following "training description" relating to the ZOMO:

/"During the training of ZOMO functionaries at the Warsaw "Nowotel" the officers show how beating should be done. Pregnant women should not be beaten in the presence of other people and "puppies," i.e. children; young people should not be beaten in the presence of their parents; and in no case should beatings be performed in the presence of foreigners and journalists. In general, everyone should be beaten so as to lose consciousness as rapidly as possible, since this makes it difficult to identify the person who does the beating."/

/"One of the exercises at the ZOMO school in Pionki near Radom consists in that ZOMO personnel in combat gear move past densely aligned rubber mannequins installed on springs. This is done under the accompaniment of a loudspeaker's cries 'Gestapo, Gestapo.'"/

One thing cannot be denied as regards the experts on propaganda at the underground Solidarity--imagination. The impression is produced that they would make good fantasy and science fiction writers. One cannot also resist the impression that these are ideas which might be applied in practice by somebody else and under different conditions.

The descriptions of maltreatment to be experienced at the hands of the ZOMO would gratify more than one author of textbooks on forensic medicine. They are, moreover, exceptionally thorough and naturalistic. These descriptions verge at a pathological obsession. Broken heads, gouged eyes, fractured extremities, blood, blood and once more blood--such are the intrinsic ingredients of these descriptions provided (it cannot be otherwise) by eyewitnesses. This has a definite

purpose. This concerns prompting not just contempt but even hatred toward ZOMO units, because they are most often encountered by demonstrators and other individuals violating martial law regulations.

According to the authors of such reports, ZOMO personnel operate under the influence of drugs, most often ephedrine, and of course alcohol. The illegal bulletin INFORMATOR published in Lublin by the southeastern region of Solidarity (No 21, 1982) contains the following description of ZOMO functionaries who took part in restoring order in Lublin on 4 May:

/"Of course, they have a high, as earlier they were pumped up with ephedrine whose effect was moreover magnified by a generous dose of alcohol. On their heads they carry helmets for street combat. Beneath the helmets are plastic face visors which completely conceal their features."/

Such descriptions appear in all other publications of this type.

Such propaganda is consistently intended to impress on public opinion the stereotype of a ZOMO member as a kind of human monster. Below is a little description presented by Voice of America (3 March 1982) on the basis of the text of a flyer supplied from within this country:

/"The ZOMO personnel were under the influence of drugs. They were transported in cages to the mine and, immediately after they accomplished their mission, locked in cages. I saw one such man close up. He wore black overalls, gloves with spikes imbedded in them, as well as in the back and front of the overalls, along with a visored helmet. He was very tall with a black beard, crazed eyes, and he emitted some inarticulate sounds. I even thought that they were not Poles."/

It is difficult to find a more infantile and at the same time harmful depiction that disregards the facts. But facts are of no importance to the needs of psychological warfare. What counts is the manipulation of the emotions of bamboozled people.

Almost all reports of such kind are based on common lies. This has been proved more than once. Because such reports trouble the public opinion, they are thoroughly verified by appropriate institutions. These lies have been unmasked a couple of times in DZIENNIK TELEWIZYJNY on the basis of concrete facts.

The weekly DER SPIEGEL (19 July 1982), basing itself on information derived from such illegal publications, published yet another "horror" report on Poland. The documentary-seeming text on the terror spreading in Poland names six dead victims of that terror. On verifying these documents a journalist of TRYBUNA LUDU (6 August 1982) demonstrated their mendaciousness and the manipulative nature of these reports, designed to upset public opinion.

In its program of 13 July 1982 Radio Free Europe broadcast the following news item:

/"An attending physician at the dispensary of the Military Technical Academy, Ewa Lukaszuk, on crossing a street on 5 May began to provide aid to a young man lying bloodied on the roadway. A ZOMO patrol appeared immediately and began to beat her with billy clubs. Her protestations that she was a physician produced no effect. Only after she began to shout desperately that she was the wife of an officer in the Polish Army, they stopped beating her and asked her for her identity card. After she identified herself, she was released."/

This news was disseminated in the form of flyers by the Underground Solidarity, scattered on the streets of Warsaw. A reporter from TRYBUNA LUDU followed this news up and talked with Ewa Lukaszuk. She denied categorically that such an incident took place. She had never had any contact with the ZOMO.

Similar instances of lies could be cited in much larger numbers. They are the main element of the manipulative propaganda furnished to society as part of psychological warfare being organized by the underground Solidarity. The aim of these activities is to discredit the organs of law enforcement and weaken the state's domestic law and order machinery.

The illegal publications present in a completely different manner the average functionary of the Security Service. He is a cultured, educated and even pleasant individual but ideologically "hard-line" and very efficient as regards the procedures for interrogation and extortion of all kinds of confessions. During August, in several successive broadcasts, RFE offered a "series" of programs under the title "Post-December Notebooks," advertised as a text smuggled out of Poland as part of cooperation with underground publishing houses. Below is a description of the SB [Security Service] functionary, taken from that text:

/"They are well-read, educated. They take special pleasure in discussing recently confiscated books. Some of these gentlemen even are cultured and have rich book collections and read KULTURA [Polish emigre literary periodical published in Paris] regularly. They are familiar with all illegal publications. They cite [Czeslaw] Milosz from memory."/

Of course, gentlemen with such a cultural level cannot resort to force, cannot be brutal. Accordingly, they focus their intellects on devising refined techniques of psychological torture in order to force a confession. Suitable examples are presented.

Thus, it turns out that these gentlemen are more ruthless and brutal than ZOMO personnel.

The interrogations take place in a coffeehouse atmosphere. We read in the text: "At the [SB] offices one can readily drink coffee and smoke a quality cigarette." In a word, high culture and politeness. All with the object of dulling the alertness of the poor victim being interrogated and forcing him to speak out frankly."

This is another element that is repeated in many underground publications with only a few details being altered.

The general impression is that the various texts concerning the activities of law enforcement organs are tendentiously and deliberately intended to liken them to those of the "German occupiers." Their construction is such that they unwittingly recall scenes from films and books dealing with the German occupation. This is a deliberate manipulative operation which, among the Polish public, has great chances for success. This is because only a small number of citizens are in direct contact with the law enforcement services, while a much greater number read about them in illegal publications or hear about them in RFE broadcasts.

The Stigma of Collaboration

One of the techniques of psychological warfare employed by the underground Solidarity is the attempt to disseminate judgments on the cooperation of certain individuals with state institutions, in the sense that it is branded as collaboration. Standards for defining who can and should be called a collaborator and who still cannot are being provided. As usual, Radio Free Europe comes to the aid. In the broadcast "Attitudes of the Public Toward the Authorities," disseminated on 5 July 1982, Piotr Jarecki provides extensive inferences in this respect, though he rather poses questions than gives answers. Jarecki has problems, because: "/...a precise definition of the term 'collaboration' is not easy. Cooperation with the authorities--but after all everyone is compelled to have daily contacts with representatives of the authorities, at work or when attending to the most elementary formalities. Total boycott of the authorities," Jarecki states sadly, "/is impossible as it would require isolating oneself from life./

/"As known, collaboration means cooperation with the authorities, but doubts exist as to the moment at which that cooperation commences.... Is the publication of an article or granting an interview to the official press an act of collaboration regardless of its nature, these days? If it is, which publications should be boycotted? These and many other difficult questions confront that part of the public which is professionally engaged in public activities."

The author of the broadcast does not, in any case, answer the questions he asks, leaving their interpretation up to his audience in Poland. On the other hand, he believes that it is not an act of collaboration to receive payment for poor performance of duties in the institutions at which one works. In his opinion, /"...receiving a pension from the state does not impose on anyone the duty of loyalty toward the authorities."/

A declaration by actors of the stage and screen [sympathizing with] Solidarity (TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE No 18, 1982) provides a more precise definition of "collaboration." It offers the following formulation:

/"Since the principles of the boycott elicit doubts, let us inform those who do not wish to find their names on the lists of collaborators that an actor who appears in a film shot by a director-collaborator automatically becomes a collaborator himself. A director who hires an actor-collaborator for his film automatically becomes a collaborator, too."/

The author of the article "Dotting the 'i,'" published in TYGODNIK WOJENNY (No 24, 1982) appeals for treating collaboration and collaborators in the same manners as during the period of Hitlerite occupation.

The basis for evaluating a particular individual as a collaborator is to be his attitude toward the "codes of behavior" elaborated and published in the illegal publications. The bulletin INFORMACJA "SOLIDARNOSCI" (No 42, 1982) published a whole set of such codes: for actors, musicians, scientists, reporters, etc.. They are catechisms of passive resistance toward the legal authorities.

It is characteristic that the term "collaboration" is to be applied chiefly to the artistic and opinion-shaping communities, that it is to be of a spectacular nature making it amenable to exploitation for propaganda purposes. Most often, an official or a worker who performs his duties well is not a collaborator, but an actor or someone who appears on TV can be considered one.

Of course, the definition of "collaboration" in itself settles nothing from the standpoint of Solidarity's psychological warfare against the authorities and the public. It is necessary to create mechanisms of individual pressure on people so as to restrict if not to impede their cooperation with state institutions within the scope defined as collaboration by the illegal Solidarity.

This aim is promoted chiefly by "lists of collaborators": printed in the illegal publications. It is characteristic that they include primarily party activists in work establishments. The bulletin INFORMACJA "SOLIDARNOSCI" (No 57, 1982) contains a "list of collaborators" naming PZPR members from the Warszawa Iron and Steel Plant. The bulletin SOLIDARNOSC--SPOJNOSC-FSO (No 7, 1982) similarly treats party activists at the Passenger Car Factory [FSO]. The next group to be most often included in "lists of collaborators" are actors. TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE (No 18, 1982) printed a "list of collaborating artists of the stage and screen."

Anyone, even against his own intentions, may find his name on a "list of collaborators." This is proved by examples taken from the rubric "Deeds and Words Shall Be Recorded," conducted by various illegal publications. Below are examples of "collaborators":

--a physician who gave aid to ZOMO personnel;

--a member of Solidarity who founded a Citizen's Committee for National Rebirth [OKON];

--two women who refused to read illegal publications;

--a government official who ordered expunging hostile graffiti.

It is symptomatic that such a "list of collaborators," which gives their names and addresses, is clearly in the nature of spreading individual terror.

The same aim is served by various declarations warning against collaboration. The aforementioned declaration by Solidarity actors of the stage and screen warns against participation in the shooting of the second part of the TV serial "The House," on the grounds that that serial "...deals in a dishonest manner with the problems of the postwar Polish generation." Actors who do not listen to this warning are threatened with dire consequences.

Such actions do not always produce the expected results. Hence they are reinforced with other forms of exerting individual pressure such as demonstrations during the performances in which a "collaborator" takes part or the staging of disturbances during these performances in some other manner such as the discharge of malodorous chemical substances in the Warsaw Komedia Theater.

If this does not help, the actions get escalated. "Death sentences" are mailed, telephoned threats of beatings are made, the doors of the dwelling are painted red, etc. This is typical psychological individual terror.

The thus interpreted collaboration as a technique of psychological warfare by the illegal Solidarity fulfills two basic aims. On the one hand, because of the pressure exerted and out of a fear of consequences to the individuals affected, part of the creative intelligentsia, actors, etc. limits or abandons cooperation with state institutions. This is not necessarily always due to ideological considerations: ordinary human apprehension and fear also are factors. Operating with a thus interpreted collaboration is an element in stimulating a negative public mood in general and prompting a feeling of menace and uncertainty, which complicates stabilization of the situation. The curtailment of the cooperation between opinion-shaping strata and the authorities by means of psychological pressure is not an end in itself but a means toward a more general end.

Adventurist Manifestations

A spectacular expression of the existence of the illegal Solidarity, and a form of pressuring the authorities, is the varied street demonstrations. Attempts to organize them were not much successful last May and June. Hence, the leadership of the underground Solidarity decided that, in order to produce better results, the organization of these demonstrations in August would have to be perfected. The basic task was to coordinate them on the national scale and subordinate the initiatives of local elements to national goals. In his "Open Letter to Solidarity Members" Wladyslaw Frasnikiuk writes:

/"The number and variety of the forms of public self-defense being organized are very large, but I believe that protest actions, and especially street demonstrations, that are scattered and uncoordinated on the national scale are ineffective and hence also inexpedient."/

This idea was elaborated in BIULETYN DOLNOSLASKI (May 1982) as follows:

/"There is an urgent need for launching informational and organizational activities with the object of coordinating and meshing protest actions throughout the country. Demonstrations are a higher form of the struggle. This is the most effective

form, since it spreads not only to large plants, as in sit-down strikes, but also to all active forces of society."/

These centralist tendencies remain in the sphere of theory. The fact is that so far not a single nationwide demonstration could be organized. Press reports indicate that there exist, so to speak, permanent centers at which demonstrations recur. The August demonstrations also, instead of spreading throughout Poland as their authors had intended, recurred at these very same centers.

We observe tendencies toward developing manipulative social-engineering techniques for organizing all kinds of demonstrations so as to confer on them the guise of spontaneity and a mass nature.

The first organizational stage consists in properly organized information activities. In view of the limited public reach of the illegal publications of Solidarity and the difficulties in the distribution of flyers, the pertinent information function is being taken over by Western radio stations, which almost incessantly broadcast information on the time and place of demonstrations to come and appeals for "mass participation" in them. These activities are most often of a provocative nature, since they prompt the illegal Solidarity to take action and upset public opinion. The share of Western radio stations in preparing the August manifestations was particularly large. Never before had such an information-oriented pressure on their part been observed. The provocativeness of these actions was immoderate. The impression was produced that everything was being gambled on them.

This is accompanied by the commencement of appropriate organizational and "logistical" preparations which consist chiefly in the selection and appropriate briefing of a group of provocateurs who are to organize "spontaneous" manifestations in designated places and imbue them with an appropriate tone by making hostile outcries. The "logistical" preparations consist in--as evidenced by recent examples--not only the accumulation of an appropriate number of national flags, banners and slogan-bearing boards, but also the preparation of effective gear for active combat with the law enforcement services. This refers chiefly to the procurement of bottles filled with gasoline as well as of various kinds of crowbars, clubs, etc.

It is the moment at which the "spontaneous" manifestation begins that is the most important. As known from experience, despite numerous appeals and summons and the precise designation of time and place, few people arrive of their own volition to take part in an illegal manifestation. The organizers are aware of this. Hence, a group of provocateurs most often organizes manifestations at a place and time when a large number of persons are likely to be present. The manifestations so far have been organized on squares and streets, in front of churches toward the end of prayer services, in front of work establishments, etc. They are started by provocateurs who, shouting "Come with us!" encourage others to join them in the manifestation. Slowly, groups of emotionally stirred young people and lookers-on appear. All this taken together can be propagandized as "mass participation."

A Warsaw student, an activist in the disbanded Independent Association of Students /N.Z.S./, who is linked to the conspiratorial structures of Solidarity, told a POLITYKA reporter (No 29, 1982):

/"Each of the four regions of demonstration has its own on-site director who is to direct the demonstration. The groups subordinate to him have a twofold task. In the event of an intervention by the ZOMO, they are to neutralize the effect of the Militia wedge being driven into the crowd. Within the crowd are 'uncles' responsible for disarming Militia personnel."/

/Teams equipped with gasoline-filled bottles and explosives stand watch outside the area of the demonstration. Their mission is to prevent military and Militia reinforcements from reaching the site in the event of public clashes./

/"The central site of the demonstration is to be Plac Defilad Square, on which Romaszewski is to give a speech. The combat teams are resolute and their mood is that of preparation for an uprising."/

Thus, manifestations of this kind cannot be disregarded, since they display the extremely dangerous character of uncontrolled spontaneity. This is the deliberate intention of their organizers. The point is to hurl a spark among the crowd which turns it into a chaotic destructive mob. The demonstrating crowd most often does not know where and why it is marching. For most often the objective of the march is not identified. Thus, one of the main factors serving to organize and--insofar as possible--discipline the crowd is not at hand. The purpose of the provocateurs is to emotionally stir the crowd and let the events run their natural course in the absence of any control.

The organizers of demonstrations are perfectly aware of the consequences of such a proceeding. The crowd turns into an unthinking, destructive and relatively uncontrollable mass. The actions of such a mob produce extremely spectacular "made-for-TV" effects. This precisely is the main aim of the organizers representing the leadership of the illegal Solidarity. The point is that such manifestations are not so much a tool for exerting real pressure on the authorities as a weapon in the psychological warfare intended to disrupt the public mood and sow unrest.

To strengthen the propaganda effect, the bulletins of the underground Solidarity advocate with a tenacity deserving a better cause the erroneous thesis that supposedly the street excesses taking place in our country are attributable to... provocation by the authorities. Such a thesis runs counter to common sense. For what would be the purpose of the authorities in provoking these incidents? It is rather public order and tranquility that are in their well-understood interest. All incidents operate clearly to the disadvantage of the authorities and make it difficult for them to exercise their basic functions.

In this case, too, we observe a certain "information matrix" that is duplicated again and again in reports of such kind. A group of people gather with the object of a "peaceful manifestation" (it does not matter that it runs counter to martial law); the manifestation runs its course without incidents; but then follows a provocation organized by a group of unidentified individuals which

prompts the security organs to intervene. The outcome of the provocation may vary. In a flyer entitled "A Note Concerning the Events of 3 May," scattered in Warsaw, contains the following description:

/"Eyewitnesses credibly state that groups of civilians led by and remaining in constant contact with Militia officers appeared in advance on the streets surrounding Stare Miasto [Old Town quarter of Warsaw], and that next these groups--with some of them bearing symbols of Solidarity Union--joined the crowd of demonstrators. Similarly, during subsequent clashes many civilians were seen shouting and encouraging others, especially young people, to continue the disturbances--and subsequently crossing over to the side of the security forces. Some of these civilian functionaries arrested the very same young people with whom a moment previously they shouted and marched against the uniformed militia."/

Zbigniew Bujak states as follows in a declaration printed in TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC (No 17, 1982): it is the business of the authorities /"...to instigate the formation of secret armed organizations in the academic community, and to transport to Warsaw, through the mediation of the ZOMO, crates with weapons left by the Germans."/

In a word, the authorities are organizing provocations against themselves and complicating their own functioning for themselves. Such a thesis is designed for simple minds.

The "Culture of Martial Law"

Any means of destabilizing the public mood is acceptable. Illegal publications print all sorts of "folk songs and ballads" relating to the times of the [German] occupation and treat of martial-law events in the same emotional tone. These clumsy texts are immediately repeated and popularized by Western radio stations. RFE broadcast on 20 July 1982 an extensive program entitled "Polish Poetry of the Martial Law Era" which quoted in toto several such poems along with appropriate commentary. Czestochowa rhymes were promoted to the rank of a political manifesto and designated as "outstanding achievements of the culture of the martial law [era]!" The illegal Radio Solidarity chose as its call signal a well-known song from the times of [German] occupation.

These songs, reproduced by various courtyard orchestras, may contribute to a resurgence of the "occupational atmosphere" and thus negatively influence the public mood.

Such symbols as the national hymn also are being used to destabilize the public mood. In July and August 1982 the "Solidarity Hymn," a clumsy paraphrase of our national hymn, was circulated in the form of flyers in Warsaw. Below is a sample of its text:

/"...Poland is not lost yet--So long as we endure here--We shall win our freedom--by the cross and strikes....We shall win our freedom--by the cross and strikes--because Zbyszek Bujak taught us...how we are to win....A free Fatherland--without prisons and the military--will be entered, region by region--by Polish Solidarity...."/

Such a profanation of the national hymn has caused feelings of outrage among the public. Even so, the "Solidarity Hymn" as well as a new version of "Rota" are being sung in certain Warsaw churches during prayer services.

It is characteristic of psychological warfare that it knows no moral restraints. All means are good so long as they help achieve the end. The underground Solidarity fully applies these manipulative principles of propaganda.

The strategy and tactics of the underground Solidarity represent a continuation, under changed conditions, of the program outlined at its First National Congress. Its basic goal is the struggle against the socialist state, a confrontation with the legal authorities. The most important task is to restore the situation to where it was before /martial law was declared on/ 13 December 1981. This is the strategy and tactics of a "hard-line" course against the party and government, of rejection of any basis for national agreement. In this struggle the experience of Solidarity in manipulating the public by social engineering techniques is being widely utilized.

Such a confrontational program of action does not stand a chance of being implemented. This is realized even by its creators. However, their goal is to sow social unrest and exacerbate the crisis in our country. The disintegrating activities are conducted according to the rule "maybe success will come." The course of events of a certainty demonstrates that it will not come. This leaves the question: but at what price?

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TEXT OF RECORDED UNDERGROUND SOLIDARITY MEETING PUBLISHED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 3 Jan 83 p 4

[Text of discussion by former Solidarity activists in hiding: "Voices from the Underground"]

[Text] Last week Polish Radio broadcast a program titled "A Transmission from the Solidarity Underground", consisting of recordings of the utterances and discussion of a group of activists of underground Solidarity. The program included: a conversation by Zbigniew Bujak with a certain activist of the underground movement in a highly secret location where he is hiding; the second tape is a fragment of a clandestine meeting of members of the so-called Solidarity Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK); and the third part of the program was made up of fragments of a meeting of the Solidarity underground aktiv in the Gdansk region. Bogdan Lis, head of the Gdansk conspiracy, presided at these deliberations.

These are indeed voices from under the ground, the voices of people who lost touch with reality and continue to dream up insane plans for general strikes, disturbances and boycotts.

They know that they lost, that society rejected these plans, and that they are now outcasts, and isolated. They fear ridicule and are calling for the concepts of honorable surrender. And still they cynically plot methods of future struggle, how to entangle workers into oppositional activity, and disrupt work in plants and factories.

They call for resistance and think about how they can absolve themselves of all blame. They propose some kind of truce to the authorities, as if they were the side dictating the terms, while they cannot even muster a count of 200; they still want to push the youth into a struggle; they dream already not of a second Japan but a second Ireland, while they are taking vows for the good of society; they want to be a moral force but applaud the misappropriation by one of them of 80 million zlotys.

This is a document of the downfall of those who, under red-and-white banners, wanted to drown the country in chaos. And still, despite the unconcealed sense of their own defeat, do not lose hope that they will do this.

Everybody knows that the entire ideology of the struggle of these people against their own State came from the political prompting of KOR [Committee for the Defense of the Workers], KPN [Confederation for Independent Poland], and the various advisors, who with the help of Solidarity wanted to implement their own antisocialist plans.

Bujak and Lis, as the recording shows, attempt to comment on some kind of program documents, which the prompters are still producing. But in calling for resistance they can no longer conceal their own weakness and impotence. And, for that matter, their disbelief in any kind of success of these plans.

This is the account that Polish Radio broadcast. We have shortened it in a few places.

First, the chairman of the Mazowsze region, Zbigniew Bujak, replies to questions.

--We have talked so far about what a strike victory would be like, but how do you see, how do you foresee the situation if we were to lose this strike, if it were either not to succeed as we would want, or if we had to give in. Well, everything that is called a strike defeat. What then? What are the prospects that one part of the activists will be able to escape, just as in the case of "December".

--Well, it can be said like this, that what will happen after a possible strike failure will depend in large measure on certain actions which we take now, or, for example, what we talked about, which is not contained in the TKK documents, but what we talked about in the discussion, that we should go in the direction of forming, right at this moment, certain social institutions that have authority, that can in every situation continue activity.

However, I think that the final defeat, the failure of the strike, will be proof that in general the whole line of political behavior of society requires some change. And that is what we should think about now: what kind of change. I would call the present line a line of social transformations in a purely social sphere. We are interested in what is changing in the economy, in the functioning of different organs, etc. Yet we continue to be very far and on the sidelines from conducting actions, political activity, strictly speaking in the functioning of the political parties, different directions. And it can be said now that if our line were to lose it means that the conduct of social actions, the attempt to apply social reforms without a strong political backing, may not have a chance. The conclusion from a lost strike may be that in the next stage there should be formed, for example, two strong parties: one peasant, one workers--this may be a renewed Polish Peasant Party, some kind of renewed Polish Socialist Party, something of that type--and then after these parties got strong support, this could, in combination in turn again with actions in the area of social reforms, only then could this give the strength that could break through with reforms in our country.

--But these parties about which you are talking would be illegal, I understand.

--Yes, yes. They would be a great force, but they would be illegal. I am somewhat passing over this situation, I still don't know what the final conclusions, how far-reaching, should be drawn from this situation. I imagine here that in such directions an attempt should be made to seek an out.

--Aren't you afraid that the failure of a general strike may create such enormous determination in groups, in small groups, that there is a real danger of terrorism, for example, or other forms of combat actions, of a combat nature.

--In general, one of the arguments for making a decision on a general strike is also this argument, that it gives a certain vision as to the prospects of further struggle with the present situation after delegalization and in connection with this naturally it restrains immediately from this type of action. However, indeed, after a strike is lost these type of actions can simply become a fact. Terrorism for any society is probably not a good solution and this should be feared, but in this case it could become a fact. How effective this type of activity and policy would be it is hard to say. In Ireland things are somehow.

* * *

--What does underground mean, in general? What is the extent of the underground, how many people?

--The first thing. In our situation there were several hundred people, except that those who came out of hiding have to be subtracted because as a rule those who came out didn't do anything in this underground except hide. That is, those 250 people who, according to statistics, came out should be subtracted. And there remains a number on the order of... well, I don't know how many. If in the Gdansk region at this moment there are a maximum of 20 people who are active and are hiding, and if we multiply that times 10, let us say, 10 centers, that gives us 200 people. I think that up to 200, because, for example, a lot fewer are hiding in Krakow. And the proportions become unbalanced, different things such as: much greater hopes, surprise that this is not functioning like it did. That is the first shortcoming. I think that we must now begin to talk on the subject of the possible solutions that the date of the 13th may supply. I think that the most probable solution is amnesty, letting everyone out. Here I think that we are underestimating the authorities and their poker plays. They already played two such hands and I think that they are capable of a third. In my opinion, they will release everyone and put KOR on trial. I think that this model is the most probable one.

--I am afraid that the right to intern will remain.

--I think that really WRON [Military Council for National Salvation] could have a long time ago given up this martial law, retaining only two elementary basic laws. One is the right to intern, detention for 48 hours, how long, finally, can the SB [Security Service] play hide-and-seek with a citizen, they grab him for 48 hours and then they're supposed to go looking for him again? No, the right to intern is very convenient. I think that the internment decree will be retained by the Sejm [parliament] for some time. It is, first of all, very advantageous. The second law is on the discretionary suspension of any organizations or societies, but the rest the authorities can forgive and just retain these two prerogatives. For

practical purposes, the rest are unnecessary. In my opinion, for sure they will repeal the internment law and for sure they will abolish the militarization of factories and plants. Regardless of what happens, there will be an alleviation. And what should be done in this situation? I believe that using the methods characteristic for the intellectuals, we will not be able to preserve Solidarity in the workplaces. That is why I think that in the workplaces we should generally call attention to the economic side. That rather this union should be more of a union in this situation, i.e., on the economic side, economic revindication, revindication of work safety and health. We can, after all, not strike, because I know that people are tired already, but we can demand observance, a secret plant commission can organize people to see that work safety and health conditions are being observed. That we have not done, and if the management does not come to terms with the secret plant commission then this commission does not call for a strike but calls for observance of health and safety norms and the work comes to a halt, or at least in some departments. We should fight with this type of weapon. We must make economic demands, get that done, and organize people around that.

--But how many of us are there? Basically the authorities can lock us up without any large repercussions.

--Maybe.

--We are a threat only while we are free. If the authorities lock us up no one will speak up for us for the next two years.

--I think that we simply must tell the people the basic things, that the coming out from hiding of the underground is first of all not the coming out of those people who acted, but those who did not hide and went about normally. Coming out of hiding is to be based primarily on this, that people are coming out who hid while they were acting. That is the first matter.

--Oh, you are so smart, but we are not so stupid.

--Coming out of hiding, what does this coming out of hiding mean?

--Let me finish and then you can talk further. First of all, we do not give up the equipment, well, yes, but we have to tell the people that, my dear.

--Then on what basis do you want to come out of hiding?

--People will come out of hiding. Activities, equipment, places of residence, nothing, will be revealed.

--Listen, there will surely be a proviso, that statements, testimony, of course, are necessary, and resources, printing resources.

--Printing resources. Some printing plant, where we paid something, did my printing.

--Please, then who was this?

--I don't have a contact.

--You don't have a contact? And they're supposed to answer.

--They're supposed to answer.

--One moment. You're weaseling. You have not come out of hiding with the printing means; after all, they are not fools.

--Well, I know that they are not fools, I simply won't say, I won't tell and that's that.

--You come out of hiding together with the printing means and the union assets.

--There are no assets. Can you see Pinior giving back 80 million.

--He already spent 80 million.

* * *

--Let's begin, tell us about this TKK, etc., and comment on the statement. Why this statement and not some other.

--Well then, the first statement.

--...only don't read.

--No, I won't read. The first statement looks like this. Everyone probably knows it, of course, there's no need to read it. First of all because past activities...

--Try to use complete words, complete words into the microphone.

--Don't interrupt me. TKK came to the conclusion that in the present situation, under the present conditions there is no likelihood of reactivating the union, even in the next few months, that there is no such likelihood. Which does not mean that there is no chance at all, maybe not for reactivation, but in general for an independent organization, for the creation of an independent union organization. But at this moment there is no such likelihood. The actions thus far did not fulfill the tasks in the sense that they did not bring about the obtainment of what TKK wanted -- first of all because society is getting tired of the types of campaigns we've organized thus far, that is, demonstrations and strikes. The example here is the 10th and the 11th, when the demonstrations were not successful. We also came to the conclusion that the situation after Lech Walesa's release, after talks with the Church began, after the date of the pope's visit was announced, in a certain sense created a new situation--the underground would not have the importance at that time as it has now, and also one cannot say that the conditions that the authorities create in lifting martial law, that these conditions are exactly those that are important to us, because that is not so. Therefore, we are simply stating clearly that without reinstatement of this union, without a restoration of a possibility of some kind of independent action by trade unions, there is no agreement. That that, which at this moment may be, is only a marriage of convenience, or something like an armistice, a truce, which does not mean that the struggle for Solidarity should be abandoned. If the conditions for a truce, if a truce is to be really a truce, then despite everything certain conditions must be created, there must be a certain minimum. Therefore, that which we

have listed here: release of all political prisoners, reinstatement of all organizations and societies, those that were legalized and are suspended on the strength of martial law. Next, the law on censorship, which has not been repealed and was not changed, and was passed during a period while Solidarity still existed. We demand simply that this censorship law also be reinstated so that the press in a certain sense can write independently...

--Excuse me. Isn't there a mistake here, because TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY is already taking advantage of these rights...

--No, absolutely not.

--And writes when a text has been deleted, where...

--Well good, but that is not what we are talking about. Except that it is obvious that what we have here is written so that it can be further developed, because, well, we realize that not everything will be accomplished. It isn't as if, that all of this..

--Well, I understood the discussion here, I understood that that is why we are setting these goals as high as possible, simply so that society...

--This will be impossible to accomplish 100 percent.

--But you see that there isn't even a word here about reactivating Solidarity.

--No. Yes, of course. That is why a truce and not an agreement, and the demands are really so that society, so that people in general, should associate this truce and the suspension of martial law with concrete measures. These, among others. If the authorities don't do this, then there will be a certain unsatisfied need, and this will not be the need of the TKK, but the need of simply the people. So as not to conduct this struggle as we have thus far, that is particularly... Bujak insisted here that we not put this struggle on the authorities-TKK plane, but on the authorities-society plane. So far we have not been able to do this because everything was regarded like this, that if something did not succeed than TKK lost, not society, but TKK. That, in short, is it. Later some questions if there are any.

Second--on calling off the protest campaign during the week of this December protest, this was motivated, among other things, by the fact that we are striving to enter into this truce, that we agree to this truce on specific conditions and therefore don't want before that, before there is a definite answer yes or no, whether we are to regard this as a truce. We don't want to create a situation which puts us into negative positions from the start. A change in operational tactics is necessary, however, since demonstrations and strikes, although not obsolete, are still not something that people can decide on easily. We believe that there should be demonstrations on the 16th, maybe not demonstrations, we will simply call these homage-type manifestations.

--No, this was simply to be a day of remembrance.

--Therefore we must change the tactics of operation. What else. Insofar as the third statement is concerned, pertaining to Walesa's release. The main point here

was the elimination of all kinds of speculation on the subject of the relationship TTK-Walesa, Walesa-TTK, Walesa-the underground. Hence this and not some other statement. Particularly since we are, in a certain sense, handing him a weapon saying that the Coordinating Commission will disband only at his request, that he is supposed to specify the conditions, whether the conditions that the authorities fulfilled are sufficient to ask the TTK to disband, to appeal to the TTK to disband. That is, in a certain sense, does something else with a private individual [as published].

--I already spoke to Walesa about this.

--Have these documents been sent?

--No. You know I only appeared here today.

--One moment. Nevertheless, the words--we are ready to abide by the decisions of Lech Walesa--you spoke in your own name, and not in the name of society.

--You joined them together in your name and here I would like to call attention to that fact that the talk here is about disbanding, and not about coming out into the open. So that the continuation of activity is the private matter of each of us.

--I would really like to know what these new forms of struggle mean?

--This is a statement saying that that what has been has in a certain sense lost value, and demonstrations and strikes now are no longer supported by society--there is no social acceptance for this type of action. And so we must act differently. In this case, this can be regarded as a form of struggle, or, in general, as a new form of action that is, among other things, that these statements, that first of all we changed our position on the matter of an agreement on whether we can with the authorities, that we can conclude a truce. Up to this time we have taken the principal position, saying that there is no agreement with the authorities, that it is not possible to come to terms with the authorities, that the authorities have ruled out everything. And our actions went in that direction, because everything was "no", in the negative form. Now we want to say "no" but in a positive form for some period of time. No one knows what will happen next, but these last decisions, including the release of Walesa and letting the Pope into Poland--I believe that this authorizes us to also say "no", positively. In a positive form.

--Wait. I will cut in here because you have evaded the question. I think deliberately, that is, that you are not able to answer the question because nobody in the government will answer these questions.

--At this time, no.

--And I know why, I will try to suggest why. Namely, in this particular fragment about these new forms of struggle this fragment seems to imply a certain fundamental division, in my opinion, not in the sense of a division as such, only a certain divergence of opinions within the TTK itself. And this implies, because it is like this: there is a group in TTK who wants to come out of hiding immediately, and there is a group that wants to remain on its post to the end. And now, this group, which means, let us say, this opinion, perhaps, this opinion which said, which proposed

that actually we must conduct the matter in such a way that the release of Walesa should be interpreted as a positive. that we, after these facts, are counting on a truce, etc. This opinion, as it were, advocates a statement in the mildest tone, without any forms of struggle. With this there will be, appear, as you remember, both... Well, good, good, but anyway we are not now calling off the week of workers' protest--it was this week that was supposed to be a element in the preparation for a general strike in the spring. Does this mean that we are calling off the general strike?

--No.

--Well then, no. You know and here it has happened that actually as a matter of fact we are already going for a truce, which clearly shows that there will already be, if such conditions, there will be a truce, on the other hand somewhere there is that prospect of a general strike about which nothing was said and note, that there is nothing in the text about a general strike and whether we are supporting it or not. This means, it seems to me, that simply, that these new forms of struggle without specifying what the result is of this, that there were two opinions within TKK, which to the very end, as a matter of fact, it was not possible to merge.

--Bujak and I mainly collided. But what is important here is that basically under these circumstances it is hard to say, to predict how this will go further. It cannot be said because these forms of struggle will be different if TKK comes out into the open, if TKK disbands entirely. But if TKK disbands and this will take place based on other principles, different if it does not disband and will continue to function. It is hard to say at this moment how it will be, and these forms of struggle will depend on that. There are ideas, those long-range actions ensuing from this program, which you read. There is a change there already. I already have a new program here.

--The final version?

--Yes, the final version. That means it has not been accepted yet, but the final version of this program group. And this is a program that foresees the situation that TKK is disbanding. This is a program foreseeing the dissolution of those bodies which exist at this moment, not the disclosure of structures, but the dissolution of those coordinating bodies and putting the main thrust of pressure on community organizing and resistance through community organizations.

--I think that regardless of whether the underground structures disband or not, new forms of struggle will have to be found anyway. Certainly for me the disclosure of structures, the disbanding, disclosure of underground structures, is the end of Solidarity. And now, can we conclude a truce with these authorities? You spoke about a truce, but to me this is actually surrender. If you agree with me that the repercussions will be precisely like those that I presented, the disclosure and dissolution of underground structures, and the coming out of hiding, then there will be such repercussions in the plants, in the organizational structures in the circulation of information--this is capitulation. And there is no point here in bragging to the people that this is a truce, that we will do this...etc. This is simply surrender. We come out with raised hands. There is no point in dreaming that we will be able to take any kind of action and achieve such a degree of organization as we have at this moment. We can't make any movement, for on one

side are the authorities and on the other side the clergy and the Church dictating, and next society, which is tired and did not support the protest. So I believe that there should be no hurry to come out of hiding. Why? Because coming out into the open, disbanding of structures, is truly the total collapse of Solidarity as an organization. It will be hard to restore this later. There is no sense in being a Don Quixote, because that is what it will come down to. I think that we are in the situation that we are because of the mistakes that we made after 13 December. I believe that we had an opportunity to restrain these authorities, the last opportunity was in October. We did not take advantage of this. We did not take advantage for different reasons. Not because we were unprepared organizationally. No, not because of that. But because we did not have, that we did not believe that there was a possibility that we would win. We could have, of course, lost, we could have lost, but I think that the opportunities were not taken advantage of and because of this, for not taking advantage of the opportunity, we take the same responsibility as we would if we had lost.

In a situation in which people are coming out of prison, in a situation in which Poland, despite everything, despite these legislative changes, which, of course, change this situation greatly, and in which the only way, the only method of acting is actually only underground activity, in this situation we will be pushed, in reality, into the background. Of course, a part, a certain part of society, we will still be able to stimulate into action, but actually this description, which at this moment is entirely improperly applied by the propaganda, but also not only by the communist propaganda, the uncompromising extremists, will begin to be at least partially adequate to the situation, that the main current of the events will take place on the extreme edge of national life, beyond us. And then what will remain for us? We will be left with an attitude, anyway we must tell ourselves that here also a certain personal determinant will come into play, that is the frustration of the people, who are trying at any price to reverse the course of events without regard for the costs which society will have to pay because we want to get out of this situation. Because conspiracy measured in years is a prospect, which in any case, holds little appeal.

--If we now add to this the general atmosphere, listen.--that is, in general a certain mythomaniacal, I would say, style in the underground which is based on this, that everyone, out of some kind of new contact, says that he has 5,000 plants and a whole heap of printshops, and in a conversation on how something should be increased, then there is nothing there. Slowly the underground more and more imperceptibly, faded into the background. Maybe it was not like that, maybe I am mistaken, but it seems to me and here I now refer to this last TTK document, that Zbyszek [Zbigniew] Bujak had the same impression. That means, notice, how he very clearly emphasized in justifying this coming out of hiding, etc., how he very clearly emphasized that he is afraid of ridicule. That is one thing and he is afraid of being regarded as overly ambitious, one who will go at all costs. And it seems to me that this situation, on the one hand the defeat of the 10th, on the other hand the feeling, that is, as a matter of fact, we are saying so in order to cheer ourselves up, that we are so strong, that we have so many accommodations, so much equipment, so much... And, as a matter of fact, it is not so bad, but it is not as splendid as it would seem.

--Zbyszek was concerned about something else. What he was really concerned about is not to be ridiculed. Indeed he spoke about a social base, about apartments, etc.

He spoke about the moment when some kind of conditions are fulfilled, people are released, Walesa or the Church approaches the TKK to come out of hiding and a certain division occurs in the union, except that at this moment, of course, everything is not, that there are no luxuries and there are no apartments, this, too is making everything very trite, putting all of this on the apartments, no... And he was concerned about the fact that in this situation this social base will become still smaller. And in connection with this he was afraid of ridicule. Even if 40 percent or 50 percent of what we now have remains, there will be such a drastic decrease in the social base--anyway, at this moment all of society is not acting, only certain specific groups, specific people, are acting, those who decide to do this.

--Zbyszek said that the base is decreasing for him already now, not at the moment of coming out of hiding...

--But he is changing these tactics, because for us, too, it is decreasing, but due to arrests. After all, all of this is a struggle, they too are seizing people. Taking on new ones, however, is always a certain risk, because first, the people are inexperienced, and second, that there always has to be some kind of reference or certification. And that is what Zbyszek was talking about. We are not as efficient organizationally as we should be if we were actually to want to conduct a struggle with this authority, a serious struggle, that is, not to shoot but to strike at various cadre groups, true, there are a number of things which there is no sense in mentioning here.

--The greatest opponents of political activity for a person are actually in his home, and as a rule these are his mother and his wife, who say: if they throw you in jail, no one, but no one, will speak up for you.

--It seems to me that a little...

--Wait, that 10 November showed an unequivocal certainty I would call--a fiction of the underground. A fiction of the underground, because I, if I want to do something, will do it anyway, and if I don't want to, and this is exactly what the 10th showed, no appeals, no detailed instructions on how to arrange a strike or a demonstration, will help. And here, as if for the first time, a very clear moment occurred, that actually, as a matter of fact, the TKK and the regional bodies are beginning a little something somewhere, society no longer obeyed. We will say that we did well. The myth of an underground fighter will spring up, that we are good... our friends will encircle us, and as a matter of fact and also new struggles and now maybe others can work because I have to take a rest. You understand, I am saying, that the failure to realize that we made a couple of mistakes may lead to a position of a hero, who comes from out of the underground, you understand, and actually as a matter of fact, you can take it from there.

--Maybe not.

--Of course, such a position is threatening. That is understandable and I don't want to say at all that if this stage of the struggle were to end, for me personally, with honor, that is, not at the price of something that I would consider to be unworthy, the fact that I would not feel a certain sense of relief simply is very ordinary, human, but in this more important matter I do not agree with you. That is why I really believe that we did not lose the case, conducting activity after 13 December. That is, without making excuses for the mistakes, neglect and other matters

which were evident here, which we can list here day after day some kind of inaccurate assessments. If the TKK group were really made up of people of solid character and also with great political minds, then I think that they also would not be able today, that is, the day that it is, bring about a situation in which the Solidarity union would be reactivated.

--I would like to know whether you believe, whether you think, that even a reactivated Solidarity, if it were possible to bring about a reactivation of Solidarity activity, was to be only a trade union, that is to concern itself only with workers' matters, or was this to be a Solidarity like it was before.

--But this is a totally different problem.

--This is not another problem, because a social movement is being talked about...

--...Another problem.

-- For you another, for me no.

--Reactivation means reinstatement, and what we are to do is another problem. When it is already here.

(In the New Year's edition of our newspaper we published a review of the Polish Radio program "A Transmission from the Solidarity Underground". The above text is a tape recording from this program.)

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FINANCIAL, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLISH SPORTS DISCUSSED

Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 31 Dec 82, 1-2 Jan 83 p 12

[Interview with Marian Renke, chairman of the Main Committee for Physical Education and Sports, by Andrzej Martynkin and Janusz Zwan]

[Text] [Question] The end of the year is a time for summing up. So, let's try to rate how things went during the 1982 sports year.

[Answer] It was a very difficult year for sure. I realize that that is not a very original answer, but in this case it is a highly appropriate one. In January a lot of us were wondering how it was ever going to be possible to bring life back to normal in the sports world, whether and how it would be possible to cope with the calendar of scheduled events, and rebuild contacts and take part in international sporting events. There was a lot of uncertainty and anxiety. At the end of 1982 and beginning of 1983 we can probably say with good reason that the sports world has protected itself, managed to find a role for itself under new conditions, and, what is more, reaffirmed its vitality and values. We were not broken.

[Question] What do you regard as last year's biggest success?

[Answer] You can talk about this from various standpoints. There are some general things, but there are also some specific accomplishments. Generally speaking, I think the biggest success was the rapid restoration of normal working patterns in the sports world, especially right after the beginning of January.

[Question] But what about athletic accomplishments?

[Answer] Let's take a look at this question with the aid of a few statistics. During 1983 world championship games were played in 12 Olympic sports disciplines (a total of 144 games). One hundred twenty six Poles took part in 82 of these games. They won five gold, six silver, and three bronze medals.

In terms of European championship matches, also in olympic sports disciplines, 99 games were played, and 114 Poles opened in 76 of these games. They won five gold, four silver, and 10 bronze medals. This record is no worse than that scored during the year preceding the Olympic Games in Moscow. On the contrary,

it can even be said that some slight improvement was made. However, I still would not want to read too much into this claim. We might be making a mistake if we were to try to draw a direct parallel with the situation prevailing at that time and say that, since we are faring no worse now than we were before, we are going to do just as well in Los Angeles. We would be deceiving ourselves to look at things in this way. This is because there are many other factors which do not allow for this kind of calculation. The Polish Olympic team in Los Angeles will be much older, whereas the team that represented us in Moscow was one of the youngest teams.

Also, in Los Angeles we are going to have a look forward to a lot stiffer competition than we faced in earlier Olympiads. All of these factors combined mean that the management of the GKKFiS [Main Committee for Physical Education and Sports] and the Polish Olympic Committee is going to continue to look at things in a very sober and realistic light. This is because we could make no greater mistake than to succumb to euphoria. Because, even though the statistical record is not all that bad, the fact remains that there were no major successes in the sports world as a whole.

[Question] Especially since we made it to world championship finals in only a few disciplines.

[Answer] If it were not for our wrestlers and weightlifters, everything would have looked a lot different.

[Question] Speaking about successes, we should not overlook our soccer players.

[Answer] As far as public relations implications and general public interest are concerned, you would have to rate soccer as our number one sport, although in purely athletic terms wrestling most assuredly winds up in first place. But all of us still remember that month when we were sitting glued to our radios and TVs almost nonstop. This is a success of such enormous importance in both the sports world and non-sports world that I do not hesitate to give it the highest priority.

[Question] Let's move on to less pleasant matters.

[Answer] The current problems we are having in getting enough equipment represent a setback and the biggest danger facing the sports world. Next year we are going to have to address the athletic equipment issue, in terms of its production and distribution, as our number one problem. The events of the past year were the last warning bell on this issue. It is not money or facilities, but rather the equipment problem which is actually the biggest stumbling block standing in the way of the advancement of athletics. This is a problem which is felt everywhere. On the other hand, when it comes to specific accomplishments, there were more than a few setbacks. Things did not go well for us in the world pentathlon championship. I felt sorry for what happened in Rome to such outstanding athlete as Janusz Peciak.

The situation in the field of light athletics has to be viewed as cause for special concern. The European championships were not only disappointing, but they also confirmed that the crisis in this area is deepening and in a broader sense than just in terms of the preliminary finals in Athens.

For some time now we have been witnessing a shrinkage in the scope of this discipline coupled with the ever poorer showings of second-string team members and the direct backups of first-string team members. During 1983 and the years ahead we on the Main Committee want to pursue a policy which assigns a much higher priority to the field of light athletics. We must put it in a specially favored position, since it is a fundamentally important athletic discipline.

[Question] Based on what you have said, Mr Chairman, it would seem as though we can be rather pleased with our performance in competitive sports. The money is there, equipment will be found, and Olympic training centers have been established. But we are also interested in athletics in the most general sense of the term.

[Answer] Competitive sports cannot be allowed to overshadow the situation in the realm of physical education as a whole. During 1982 we made a number of decisions geared toward the promotion of physical education. We have provided all associations and organizations concerned with amateur athletics such as the People's Sports Unions, the Society for the Promotion of Physical Education, the School Sports Union, and the Student Sports Union with major additional funds to be spent on the training of instructors, organizers, and referees. We have appropriated considerable sums of money for the construction of simple sports facilities in housing projects and the construction of sports and recreational centers at the gmina level. These programs will continue. We are expanding the network of centers which rent out athletic equipment. We realize that at the prices which are currently charged only people who are well off will be able to afford to buy even the most common kinds of athletic equipment.

So, things have not reached the point where the prospects of how we are going to do at Los Angeles and other major sporting events are going to make us ignore the problems of amateur athletics.

[Question] Apart from those which you have already mentioned, what other kinds of problems need to be resolved quickly? In other words, what is the GKKFiS working on right now?

[Answer] On a law on physical education. The time has finally come to define the role played by physical education within the context of the social and legal systems. This is almost a historic undertaking for physical education and sports. I would like to take this opportunity to stress that it is a total misconception for anyone to view a draft law in this area as a threat to the public character and autonomy of the athletics movement. The intent of this law and the actual changes proposed are totally at odds with this perception. In the first few months of 1983 the law will be submitted to the Sejm. I already talked about the athletic equipment problem, so let's skip that topic.

[Question] But what about intramural workplace physical education? Right now this is likely a problem that needs some quick solutions.

[Answer] That is just what I wanted to talk about. Athletic activities have depended to a large extent on the donations made by workplaces. Drastic changes occurred in the last 2 years. Trade unions are no longer a source of funding. Workplaces, which are self-managing entities, are also withholding contributions in support of athletic activities. This poses a serious danger. We have submitted certain proposals made by the government, but in this area not all problems can be solved at the national level. In essence these kinds of problems will have to be settled in the workplaces themselves. Sports activists must also take action to present their proposals to workers in order to back up claims for coming to the aid of Society for the Promotion of Physical Education clubs and other organizations.

We are entering the new year which precedes the year of the Olympic games. This confronts us with certain responsibilities associated with the training of the teams which will represent us. A program for the final phase of this training program has already been accepted and ratified.

[Question] It is our opinion that action needs to be taken to bring the stipend system more into line with current conditions. Given current prices it is hard to feed a family on 8,000 or 12,000 zlotys a month. The old "under-the-table" payrolls and make-believe jobs are coming back. Are we going to tolerate the present state of affairs or make the system more realistic?

[Answer] In the very near future some decisions will be made aimed at raising stipends by a large margin. We foresee stipends going up by 50 percent. We are also proposing that stipend levels should be set by the chairman of the GKKFiS with the consent of the minister of finance and the minister of labor and that these stipend levels should require the approval of the Council of Ministers in each and every case. In this way we will react more flexibly to price and wage trends.

In addition, we want to make it possible for first-string teams--with world championship ratings--to be awarded certain additional bonuses by the chairman of the GKKFiS. This should help to limit the degree to which other "solutions" are resorted to.

[Question] Does this not in other words amount to professional sports? Maybe the time has come then to think about the formation of professional sports teams, at least in selected disciplines. What good does yet another fiction do us?

[Answer] I think that what we are talking about here is a certain term of reference, a term which is viewed as representing a solution or almost some kind of magic formula that is supposed to provide an answer to our problems, but without fully realizing what this term really means.

The stipend system represents a solution which puts the competitive athlete in a clearer position and makes it possible for him to participate in sports and for that matter on the very highest level where such activity could not otherwise be reconciled with the holding of a regular job. I think that this is what needs to be done in our social environment. The worst fiction is when

the attempt is made to pretend that a person is holding a job and at the same time playing, let's say, in the first league or that a person is holding a job and is at the same time an Olympic champion in light athletics.

Professionalism means something else. This is what happens when an athlete becomes part of a system that is a sort of business, a system where money plays a critical role in the field of athletics as well. This all has to do with the role played by wealthy team owners, the enormous role played by advertising and so on. How is it possible that all of these things could be transplanted into our social and economic environment? I believe that as far as our sports world is concerned this kind of professionalism represents no solution. Not only for doctrinal reasons, but also for the most practical of reasons.

[Question] In 1983 in the field of light athletics so-called licensed matches are going to be introduced for participation in which competing athletes will receive officially sanctioned payment. Not only Poles, but also contestants from other socialist countries are not allowed to participate in these matches. It is rumored that a decision to "boycott" these matches was made in Havana at a meeting of chairmen representing the main committees of the various socialist countries. Is this true?

[Answer] It is true that this was discussed in Havana. How could there have been any doubts about this? It is feared that this might pave the way for the professionalization of sports, first in light athletics, and in view of the role played by light athletics this could lead to more far-reaching consequences. Consequently, it was decided that, as it is presently formulated, this proposal is still unacceptable as far as we are concerned. Further talks will be held on this subject with the directors of the IAAF.

[Question] Since we are on the subject of money, we wonder what is going to happen to the money derived from soccer-player remittances or the income earned from participation in events such as the recent soccer world championship games in Spain?

[Answer] All of the money which is made by participation in sports, either through remittances or fees for participation in sporting events, is deposited into accounts of the GKKFiS or the Polish Olympic Committee and as such represents hard currency at the disposal of our athletic organizations. To be sure, we cannot spend this money however we want to, since, like everyone else, we too are subject to the general fiscal laws of our country. For example, we cannot import foreign goods in excess of the quotas granted to us by the Planning Commission. On the other hand, we can draw on these funds to pay the costs of international contacts. Owing to the fact that we have accumulated all of these funds, the question of free control over the hard currency earnings of Polish athletes has become a topical issue. Starting in 1983, we ourselves will be responsible for paying all hard currency expenses, primarily those associated with our participation in foreign preliminary finals. So, athletics will be one of those sectors which will be able to pay its own way. In saying this we at the same time want to obtain more freedom from the minister of finance in deciding how to spend our hard currency resources.

[Question] In this regard does GDDFiS support the emigration of coaches? Are questions being raised as to whether we can afford to lose these professionals?

[Answer] The dimensions of this problem are very often exaggerated. Based on what one reads, one might draw the conclusion that our coaches are emigrating in the thousands and that all of our really good coaches are working abroad. Meanwhile, as of the end of November 1982, the number of coaches working abroad amounted to 77 persons. Most of this foreign travel took place with our consent. We have agreements for this kind of travel with many countries, e.g., Mexico, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, and so on. There are also some coaches who are working under contracts entered into on their own initiative, contracts which we later approved. Our plan for the future is that this process should be controlled, and not spontaneous.

As far as the best coaches are concerned, we will approve their decision to travel abroad for 1 or 2 years at a moment's notice as long as this does not jeopardize a given sports discipline and provided that we conclude that a given coach deserves this sort of bonus. It was in accordance with this principle that people like Klemens Roguski has spent time in Greece and Janusz Tracewski will be going to Belgium.

[Question] Not so long ago there was a lot of talk about around 100 coaches going to Libya. Is this really going to happen?

[Answer] The Libyans did respond positively to such an offer, but no specific followup talks were ever held and the matter was dropped.

[Question] Audits were conducted in several sports unions, and quite a few of these audits produced hints of scandal. Have any of these suspicions been confirmed, and are transgressions to blame for any of this?

[Answer] In a couple of cases certain irregularities were brought to light, and decisions have been made on ways to correct them. For example, in the case of the Polish Cyclists Union there were 27 instances of irregularities in accounting for foreign contracts. Seven persons were required to repay a certain amount of hard currency. The Polish Karate Union sent five instead of eleven people to Budapest. The union president had to repay the travel expenses difference. Several irregularities were discovered in the performance of the business management board of the Polish Yachting Union.

There are more such cases. In the case of every union which was audited the precise nature of such irregularities was determined. In each case our audit office made appropriate recommendations. However, there were no cases so flagrant in nature as to require the removal of union officers from their positions. Things like this have happened in previous years. Nor can one rule out the possibility that such things may happen in the future.

[Question] Martial law has been suspended. Is it possible that this might have some impact on the policies of the GKKFis in the area of international contacts? Is it not true, after all, that in spite of everything these contacts were seriously restricted last year?

[Answer] During 1982 (counting 11 months) we still had more than 1,300 contacts with foreign institutions, and that is quite a lot. During 1983 our foreign contacts will continue to be managed on more or less the same basis as they are now. Poles will be competing in all of the most important sporting events such as the world and European masters championships, provided that they continue to represent appropriate levels of performance. We are especially interested in exchanges with the socialist countries. We will continue to make careful studies of all proposals inviting rookie sportsmen to participate in international competitions. We must also make cutbacks on the number of foreign associations trying to set up exchanges which will not be paid for in hard currency.

We consider it to be a success that there has not been a single case where international contacts have been prevented due to lack of funds wherever such contacts were warranted for athletic reasons. We have pursued and we will continue to pursue a cost-conscious policy, but the lack of funds is not going to cause any interruptions in our main schedule of events. This is the truth, and I think that not enough is being said about this. There are countries where sports fare the worst in a recession situation. Individual athletes and entire teams are withdrawn at the last minute from events which have been in the planning stages for months. There have been no such cases in Poland.

[Question] What kind of budget will the Polish sports world have in 1983?

[Answer] Together with subsidies paid for out of the national budget, it will come to a total of 9,509,000,000 zlotys. This amounts to an increase of 2.9 percent in relation to the amount of funds spent in 1982.

[Question] What about the hard currency budget?

[Answer] It will in fact cease to exist, since as of 1 January 1983, as I already mentioned, we will be shifting over to a system whereby we have to pay our own way. From the government we will be receiving only those funds and quotas which are essential to pay for imported athletic equipment for first-string team.

[Question] What kind of new year's wishes do you wish to pass along to the minister of sports and physical education?

[Answer] First of all, that more young people than ever before should find a place for themselves in the sports world that will help contribute to their self-realization, the fulfillment of their most cherished ambitions, and their personal joy.

Second, that within the context of the sports movement it will finally no longer be necessary to talk only about money.

And third, that over the course of this year we will be able to look forward to the prospect of emerging from the Olympic Games with a record we can be proud of.

[Question] Thank you for granting this interview.

TEXT OF DECREE ON STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS PUBLISHED

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 38, 11 Dec 82 pp 667-668 Item 255

Decree No 255 of the minister of science, higher education, and technology on student organizations and associations, issued 10 December 1982

Text On the basis of the Article 128 of the bill on higher education, passed 4 May 1982 DZIENNIK USTAW No 15, Item 113 the following directives are being issued:

1. Student organizations and associations may begin their activities after securing an approval of their activities and after a registration conducted by an appropriate administrative body.
2. A petition to register a nationwide student organization ought to be submitted to the minister of science, higher education, and technology by the founders of the organization. The petition ought to contain:
 - (1) the name of the organization and its address;
 - (2) full names of the founders, name of the school of higher learning, department (specialized institute), year of standing, and address;
 - (3) full names of authorized founders to be involved in the registration process;
 - (4) three copies of the statute (bylaws, founding declaration);
 - (5) definition of the activity range of the organization.
- 3.1. The minister of science, higher education, and technology in conjunction with other interested ministers (heads of central administrative agencies) approves the activity and registers a nationwide or local organization after establishing that its statute (bylaws, founding declaration) is in conformity with the existing laws, and particularly the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, and recognizes the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the construction of socialism as well as the principles of the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic.

3.2. The appropriate body of the student organization will notify the minister of science, higher education, and technology of its membership within 2 months of the registration notification.

4. The cells and branches of the organization (association), as defined in the Article 123 paragraph 2 points 1, 4, and 5 of the bill on higher education of 4 May 1982 DZIENNIK USTAW No 14 Item 1137, hereafter referred to as the "bill," active on the premises of a school of higher learning, will be recorded in the register of cells and branches by the rector of the school of higher learning on the premises of which these cells conduct their activities.

5. A petition to register a student organization (association), referred to in the Article 123 paragraph 2 item 2 of the bill, will be submitted by the founders of the organization to the rector of the school on the premises of which this organization (association) will conduct its activities. A petition ought to contain:

- (1) name of the organization and its address;
- (2) full names of the founders, name of the school of higher learning, department (specialized Institute), year of standing, and addresses;
- (3) full names of the authorized founders to be involved in the registration process;
- (4) three copies of the statute (bylaws, founding declaration).

6.1. The rector of a school of higher learning approves and registers a student organization (association), referred to in 5, after establishing that its statute (bylaws, founding declaration) is in conformity with the existing laws, and particularly the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, and recognizes the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the construction of socialism as well as the principles of the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic.

6.2. The rector informs the authorized founding members, the minister of science, higher education, and technology, and the appropriate minister (central administrative agency head) within 14 days of the act of registration.

6.3. The appropriate body of the student organization (association) active in a school of higher learning is required to inform the rector of the school of higher learning about its membership within 1 month of receiving the registration notice.

7.1. A petition to register a scholastic, artistic, or sport circle, referred to in Article 123 paragraph 2 item 3 of the bill, ought to be submitted to the rector of the school of higher learning by the circle founders. The petition ought to contain:

- (1) name of the circle and its address;
- (2) full names of the founders, name of the department (specialized Institute), year of standing and addresses;
- (3) full names of the authorized founders to be involved in the registration of a scholastic, artistic, or sport circle;
- (4) program, scope, and field of activity of the scholastic, artistic, or sport circle; in the case of registration of a scholastic circle it is necessary to submit additionally a recommendation of the appropriate Department (Institute) Council.

7.2. The rector of the school of higher learning approves and registers a scholastic, artistic, or sport circle after establishing that its program, scope, and field of activity conforms to the existing laws.

7.3. A scholastic, artistic, or sport circle, whose scope of activity covers more than one school of higher learning, will be registered by the rector of the school of higher learning, where the circle's office will be located, upon consultations with the rectors of the schools of higher learning, covered by the activity of the circle. Such circle will be also covered by the regulations in 7.1 and 6.3.

8. When the registration petition for a student organization, scholastic, artistic, or sport circle is rejected by the rector, the founders of such an organization have the right to appeal to the appropriate minister (central administrative agency head).

9.1. The statute (bylaws) of a nationwide student organization or a school student organization (association), active at a school of higher learning ought to contain:

- (1) name of the organization and its address;
- (2) aims and tasks of the organization;
- (3) membership eligibility requirements;
- (4) executive bodies, mode of their appointment as well as their authority and term for which they are appointed;
- (5) sources of funds and means of establishing membership fees;
- (6) membership rules and regulations as well as duties and obligations of the members;
- (7) mode of passing a statute and introducing changes in it;
- (8) conditions for and means of dissolving the organization on the basis of a resolution passed by the organization's executive body and the regulations

with regard to the disposition of the organization's property in the case of a dissolution.

9.2. The statute (bylaws) may also contain other regulations which are necessary to regulate the organization's entire activity.

10.1. The register rosters of student organizations ought to contain in separate columns:

- (1) name of the organization;
- (2) names of the founding members along with the school of higher learning, department (specialized Institute), year of standing, and home address;
- (3) names of authorized founding members;
- (4) registration date for the organization;
- (5) region of activity;
- (6) organization's location and address;
- (7) references to school and local cells;
- (8) reference to organization's dissolution;
- (9) reference to corrections and changes in the statute.

10.2. The state (bylaws, founding declaration) of the organization ought to be attached to the registration roster.

11.1. In case of dissolution of a nationwide student organization on the basis of its own resolution, the dissolution ought to be carried out by the organization's executive body jointly with a representative from the ministry of science, higher education, and technology.

11.2. In case of dissolution of a nationwide student organization by the Voivodship Court, the dissolution ought to be carried out by the dissolution commission formed by the minister of science, higher education, and technology.

11.3. The decisions with regard to the disposition of the property of the dissolved organization, referred to in paragraph 2, will be made by the minister of science, higher education, and technology.

12. The regulation 11 will be appropriately applied to the student organizations referred to in Article 123 paragraph 2 of the bill.

13.1. The registrations of student organizations carried out prior to the enactment of this decree become invalid.

13.2. The re-registration of the student organizations active on the day of the enactment of this decree may be carried out by an appropriate administrative body after the executive body of such an organization submit a petition containing its statute and the name roster of its leadership.

14. The executive order of the minister of science, higher education, and technology on student organizations of 18 December 1980 /DZIENNIK USTAW No 1, 1981, item 3, and No 32, item 1907.

15. This decree becomes the law on the day of its announcement.
B. Miskiewicz, minister of science, higher education, and technology.

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CSO: 2600/188

'STYLE' OF PARTY FUNCTIONING DISCUSSED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 19, 10 Nov 82 pp 6, 7, 11

[Article by Kazimierz Morawski, chairman, PZPR CKR [Central Audit Commission]

[Text] The party's leadership role in the state is subject to a constant and very penetrating scrutiny by our society. Society comes into contact with the party more rarely at the stage of formulation of programs and of the resolutions evolving from decisionmaking, but more frequently at the stage of the party's execution of program tasks. On the basis of this latter sort of contact, society forms its image of the party, judges the rightness of its actions, and trusts in the effectiveness of party guidance. The surrounding community observes the mode of operation of aktiv echelons, group elements and particular workers of the apparatus and often forms its attitude to the entire party on this basis.

How frequently it happens that, when seeking the cause of a lukewarm reaction of some community to an evidently correct party initiative, we find to our amazement that the poorly-disposed attitude towardst the party is a result either of an unfavorable opinion of the activity of some specific party individuals, or of the sluggish nature of the echelon whose active reaction once would have been expected by everybody.

How often in the past have even party members been reluctant to participate actively as a result of inefficient organization, simulated work or even carelessness of the party of the party echelon. It is easy to cite situations in which the party echelon reckoned with administrative elements, admonishing them for bad, late, inexact or clumsy activity, while it was itself guilty in other matters of not being a model of solidly organized activity.

Just Having a Program Is Not Enough

Solidly organized activity consists of concentrating in intraparty life on formulating and undertaking the right resolutions without always being totally certain of their full implementation. This is coupled with the characteristic faith of the aktiv and the apparatus in the automatic operation of resolutions and reduces the essence of party political work to limiting the many deliberations and meetings that often have no application to life, thought, discussion or activities in a specific workers' environment.

Today we have the answers to many questions: the kind of party that we have, who quit the party and why, what sort of threats and newer, more positive tendencies are emerging in the party. In a complex sociopolitical situation, however, correct diagnosis of our own affairs and correct social diagnosis and awareness of tasks are not enough.

What is also important and, for the near future, perhaps most important, is how the party functions on a day-to-day basis, which are the work-impeding elements in its style and which elements foster positive impulses in the implementation of the program. Therefore, in the reports campaign it would be worthwhile to devote more time to such problems as these: the style of day-to-day activity of the echelon and the POP [Primary Party Organization], the method of formulating, implementing and evaluating performance and suitability and effectiveness of the forms and methods applied.

Such a formulation of the questions relating to the manner of party operation acquires special urgency right now when the party has a clear program and an awareness of the conditions for its implementation. The struggle then centers not around goals, but around means--how shall we act in order that our program may become a reality, while we draw the majority of our society into a cooperative effort with the party?

The present time also calls for a more penetrating look at the way the party fulfills its leading role. Since our situation has changed and is changing, methods of operation and certain criteria for evaluation must also change.

We Must Work Differently With the Cadres

Such a requirement places before the party, above all, the tasks of seeking various forms of social support for the introduction of economic reform, and of assuring its influence on the implementation of social goals as well as its impact on guaranteeing that the general proportions of economic development are correct. The development of plant and territorial self-government promoted by the party, will require more indirect methods of guaranteeing the effectiveness of party influence. The creation of the patriotic movement of national rebirth will awaken new skills of work with nonparty members. The coming into being of new trade unions independent of the administration will stimulate social activity in plants that the party should bolster by its activity.

Generally, the growth of the role and the activism of the various organizational units of public life authorized democratically to participate in making decisions about the course of state and social affairs have changed the circumstances of party echelons and organizations. To this end, the form of individual explanatory and agitational work must change. Party members who take part in a particular body must become more active; the work of echelons with party members must thus become more individualized.

The new approach to party activity requires that the party's political function be carried over to the organs of the state and economic administration, as

well as to work with the leadership cadre and party advisors. The usual political loyalty of leadership cadres is not enough to ensure real effectiveness in the party's guidance of issues. They must be given specific tasks and political requirements not only during the cadre review, but every day from the moment that they are recommended by the echelon for a leadership position. The party has the right to demand that the leadership cadre think in political and state terms and have a sense of their upbringing duties in their own community.

The present situation in this area is far from perfect, as is clearly evident from the results of comprehensive inspections conducted by the Armed Forces Inspectorate and the Central Audit Commission [CKR]. Too often, comrades who have been recommended by the PZPR and hold leadership positions in the state and economic administration are totally indifferent to waste and confusion that are widespread in the spheres under their jurisdiction.

In the eyes of the citizen, every office is a part of the socialist authority. The work of the leadership cadre at all levels is subject to the careful scrutiny and assessment of society. We must not forget this. The manager, the director, the boss and the secretary are also--perhaps above all--teachers within their milieu. An inspection should not point out bad work and carelessness to them: they themselves should show their subordinates and coworkers where they must work better and more efficiently.

The changing social circumstances will create a method for the party's fulfillment of its leadership role via indirect influence, i.e., through the implementation of party objectives aided by the development of the proper attitudes and behavior among individual party members working professionally and functioning as party operatives within given communities. However, for party comrades in plants and institutions to fulfill their calling properly (the calling that emanates from their red identification card), echelons and POP's must prepare forms of contact that are more individualized and extend beyond the meeting itself.

This is not an easy task. It requires a new approach of the higher echelons to evaluating the work of local elements. Significant tasks will fall to the party apparatus whose function of organizing/analyzing and reporting will change at times to functions of inspecting, reckoning, agitating and penetrating into the community in a positive manner.

The self-satisfied attitude that still rules the day in many party echelons at various levels maintains that key positions are held by party members. This attitude ought to change into their systematic, fundamental assessments not only of their work obligations but likewise of their general attitudes as party members; their words and deeds in their day to day functions should in no way contradict one another.

Committees as a Model of Efficiency

The Ninth Party Congress, adopting the assumptions of the socialist renewal process, set before the party the task of improving its style and methods of operation. The improvement of the party's style of operation is a constant task, not a brief campaign. Many aspects of this effort are associated with the general principles of a modern system of direction and management. The party is a concrete institution having a structure, people, funds and operational goals. Hence the importance of the general efficiency of party committees as organized institutions.

From the organizational viewpoint, the principles of efficient and orderly operation likewise apply to party committees. Thus, the following questions must always be kept in mind: Where do the objective difficulties lie, where do carelessness and bureaucracy occur, how is the scale of service superiors-subordinates and responsibilities organized and how does it operate, and how efficient is the daily management, informing and quick analysis? Good communication vertically among party elements, concern for people, the manner of selection of party elements and the way they execute their duties all belong to the style of work.

In other words, we must continually ask: What is the ideal in the operation of party organizational elements, who are to serve politically as models of economizing, of well-aimed methods and of effective action.

The style of work is a broad, but very specific concept. It comprises concern over human affairs, their recommendations, demands, complaints and grievances. It is more than receiving petitioners, giving them time, answering their letters and acting upon valid complaints. "Style" includes the way we conduct a conversation, how much commitment we demonstrate to the citizen rendering the complaint, how much real concern for a particular matter he senses, how much time will be given to this matter and finally, the reaction of the party member or citizen regarding the application of recommendations and demands.

Another example: showing people the party's interest in a given problem lies not only in the frequency of meetings and deliberations upon the subject. It is likewise following through in the subsequent stages of making noticeable improvements with a solicitude equal to that exercised in undertaking the resolution.

Good style means having honest principles, i.e., speaking with candor and making just assessments, not only from the speaker's platform and in reports, but also in face-to-face conversations with colleagues at work and people with whom one comes in contact. It takes no art to make a statement in a report that somebody is doing poor work. The greater art and the better party style is to speak directly to the person involved. Similarly, when we make evaluations, we prefer to generalize and thus gloss over matters, rather than making an honest assessment and assuring the people that the party is on their side if they are in the right.

The party's reputation is a particular milieu is sometimes damaged by un-exemplary behavior, laziness or the dilatoriness of a specific party member's actions. Sometimes nonparty members who get the wrong reaction from the POP or the party committee point the finger.

Language Can Be Persuasive

Party style is likewise the skillful stating of tasks. Frequently we assign tasks in such numbers and make them so all-encompassing that the lower elements, overwhelmed, cannot but implement them superficially, or worse, they cannot get beyond the discussion stage. The image of the party would be much better served if a specific task were assigned to a specific person, not in secret, but with the knowledge of the entire group, along with its mutual involvement.

We rarely ask ourselves the question in our party surroundings, what specifically do you intend to do to help implement a given plant or municipal committee proposal? What a good impression would be made if a political employee or the secretary of a particular party organization asked rank-and-file employees more often what sort of party initiatives they would like to see in their plant or institution. Party members still speak too infrequently with their fellow workers about party concerns or about the party's efforts to resolve various problems. We must talk more and agitate more wisely.

Another matter of importance is the style of our statements and our way of writing about our efforts in acting and guiding party members should use simple language, the language that is the most readily understood by workers and peasants. Let us speak simply and stop trying to impress people. A heightened style of political commentary on the country's problems is natural at higher levels, but it stands in the way of communicating about the party in the enterprise, the production cooperative or the gmina. The Polish language is rich and colorful. We ought to select from it those words that will convince and will encourage people to cooperate with us. Thus, we must be concerned over the party's language, its style of utterance and the form and the content of written materials.

A Democratic Style of Work

The concept of the party's "style of operation" cannot be separated from the content, the history and the experiences of management theory; nor can it be isolated from the general principles of praxeology. But while these two disciplines have established the subject scope and the methodology of analysis, the sphere encompassed by the concept "the party's work (operational) style" requires that we give basic consideration to adapting Lenin's teachings to contemporary PZPR theory, policy and practice.

This is the task of the party research institute and WSNS [Higher School of Social Sciences]. The research of these institutions will help us to decide which methods and forms are worth repeating and are strong enough to be used permanently. The prescribed order of procedures and the dominance of specific types of actions that lead to the formation or elimination of stereotypes must also be studied in detail.

As the experiences of modern political parties, including the PZPR, demonstrate, the methods of their operation and their implementation of political goals are not fixed, but change according to objective and subjective factors.

The Leninist style of party work is the way it manifests (expresses) its identity: it is a process of coordinating the principles that constitute the party with the political goals and interests of the working class. The style of party work is determined by the ideologically objectivized principles that form the set of rules of political action.

Experience shows that the style of party work ought to be a function of general socialist values. It emanates from systemic, political and moral premises, and also represents a particular standard for evaluating political actions. The correct style of party work does not admit of tensions, conflicts and quarrels; it prevents them from mounting up and thus avoids crisis situations.

The democratic style of party work consists of a method of appointment and operation of party authorities in accordance with the majority will, secret elections, openness in action and a way of discussion and criticism limited to party interests encompassed within the categories of its ideological, political and organizational unity built on Leninist principles, and not catering to personnel hierarchies or individual affiliations.

In a democratic style of party work, a special role is played by the following: the process of preparing and programming decisions involving the majority of party members, the bidirectional flow of information, a cadre policy that consistently adheres to the requirements of professionalism and political commitment, as well as the control of operations internally.

Only democratic forms of party operation enable us to overcome negative subjective elements that have a deleterious influence upon the style of party work, such as the fear of risk and innovation, the characteristic disinclination to take joint action, the tendency to hold a monopoly on authority in a particular function and even being on the defensive against self-government and healthy spontaneity. Observing democratic forms and methods of operation will have the effect of increasing individual and group initiatives, create a sense of coparticipation and coresponsibility and the proper atmosphere in interpersonal relations.

As we read the theory of party operation, we find recorded the factors that hamper or destroy the value of democratic operation. Some of these factors are: the enervation of ideological life in the party and the low level of ideological awareness; the lack of familiarity with political principles of party operation, organizational disintegration, the weakening of member ties and the weakening of the party as a community; the limited nature or lack of fulfillment of POP control functions with regard to echelons; the assumption of POP functions by narrow groups of party operatives; the lack of concern

for or the improper methods of achieving an increase in party ranks; the lack of party mobility in adapting the forms and methods of operation to a changing reality; the assumption of the powers of other authorities or the overlapping of decisionmaking areas of the party and state apparatus; the inadequacy of party endeavors with regard to program assumptions and sociopolitical conditions.

These and other factors should be a permanent consideration for groups setting up programs for a particular party echelon.

Detecting the Seeds of Impropriety in Time

In studying and analyzing the whole complex of matters related to the implementation of resolutions and the style of operation and method of executing party tasks, the CKR [Central Audit Commission] encounters a number of phenomena that, which not yet full-blown, carry the seed of possible dangers.

Such situations include the tendency to undertake some efforts not for the upbringing and educational effect they will have on party ranks and society over the long-term, but for their short-term propaganda-informational value. There is frequently a tendency to "pretend" that subjects that are brought up have already resolved existing problems, as well as an excessive legislative tendency that is both unrealistic and lacks concreteness with regard to enforcement.

In some echelons, the psychological mind set inclines toward "big" topics to the neglect of incidental and small-scale issues that are more important for people than such big program categories. This sort of "totalistic" trend is cultivated in the presentation of problems at every level.

The frequent "mechanical" repetition by lower levels of ideas from the central level without any effort to adapt the general content to the needs and perceptual potential of the particular group inhibits communication. The issue of the skill to concretize tasks that emanate from resolutions is a similar matter, particularly when such tasks are assigned to individual party members.

The seeds are spouting of a return to poor routine in information and intra-party reporting, manifested primarily in the vague and intuitive assessment of attitudes, behavior and societal wishes. The stalemate continues concerning the forms to be used in disseminating the content of Marxism and Leninism in spite of the Ninth Congress recommendations. Sufficient efforts have not been made to relate the important ideological categories of Marxism in simple, clear language, particularly when they come into contact with the realities of the present stage of Poland's socialist development.

The tendency to report the success of party activity where restraint is demanded is psychologically understandable but methodologically dangerous. We have not yet fully developed scientific methods of the systematic, objective study of broad party and public opinion to be used in formulating political and social evaluations. Here and there we find a return to formalism in organizational management that is bereft of the straightforward assignment of concrete, differentiated tasks. We should be aware of these shortcomings in the planning and implementation of every endeavor.

Wanting To Be Subject to Control

I should like to give some attention to that sphere of party operation that is of greatest concern to control-auditing organs because of its statutory-regulatory nature, namely, control in the party and the state. One thing is certain: in its desire to fulfill properly its controlling role over social processes and the state, the party itself must want to be subject to control and it must want to make fuller use of statutory powers and control duties with regard to the implementation of its own resolutions and proposals. The tendency to yield to control is rare in the party, and issues of external control and self-control alike meet with resistance.

Regardless of how we define control, it is definitely an integral element of direction and management, its effectiveness determining the proper implementation of resolutions and decisions, both on the micro scale and the macro scale.

In the modern management of the large institution, the enterprise and the like, the organization of control activities, i.e., studying the resultant data and drawing conclusions from this data should take up approximately one-third of the actual work time of the management. Theoreticians treat control as the key element of efficient operation; they emphasize direct interdependence between control quality and the success of decisionmaking and the effectiveness of operations.

Despite attempts made in various periods within the economy, the state and the party, the control of execution was not and is not our strong point. Weaknesses here reduce the effects of the country's development, have repercussions in social awareness and reflect upon the party's activities.

Many operatives still believe in the automatic operation of programs and resolutions. We find this criticism and self-criticism in many fields.

For example, the repeated studies of the work of people's councils have shown that in each case that legislative activity has significantly dominated coordination and control efforts. Numerous party voivodship committees have been critical of the same disproportion in their own work.

Giving direction to every activity from the sphere of public life, including above all the direction of party activity, is merely prefatory to continually improved and better coordinated measures that benefit from practical experience. In considering the many aspects of the party's style of operation, we must always emphasize that the control of operations, an important feature of direction, should be a continuous process. It should be as harmonious as possible, and should make use of new materials for evaluating situations and drawing conclusions.

The need for efficient, straightforward, effective control emanates from life itself, where every step brings an encounter with deviations from the established line of behavior and from the necessary priorities of action. We discover many manifestations of the lack of discipline and executory unconscientiousness, as evidenced, for example, in the findings of local operational groups and the Armed Forces Inspectorate.

The party's guide in solving problems of control has most often been the solution offered by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians. In practice, this was most fully expressed in the Statute passed at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress and the CKR code of regulations passed in 1981.

We realize that the implementation of the party's Ninth Congress program as well as the programs of subsequent plenary meetings of the KC Central Committee will succeed only if the party and the entire society take a very active part. Thus, we of the CKR have aimed all of our organizational-control activities toward monitoring the effectiveness of party action and its consistency in the implementation of its own resolutions.

We are aiming for openness in the making of post-control recommendations and in intraparty discussions concerning the results of audits of the particular problem areas. We believe that if we show party rank-and-file, and even the entire society, that the party is ready to yield to control, this will help to ensure order, efficiency and the elimination of incompetent action.

This is a long-range process. It is essential that we eliminate all elements that obstruct the ordering of party affairs and put off the regaining of its credibility in the eyes of PZPR members and the entire society. The diversity and complexity of many issues encompassed included in the style of party operation, their daily and multidirectional contact with many spheres of socioeconomic life causes them to have an impact upon the development of the mechanisms of this life. Likewise, they themselves are subject to the pressure of standards and habits that arise outside the party. This mutual impact has both its goods and bad aspects.

The party, as the leading force in society and the leadership force in the state, must be especially sensitive to the slightest symptoms of danger, for regardless of where evil arises, the entire burden of criticism is borne above all by the party.

8536

CSO: 2600/185

PROCEEDINGS OF TENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM DESCRIBED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 19, 10 Nov 82 pp 1, 2

[Text] The Tenth PZPR Central Committee Plenum, devoted to problems of the country's socioeconomic development over the past 3 years, took a broad look at the complex circumstances and interrelationships that are crucial to our emergence from the crisis. There was extensive discussion of economic problems (with 152 comrades offering their opinions), and in his closing speech, PZPR KC [Central Committee] first secretary, Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski supplemented this discussion with his view of their social and political aspects.

In debating the question of economic mechanisms, and in particular the assumptions of the three-year plan and the degree of implementation of the reform, experts took into consideration the criterion most in evidence and most varifiable by society in general. For working people, the fundamental test of our progress in overcoming the crisis will be above all an improvement in the material circumstances of life.

The basic social goals of party policy were defined clearly and unequivocally. Improvements in feeding the nation and the creation of circumstances for finding a permanent solution to the food problem and the problem of supplying people with the manufactured good indispensable to daily life were viewed as priorities. Putting a stop to the worsening of the housing situation, and creating premises for its gradual improvement were likewise seen as vitally important.

We shall return again and again to the tasks outlined in the Tenth KC Plenum resolution for solving the crucial socioeconomic problems of the country's development, as we work on the detailed operating schedule for implementing the provisions of this plenary meeting by party elements at all levels, and by all party echelons and organizations.

During the open, honest, frequently controversial Plenum discussion, the fact was not concealed that fatigue resulting from the difficult situation does not help the public mood, but in many communities fosters apathy and passivity and weakens the public's hope that the economy will stabilize and market stability will be restored. The proverbial "light at the end of the tunnel" is still viewed with much skepticism, even though it is real. It is seen in the increasing trends toward improvement, such as the high level of production

in the raw materials-mining subsectors, in the August 1982 increase in total industrial production--the first increase in 25 months, the increase in labor productivity in industry and the increase in export.

In spite of the fact that the private citizen does not yet feel the effect of these symptoms, in reality the production decline has been halted and our economy is now at the turning point on the road to recovery. But this is just the beginning. The attitudes of society are still determined by sudden price increases and severe shortages in market supply; thus, society does not realize that there is hope that we will surmount the crisis. Distrust still runs very deep.

A tremendous amount of attention in discussion was given to voluntaristic pricing, i.e., the abuse of the right of enterprises to set prices, their cultivation of the "free American price" based upon a monopoly on a specific product or a great demand for that product. The tasks of party echelons and elements in opposition to these threatening phenomena that increase society's frustrations continue to be very important.

Extensive discussion at the Tenth Plenum was devoted to the dangerous tendencies that are being manifested in contradiction to reform assumptions, based on the increasing share of administrative employees in some enterprises. The bureaucratic demon is again running wild; a basic improvement in the ratio of workers directly involved in production to other groups will be an important test of the principles of enterprise autonomy.

The task of party echelons and organizations to implement the Tenth Plenum resolutions must be accompanied by the constant awareness of the priority values expressed in faithfulness to the line of the Ninth PZPR Congress. These include abiding by social justice as the central value of socialism. This means that the principle of a just wage for the work done must be strictly observed. It means that a clear system of incentives (wage increases) must be created that is contingent upon production results and work productivity. Social justice means that workers' interests and their moral standards must be determining factor. "Workers should have no doubt that they are our ruling class." The priority tasks of the war against speculation and the restructuring of the system of control to include worker participation as a political battle, given our special circumstances, also fall into this broad category.

The unfavorable world situation, international conditions, the sanctions escalated by the United States and calculated to break down our economy, oblige us to keep in mind that a severe class struggle is also being waged on economic grounds. Special clarity and precision are obligatory in this sphere. This was put succinctly by Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski in his final address to the Tenth KC Plenum: "We must constantly purge the road to understanding. In this regard, the party line does not change. It is the line of struggle with the economy and, at the same time, it is gaining society's understanding, seeking understanding with all people of good, patriotic will. The permanence, the consistency of this line--they are our political and moral capital, the basic element of our credibility. We must watch over them, for they are delicate, but vital elements."

EMIGRE DAILY PRINTS DISSIDENT CALL FOR BROADER RESISTANCE

London TYDZIEŃ I DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 27 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Bartosz Pieczyski: "To Broaden the Range of Resistance"]

[Text] The most conceivable range [of resistance] so far: from street demonstrations--through strikes--to a bloody uprising, will not be sufficient. This sounds paradoxical because for many it already is more than they can stand. Yet I repeat: it will not be sufficient for us, although it will be for the WRON, for it can be used for:

1. Drawing public attention away from Poland's disastrous economic failure;
2. Fishing out "Solidarity" activists and other courageous and active people, by breaking up the underground structures so strenuously created;
3. Serving as an argument that society is internally "disrupted" and "at loggerheads," because after all not all people are demonstrating on the streets.

It is not sufficient, because the experiences of 3 and 13 May, as well as 31 August, show that, though demonstrating our hatred for the PUSP, Secret Service, MO, WRON, OKON, PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] and the like, we clearly cannot go all the way. Furthermore, actions "democratically" discussed in the underground press have no chance for full success, as they are exposed from the very beginning. We cannot afford a showdown with the authorities. Demonstrating on the anniversaries we will not catch the WRON, Secret Service and the MO by surprise, because they are waiting for us and know what to do. They anticipate our demonstrations to such a degree that they provoke them when we lack the initiative! They fear surprise because on this point they have always lost the battles and have had to give up their positions. There are ways to surprise these authorities, but they should be discussed by the colleagues from the Provisional Coordinating Committee among themselves and not heralded ahead of time. If we want to win this war, let us not tell the enemy what reserves we have, where they are located and when we shall put them into action. For the time being we do not have an effective answer to the authorities' repressions. Thus if the time is not ripe for fighting (by striking, demonstrations or violence) until the end, namely to victory, let us not launch attacks that have already been exposed, which earn us nothing. For we gain publicity, but lose strength. It is an unfavorable outcome.

The range of resistance must be broadened by all those elements which do not spill blood, do not cripple, cause no damage. Such a range already exists, but still lacks content and has not been converted into broadened action. Underground publications are being distributed, Social Defense Committees [KOS] are being formed and independent education is being born. Is this little? It is. Time passes and we are standing still in too many places, as if the paralysis of 13 December will not end. Time, interrupted by occasional preannounced demonstrations, will not work for us if we do not simultaneously work for society, which expects from us something more than appeals and declarations. I know that such a view stirs up controversies and someone may ask: "Actually, from what 'position' does the author speak?" My view is born from two simple, almost banal observations:

--The strength of the WRON lies in its having a whole army of truncheon-bearers, well armed with mechanical and chemical equipment and not badly trained in street round-ups and battles; this exposes the vulnerability of "Solidarity," which is used to hunger and peace marches, with singing and chanting;

--The weakest point of the WRON is the fact that it acts without the nation's support, in spite of the nation, without any moral or legal rights on its side. WRON cannot offer any systemic solution to Poland's crisis (while taking refuge in the neostalinization of almost every area of public life). Here we are at an advantage because we know what we are fighting for, we know what kind of Poland society wants, we have the program of "Solidarity's" Congress, we realize what in it needs to be specified, we are an organization recognized by law, unlike the WRON, OKON, or PRON which are unconstitutional organizations, and thus usurpatory and illegal.

These are supposedly truisms which everybody knows and there is no need to repeat.... Yet what happens in practice? With a strange relish we stick our heads out where we know they are going to get beaten. Instead we should be using these heads where we clearly have the upper hand and can act effectively. Is independent education a forceful solution? Is editing the underground press an act of violence? Yet the WRON fears these actions more than marches and slogan chanting. The WRON mobilizes armies of informers in order to get us--precisely on this point. It does not brag about how many people were beaten or imprisoned; yet it brags about each capture of a "Solidarity" radio station, each uncovered printing press, each confiscated edition of an opposition booklet.

If things continue this way, I am afraid we may have millions of citizens shouting "WRON to the Don" every few months, but daily serving this same WRON at the banks of the Vistula, Odra, Warta and Bug rivers, "for what to do, one must live."

Is there in every work place at least one person who knows how to act toward the regime's attempts to impose "self-government"? And not only in larger enterprises, but also in the majority of medium and small ones? And not only in large industry, but also in cooperatives, educational and scientific circles, state administration, transportation, communications, commerce.... And in the countryside? Do people know how to act when, after the final delegalization of

"Solidarity," trade unions of the Czech-Hungarian-East German type, namely an extended arm of the party and the government, take over? Should not the specialists for these matters among us already search for ways to assure that such possibilities do not take us by surprise, and that rather our actions take the enemy by surprise?

Furthermore, the media with the widest reception of culture and art (TV, radio, film, theater) are boycotted for political reasons, and because of their "Albanian" level. How should the gap be filled? A boycott on the part of the artists and the audience is a protest, but in the long run it will become anti-culture. How to find a solution, that is a problem of several unknowns. How many of us understand that a solution to this problem is a real "to be or not to be" of the national sense of identity?

Hosts of people are fired from jobs. Students are removed from schools and universities. Other people--often eminent ones--have emigrated "internally" on their own initiative. Where to? Have they emigrated from "Solidarity" as well? What good is it for the whole of society? Answers to these and other questions must be given by people whose duty it is to remember that they were active before 13 December ... when the costs were lower. Someone might say: This is nothing new, a return to the nineteenth-century slogans of work at the basics and organic work. Well then, if it's nothing new, why is it so hard?

... Millions of sullen Poles doing their own thing beyond the reach of the authorities' eyes and ears--that is dangerous for the authorities and gives a chance to these millions. Thousands of Poles spontaneously on the street--that gives a chance to the authorities, there they can win. Let us not give them this chance, let them remain uncertain as to what way of fighting we have chosen. The present dominating style of the opposition's activities is not as dangerous for the authorities as it seems to us. The eruption will take place, the battle will come--and we shall win it, as we must; but only when we learn how to control ourselves, when we are so organized that the cutting of telephone links will not deprive us of communications, and the ZOMO's presence at work places will not force us to produce useless junk for the LEMA markets; when our actions are known to all of us--without publicizing them in the press and when we can answer the repressions of the authorities with repression. This will have to be learned, let us work at it now then, and not pretend that we already know how to. That is why I propose to broaden the range of resistance.

From the Editors: This article appeared in the KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee] bulletin No. 17, 4 October 1982.

12270

CSO: 2600/172

POLISH DISSIDENT CIRCLES LINKED TO PAST CRISES

Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish No 30, 12 Dec 82 p 11

[Article by Barut: "Consolidation of the Trojan Horse"]

[Text] I often ask myself the question, What if one made a sociological study, taking for the baseline of analysis, and perhaps also of synthesis, the periods of 1949-1956 and 1975-1982? How would the destinies of those responsible for the implantation in the 1950's of the moral philosophy of terror be seen to evolve in that case?

A cursory glance at the personal (overt) composition of the Social Self-Defense Committee of KOR answers the question. A great number of these people were directly or indirectly involved in the blunders and distortions of those years, or originate from the circles that have left an ill-famed record in Polish postwar history. This fact is worth recalling at every convenient occasion, for indeed, for some reason, it so happens that the very individuals who should be evaluated and condemned are themselves now evaluating and condemning. These circles, repeatedly compromised in postwar Polish history, should be stopped from continuing to play a decisive role in the life of the state and the nation. Furthermore, when, in 1956 and 1968, these circles lost their monopoly to "power" in Poland, they decided in 1980 to recapture power and introduced "humanism." The list of those who had experienced that "humanitarian humanism" on their own skins is endless and includes people of the caliber of Berling, Rola-Zymierski, Gomulka, Ingarden, Konrad Gorski, Chalasinski, Dobraczinski, Wankowicz and Galczynski.

Those circles, however, now deport themselves as if they had nothing on their conscience and attempt to terrorize those who have not joined their ranks. I have written already that, for this, Primate Wyszynski, and, on occasion, the entire Church had run into flak. For this, General Jaruzelski is getting his share of it, and branches of foreign publishing companies illegally operating in Poland fabricate all sorts of libel and calumnies about Wojciech Zukrowski, Jan Dobraczinski and many, many other righteous persons and patriots.

Branches of foreign publishers in Poland? That's an outright lie! How can one write such falsehoods in a civilized country? This is a hit below the belt like in Archerling's time. The revisionists in RFN are just so many windbags. They do not take their own words seriously. Yet watch your language, sir, Mr. Barut,

or you may be assured of a death sentence if you go on like this undermining the credibility of the "inner" opposition.

I could not care less for the orders and instructions of the "inner" oppositionists, but I am deeply concerned about the highest value, the national interests of Poland, and for these interests, if need arises, I will give my life without hesitation. For I have only one Fatherland, Poland, rather than the whole world or even the universe, these concepts that both the "inner" opposition and the external enemy are offering Poles to swallow as a sweetmeat.

Their basic slogan is: Let all young Poles leave and enslave themselves to other nations while only the elderly, the handicapped, the disabled remain in the country. This hypocritical doctrine is wrapped in a colorful, bright ideology. The truth of the matter, however, is that Polish brains and strong hands are in demand all over the world. We must oppose this, but it will not be easy, as the "inner" opposition acts in an insidious way. Where unavoidable, they adapt themselves to the current situation, but then they go on with their drive as was demonstrated, for instance, during the 1970's.

Coming back, however, to Barut's lies--are there in Poland illegal subsidiaries of foreign publishers or are there not?

After August 1980 A.D., the "inner" opposition stood on such a firm ground that NOWA [Independent Publishing House], about which I have written long ago, became an affiliate of the Literary Institute in Paris. To this end, the two firms, the "inner" and the "outer" signed a special agreement, published in the Paris KULTURA. Let me quote a few paragraphs from that document, the signed agreement between the Literary Institute in Paris and NOWA in Warsaw.

§ 1. The subject of the contract is transfer of publishing and authorship rights that are the property of the Literary Institute to the Independent Publishing House [NOWA].

§ 2. The Literary Institute is represented by editor Jerzy Giedroyc and Zofia Hertz, and NOWA by Konrad Bielinski, Grzegorz Boguta, Marek Borowiak, Marek Chimiak, Mirosław Chojecki and Adam Michnik.

§ 3. The Literary Institute authorizes NOWA to act as the representative of the Literary Institute in all matters ensuing from the rights of the Literary Institute on the territory of Poland and with respect to all publishing houses and administrative and government agencies. This authorization also covers the rights defined in Article 3 (Arts. 3). The books must carry an indication that the copyright is the property of the Institut Littéraire, Paris.

§ 5. Proceeds from the publishing and authorship rights received from domestic publishers (operating in Poland) will be remitted to the "Paris Culture Foundation."

§ 8. The contract is effective as of 1 November 1981. On behalf of the Literary Institute, Zofia Hertz, Jerzy Giedroyc, Editor; on behalf of Independent Publishing House, Grzegorz Boguta, Marek Borowik.

What transpires from the above document? First of all, the Independent Publishing House [NOWA], which in Poland is surrounded by legends, is not all that independent, but, on the contrary, is a subordinate of an anti-Polish center, and one must be surprised after all that, so far, articles from the Paris KULTURA are not reproduced in their entirety in Polish press, television and radio. I hope, however, that this will also come in due time, so that the goals of the "inner" opposition will be laid bare and it would become obvious that it has no more in common with Poland than the Paris KULTURA has with France.

These tentacles, groping towards the incapacitation of Poland, used not only unofficial channels; advances were also made via diplomatic agencies and went so far that NOWA operated already on almost an equal footing with the other, official publishing houses. It even had an advantage over them in that for the books and articles it published it paid higher royalties to the authors and that its books were printed on paper of a better quality. Where that money and that paper came from is a great mystery that heavens only can fathom!

When the Paris KULTURA took NOWA into its subordination, it knew well what it was getting and what it could achieve thereby. Indeed, in July 1980 the "inner" opposition, in addition to its official influences in Polish radio, television, theater, film industry, schools, publishing houses and the press, had at its disposal an illegal publishing base. Through the medium of NOWA, KULTURA had a say in what was selected for publication in our country. All these activities had one goal. It was disclosed by Vladimir Bukovsky in an interview with Barbara Torunczyk, a representative of the Paris KULTURA.

"It is necessary, at any cost," said Bukovsky, "to try to synchronize the crisis, so that it erupts not just in Poland, not just in Czechoslovakia, but also in the Baltic nations, so that the USSR be forced to fight on a dozen fronts at the same time." (KULTURA, No 1/400-2/400, p 36)

We are expected thus to get consolidated, but with whom? With those who have taken a vow to destroy Poland and its social system? Or maybe we should fraternize with those who want also to erase the Polish Nation from the map of Europe and everything that is Polish there, only not overnight, but by gradual changes, step by step, deprive Poles of their national consciousness. When, however, a Pole no longer feels that he is a Pole, then we can easily take away from them what has been their birthright from time immemorial and turn them into slaves?

These are no empty and ungrounded theories but the cruel truth confirmed by the destinies of the Polish people. Everybody acknowledges today that we have let ourselves be knuckled under and a long time will elapse before we get to our feet again. Actually, time is not the only factor, for important is the attitude of every Pole, and I stress, Pole, as other nations, even if friendly to us, have their own problems and are not going to foster us. It depends on us alone whether we will be a strong nation or a mediocre entity.

Once we are talking of consolidation, why don't we ask, how has it come about that all of a sudden the Poles are ready to scratch each other's eyes out, that they threaten one another with gallows and murder? What is the cause that not

only large groups of people are antagonized and at loggerheads, but even in families people scowl at each other with hate? Did this fall out of the blue sky? Latest space flights evidence that the sky is far, far away. What is its influence on the Polish destinies then? In my opinion, it is minimal. We are left thus with this globe. Who of the earth-dwellers wants the Polish people to be a nation of serfs, a nation of inferior creativity, a nation subservient to other nations, a nation so passive that it leaves its own fate at the mercy or disfavor of other nationalities? I will commit no error if I say that incapacitation of nations is in the best interests of those supranational interest groups that proclaim the freedom of the individual, of the person, while enslaving entire nations. In order that the enslavement be as complete as possible, these groups foster within individual nations the circles that are exponents of their interests. Those circles, however, in trying to conceal their true objectives, make use of such general categories as the destinies of mankind, the human rights. In the meantime they try to make the impression that they are working, that they are doing something for the good of the nation and state; but, when this "something" in due time turns against the genuine and natural interests of the state and the nation, they change the banner and go on doing the same thing, only under different slogans.

Our postwar history gives perfect illustrations of events when groups with petty bourgeois interests served their own selfish interests under the pretext of serving the "interests" of workers and peasants. After 1956 those circles forgot that they ever had anything in common with the Polish workers and peasants and, instead of the "producing class," came to use the terms "drudge" and "bumpkin." Towards the end of the 1970's, after realizing that the intellectuals alone--especially those close to the pie--and the students fooled by them carry little weight, they decided to use again the worker and the peasant. One must acknowledge that they did not tinker with the job. They went about the dismantling of Poland with a truly masterful skill.

1600

CSO: 2600/196

'POLITYKA' INTERVIEWS DEPUTY PREMIER SZALAJDA

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 45, 25 Dec 82 pp 1,6,7

[Interview with Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, by Jan Bijak: "More Than Just Hope"]

[Text] [Question] We are in the economic situation that we are in, and no other. Among some of the investments which we embarked upon at one time, some of them are not useful. The question arises as to what to do with them.

[Answer] First of all we had to take an inventory of everything we had on hand when the crisis hit us in 1980. We have already done that. All last year work continued on checking all investment installations. We finished determining which investments should be continued and completed, which should be continued but would have to be suspended until we could afford it, and finally which should be eliminated altogether. As for what comes next, the concept which I had and continue to hold had its advocates and enemies like everyone else's.

[Question] What sort of people were against it?

[Answer] Those who said that the only thing wrong with the country was overinvestment. But that is barely part of the truth. The basic mistake lay in the fact that investments were made irrationally and not in a comprehensive way. Often too, our great indebtedness was related to investments. But that too is only a part of the truth of the matter, because a major share of the debt bearing on our current economic situation stems from noninvestment areas. Things would be entirely different, if we had distributed investments in a rational way and paid attention to the requirements of economic balance.

[Question] Except that this called for an excellent awareness of the situation and great imagination, perhaps imagination in particular.

[Answer] Imagination too, but mostly expert skill. The ability to forecast, to build a strategy with foresight. Meanwhile, this did not work.

So the blame was placed on industry, the insatiable monster which inhaled everything given to it. I still have ringing in my ears the statement of a well-known journalist made that the Carthage of modern times should be torn down and plowed over. Meanwhile, it was and still is my view that what was begun should be completed and utilized rationally, to the greatest possible extent.

[Question] But is there not a contradiction here? A moment ago we said that there were errors in strategy, so if we continue what was begun, then we are making a faulty structure permanent.

[Answer] Just to avoid having this happen we verified the investments, as I mentioned at the beginning. It is a question of taking advantage to the greatest possible extent in keeping with capabilities and right reason, and at the same time losing as little as possible.

[Question] So let us go on to concrete examples. We have an installation like Ursus, with a Ferguson license. We have one like the small-car factory, an installation which has been more or less checked out without anyone's finding any special fault with it, and we have the most criticized execution: Berlieta and color television.

[Answer] Good, those are excellent examples. We did not agree on them. You picked them. One at a time.

Ferguson tractor, Perkins engine. Not bad. It is surely not technically inferior to the Czech Zetor or one we could have developed in time in our country. Thus, if the financial obligations have already been incurred and the engine is not bad, and the investment is well along, then the most reasonable thing to do is to finish quickly what we have begun. And produce Massey-Fergusons. Of course, a decidedly better solution would be to get together with the Czechs and make a tractor together. And this is what we should have done when we made the choice. But the choice made was Ferguson. The matter has gone so far and we have invested such great resources that now the only thing we can do is to finish it up quickly, because we are in tremendous need of tractors.

[Question] Now let us take the Berliet.

[Answer] Let's take the automobile factory first. We could talk about whether this car is a success or not. But at the moment, after all, we are facing just about the same dilemma as when we decided on the small Fiat. because the Model 126P is coming to an end in today's form. This is an issue of 2-3 more years. We have to change the whole instrumentation, matrix, everything. Actually, we have to make a new car. Exchange for the same thing? No, because it is already an old model. So what are the possible solutions? One would be to keep cooperating with Fiat, because the license and transaction are good. (Last year there was the idea of the Panda model, but we gave up on it owing to the costs). Another similar angle would be to go into cooperation with some other Western firm on principles like those we have with Fiat. Or to seek cooperation with some

socialist country, but this is very difficult, because the Czechs already have the specialization nailed down...

[Question] What about the Lada, for example? The car has a very good reputation.

[Answer] True. Very advantageous cooperation was prepared with the Soviet Union. It was to be a cooperative model "thousand," but some other decision was made. We committed ourselves to the Polonez, which is not the best car for our times in terms of technical design and fuel consumption. We missed the chance for very encouraging, beneficial cooperation on a car with a capacity of a thousand centimeters, one being set up by Soviet industry. And this would be a capital supplement of what we lack.

[Question] What if we were to come to an agreement with the Czechs and the GDR and get something new going among the three partners?

[Answer] Sure, but it would have to be three willing parties. Let us be frank. It is not obvious how this would interest the Czechoslovak side, which has its Skoda, not a bad car. They improved it. They will come out with a new model and export it. This is enough for them for the time being. There is one other possibility greatly preferred just now, to make our own Polish car. That is what the factory says. But what guarantees do we have that the car will be any good? Will it go onto Western markets? Who will handle distribution? As you can see, there are many problems to be resolved. They are complicated. Work is presently in progress on getting the most suitable decisions ready.

[Question] And the Berliet?

[Answer] This is a completely different matter. With full conviction I can defend the concept of finishing up the Ferguson. I have my view on the future of the small car. On the other hand, in my mind and judgment the Berliet is a failure as an investment, because of the bus and the fact that we have not been able to create an efficient cooperative base divided up into plants. This is a collection of many parts produced domestically and abroad. From various parts of the world, various companies. The design turned out to be too weak for our transport conditions. The idea to join up with either the Hungarian Ikarus or the Czech Karos was a good one. As a result, we do not have a bus of this class at the moment. Hence, we have to do something with this unfortunately unsuccessful license. We are therefore getting as far away from it as possible, keeping what is best and trying to cooperate with Karos and Ikarus.

[Question] Still Polkolor perhaps?

[Answer] Polkolor is like Ursus. I think that we have to finish it up quickly. After all, the installation is actually completed. Supermodern technology has been installed there, and mainly through export the plant is making a go of it and is not a burden on the economy in these difficult times. Shortly it should be producing more and more for the domestic market.

[Question] Which means that everything should be all right?

[Answer] Just a moment. I do not want to play the role of advocate of old investments. It is a question of our having received a certain inheritance from the past decade, and we have to get as much benefit out of it as we reasonably can.

[Question] You are a representative of industry, and industry always wants to rescue everything and receive approval for successive investments.

[Answer] I am not the representative of industry. In the government I am responsible for industry and for industry's implementation of the social and economic policy being waged by the government. At the moment I do not know of an instance in which today's investment goals were in conflict with the present or future interest of the country, but I want to tell you that unless we begin normal investing, that is, on the level of about 20 percent of national income, we are going to run into some exceptionally difficult times.

[Question] But you have to admit that industry is a glutton for investments.

[Answer] That is the logic of development, of progress. Industry is the conveyor of the changes of civilization. I agree, though, that we have to judge whether the direction of investment coincides with social needs, whether it meets the world's trade tendencies, in terms of the prospects long range for raw materials, for power and energy. But these are not just issues faced by people in industry. Here we are looking at macroeconomics, politics, and social programs.

[Question] How do we determine what sort of needs we want to meet. In other words, what is our investment strategy like? Up until now, after all, we have been talking about inventories, right?

[Answer] The problem consists of the fact that the national income we are going to produce in the next few years will only let us finish those investments which are presently classed for completion within 10 years. On the other hand, nothing would be left to start much needed new investments. This means we run the danger of a growing technology gap in respect to the countries developing at a normal pace. Hence, what can we sell to the world in the future? Products that are 15 years out of date, for example? Coal, a little sulfur, copper? Nothing but that? We are investing not for industry, maybe for the whole economy or not; maybe I put it too strongly, but that is what it is all about.

[Question] Isn't this just scare tactics?

[Answer] No, these are the demands of the times today. In this regard the world is absolute. Does this mean that somebody wants to take the lion's share away from the society's meager reserves at the cost of its standard of living, as low as it is, and at the cost of housing and food?

No, the only thing is to increase national income, if only to eke out enough more for investments, which means development, without taking anything away from the basic items there. So we will not become the Third World. We have to realize that the years 1983-1985 are just for stability and perhaps just a little higher national income. Beginning in 1985 we have to become a normally investing country, for the reasons I have mentioned.

[Question] Altogether this sounds rather discouraging nonetheless.

[Answer] Well, then, so that it will not be altogether discouraging. The economic reform can provide us with capital aid. We are dividing up the meager investment funds using different ratios from those before. We are leaving more than 80 percent to the enterprises. The great centrally-guided constructions, the ones we were talking about, do not come to more than a dozen and some percent. If the results of the reform are like those we project, that is, each enterprises making maximum use of its own funds to expand the technical innovation of its own design offices and those with which it cooperates and of the research centers, if we manage to maintain contact with modern technology, then there is hope that we can avoid allowing the gap between us and the world to expand.

[Question] This view rather astounds me, because you do not pretend to be the greatest champion of the reform.

[Answer] Who then is?

[Question] Heavy industry, for example. Some rather unfortunate statements made by your coworkers also contributed to this.

[Answer] To me the advocate of the reform is not particularly the person who talks loudly about the fact that he is for it but does not know how it use it or implement it, or else utilizes the mechanisms of it to the detriment of the public interest. I prefer someone who is less enthusiastic in his words but has the knowledge and experience and in keeping with them makes practical use of the instruments of the reform. Enthusiasm on its own is not enough. Besides, today it takes great knowledge, expert ability, and responsibility to make a great change in the economic-financing mechanisms and to introduce a completely new economic system. If along with this there is enthusiasm too, well and good, but it is neither an adequate nor essential condition for the implementation of the reform. The overwhelming majority of good, experienced staff wants to reform the economy. It understands this need the best. Sometimes it has to be convinced of the new solutions. Sometimes it needs help here, but at the moment this staff is already introducing the reform with full conviction, and it bears the burden of this process. It is the industrial personnel that has put forth many proposals to improve mechanisms of the reform. Of course there are exceptions, but this is true of any principle. What is characteristic is the fact that the implementation of the reform is going

the best in those plants where the most experienced people are doing it, those with great knowledge and professional skill.

[Question] I remember our talk years ago when you were still director at the Katowice Steel Mill and said that you were generally for maximum decentralization and very clear responsibility for the various levels. Are you still for decentralization?

[Answer] It is a good thing that you mentioned this view, a view from several years back. Decentralization is the key to the economic reform, and nothing here has changed my mind about it, but I thought then and still do that a condition to the conduct of the reform is an awareness of all the dangers which can beset it and some protection of the reform against these dangers. This means care in implementing it, not jumping into the deep water. Some of this reform has been too spontaneous. Some of the mechanisms have not worked.

[Question] For example?

[Answer] Let us take just the price sphere. The labor productivity sphere. Employment. We had to correct many of these mechanisms this year and we are still working on the corrections.

[Question] A few more corrections and we will be back at the point of departure.

[Answer] No, you have to be familiar with these corrections. Anyone familiar with them knows that they are bolstering the reform and not the other way around. I think that we have managed to make it through the most difficult period. Those who came to the reform cold with a pencil and paper in hand got through it better than the noncritical enthusiasts in some industries who got things to the stage where today everything is there, the raw materials are there, the people are there, and the machinery is there, but there is no product on the market, while the factories are making a fine profit.

[Question] This is just what worries people, and after all it is exploited for attacking the reform.

[Answer] We have certainly made it over the greatest hurdle. We managed to do this mainly despite all the difficulties and problems throughout the year we did not get away from the reform. During this time we made the reform more solid and permanent, because at this moment, basically, we are also planning in keeping with the reform, and the mechanisms of foreign exchange allowances and profits are operating in keeping with the reform, and the tax system is working. I think this is a tremendous achievement for 1982, but since during this time it worked out that certain mechanisms are working too little because the old directive mechanisms do not work any more and the economic ones are defective, there is

the matter of corrections. Price-setting, tying production to productivity, incentives, and steering through the aid of benefits and priorities are a whole block of problems which need corrections and improvements.

[Question] And we are waiting for results.

[Answer] Mr Editor, let us not forget that 1983-1985 is a period for getting out of the crisis, for structural changes in the economy, and for stabilization.

[Question] I would like to get back to 1978 conditions. I lived pretty well then.

[Answer] Exactly. You would like to get through the crisis but not feel it. I would like to do the same thing.

[Question] We are going through it and we have been feeling it now for a good several years. The society has been demonstrating angelic patience, but it would like to have a perspective that is just a bit clearer.

[Answer] It may be painful for us, it may annoy us, but we are still in a profound crisis, and we are only beginning to get out of it. We are in this valley, and we are just beginning to rise. You are right that the citizen cannot see these clear positive signs very much. Nonetheless, if we were to summarize the data, this year, in our exceptionally shaky economy as well as in political and social life, there has been progress towards stability. And this is the light at the end of the tunnel. Next year this will show in food, providing agriculture with the basic means of production (here it is a question of a whole shock wave, nearly 30 percent of investment outlays), housing construction, and providing young people with footwear and clothing. Overall, we want to include the basic needs in six operational programs, not 14. And we want to still introduce something which I consider to be one of government's good ideas.

[Question] The society loves good ideas on the part of the government.

[Answer] We are introducing what are called "government orders." They fully respect the plant independence stemming from the reform. Where there are serious shortages and we have no possibility of using directive planning, we want to place government orders. These orders would receive priorities for supplies, tax facilitations, and other priority to provide an economic incentive, to gain the items necessary to improve the economy and the market.

[Question] Will there be enough shoes for everyone next year?

[Answer] There will be as many shoes as before the crisis.

[Question] But a lot have worn out, and there are none in reserve.

[Answer] Yes, but we have to hold on psychologically. If the society places a little trust in us, and if certain goods are not hoarded, then we will see some real improvement in such goods as shoes, and washing machines, refrigerators, and radios. For next year we are planning to reach the level of 1980, 1979. This would come close to the times when you could buy shoes or a television set, maybe after looking a little, but you could indeed buy them.

[Question] In the RZECZPOSPOLITA interview you said that we would make items of a basic standard next year. This statement bothered us. Does it mean going back to pioneer days?

[Answer] As a man who coordinates these things in the government, as an engineer, I will tell you frankly that the thing that bothers me the most is the fact that besides the objective reasons for lower quality, like the situation in the supply of materials and the market situation, we do not have strong enough incentive mechanisms to provide an appropriate level of quality. For many years we have had a situation in which the economic mechanisms did not reward good quality. They did not work so that poor quality faced a severe penalty and good quality a profit. The matter appears simple, because who does not want good quality? Me, Szalajda? The government?

[Question] But what if the worker does not want it, or the director [of the plant]?

[Answer] Everybody wants good quality, but what comes out is bad. This means that the mechanisms are not strong enough, but I do not want to get back into considerations of the economic reform.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] The mechanisms of the reform have run into abnormal conditions. What sort of situation gives rise to good quality? When there is competition, when there are lots of goods. There is no competition now, no market, no goods, so how can the mechanisms work to improve quality? If you find shoes in a shop with some minor defect, are you going to go off and leave them?

[Question] But that's a terrible way of putting the thing off to the future, because we are not going to have an abundance of goods all that soon, and the hardest thing is to deal with a producer monopoly.

[Answer] We are looking for solutions. In the packet of matters bolstering the mechanisms of the reform -- I am purposely using the word "bolstering" -- we have devoted a great deal of attention to quality. We are providing for large penalties for enterprises with bad goods. We have given priority to good commodities. We will take unjustified gains. But I am not overly optimistic here. It will work better, let me repeat,

when the market starts to create some sort of competition.

[Question] In several publications, including POLITYKA, the question of what is called "reorientation" came up. Are we in condition, going into the closer ties with CEMA neighbors, to mobilize our whole industrial potential and at the same time to maintain contact with world technology? Is this close relationship a question of necessity or of some sort of choice?

[Answer] To a great extent this is undoubtedly a question of necessity, but first of all it is a rational choice derived from the conclusions we have reached from the experience of the past few years. This follows from our economic situation, our tremendous indebtedness to the capitalist countries and the restrictions imposed on us by the West. But I said that above all it was a conscious choice dictated by stable conditions favorable to Poland, conditions for cooperation with the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries. Besides, all over the world neighboring countries have close economic ties. And if the neighbor furthermore is close in terms of politics and system, has all or nearly all the basic raw materials, and is a huge market of sales for our commodities, then after all it is a natural partner. I think that we should maximize exports to the socialist countries, and let us not hide that fact that this means mainly to the Soviet Union above all, on the principles of ordinary profitable trade, and this is being firmed up in very solid straightforward terms. Let us take ships, for example. There is a crisis everywhere in the shipyards, and we can sell any amount we want. We have huge, very profitable orders. Let us take metallurgy. Next year we are exporting to the Soviet Union about 700,000 tons of rolled goods. We have never exported so much. This is a capital affair! And today when there is a "steel war" going on between the United States and the European Economic Community over every ton!

I gave examples, but I could give you dozens more. In our trade with the Soviet Union if we came to a balance and gained a surplus, then we would be able to buy what we needed: gas, cotton, and various items which today we are buying from the West or are not buying at all, because we have nothing to buy them with, despite the fact we need them very much.

[Question] Then there would also be a certain ease in the balance of payments situation which would make it possible for us to buy from II payments area, which is necessary for us to expand certain technologies.

[Answer] Exactly, technology, engineering. With a basic mass of goods here in our zone, we can easily save up the amount necessary to buy from the West certain refined technology, modern designs. There is neither the necessity nor the need to close off technical cooperation with various countries. This would be a mistake, although the question of modern technology does not look the way most people in our country think it does either. For the Lada the Soviet Union does not import anything, but for the Fiat 125 we are importing 300 dollars' worth of equipment, and for the

Polonez, 400 dollars' worth. Hence, in many matters, as this example shows, we do not need to look any further for solutions.

[Question] From what has been said, certain elements of long-term economic strategy appear. Let us try to sort of draw them together.

[Answer] I think that we still need to put all this in order. Let us not forget that we have called 1983-1985 the three-year stabilization period.

[Question] We were successful with the three-year period 1947-1949.

[Answer] We may be with this one too. In the coming years we are going to have to make a more profound reorientation and restructuring of our economy. We have the duty to abide by the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress, which are basically timely. The exploitation of our raw materials resources, the development of traditional industries, like construction machines, shipbuilding, coal, I think...and copper, everything that is produced by the electric-machine industry and light industry. Many elements are unknown today, though. Everyday I look at the prices on the markets for coal, copper, silver. Everything is very changeable.

[Question] I read that the current prices on copper, for example, do not cover costs.

[Answer] No, that is not true. It is profitable for us. It is after all interesting that the less it is processed, the more profitable that copper is for us.

[Question] The commonly held view is that the more something is processed, the more profitable it is.

[Answer] Not always. I will tell you, for example, that it does not pay to export silver in the form of jewelry, better in its pure form.

[Question] I would not be so sure of that.

[Answer] I am indeed sure, because I follow these things. It is a question of customs duty.

[Question] What will happen after the enterprises are demilitarized, when we suspend martial law, or will the provisions of martial law really be lifted all that much?

[Answer] There will have to be the discipline of special rules in our economy for the period of the crisis in the realm of raw materials and basic social needs: shoes, clothing. The latest law of the Sejm provides for this.

[Question] Now a couple of questions which ought to be lighter weight. The government press office issues daily bulletins based on the information from the voivodships. How do you react to the information that owing to a shortage of two coal cars a Bialystok enterprise cannot carry out its export contract with Yugoslavia valued at 300,000 dollars, or that there are 3,437 cars standing at the Compact Car Factory [FSM] for want of upholstery padding, arm-rests, and seats from Plytoleks in Lodz and Zamech in Bydgoszcz, or that 7,478 Marks more is needed to buy glue thread from the FRG, and that this shortage is holding up furniture production, or finally that because of a lack of plowshares in Poznan Voivodship, 18 percent of the land did not get plowed this fall?

[Answer] All my professional life I have fought with myself to reconcile interference in particular matters with their generalization and the search for mechanisms which will eliminate these problems one at a time, if not right away then sometime.

[Question] The way that I read this, my hair stands on end.

[Answer] Just a minute there. It is not a question here of whether I have become used to it or become indifferent. It is a question of viewing these things in the proper perspective and making the proper use of one's time.

[Question] Do you think that somebody will take care of the issues I have mentioned?

[Answer] I do not even know if anyone will take care of it. All I know is that good use would not be made of my time if I were to use it to take care of this detail. The examples you gave are genuine. The first two concern transport. I am currently working on the problem of the proper functioning of domestic railway transportation in 1983-1985. The problems of investment, employment, cooperation with industry, repairs, new rolling stock, altogether everything which should prevent today's problems. Even if I wanted to I would not be permitted to take care of these things: two railway cars here, three there (sometimes unfortunately I do take care of them). I have to focus my energy and experience on what will make the railroads work better, by a little a few months from now, more a year from now, and still much better by the end of 1985.

[Question] Are you happy to go back to the Katowice Steel Mill, or are you not a little sorry about your former workers?

[Answer] I am sorry, yes. I will tell you about it. The workers are still young. Probably only 8 percent of the people there were experienced. These young people came to the mill several, at most a little over a year and some, months before August 1980, from various parts of the country. I understand them. I was with them for those first few days. I am not sorry that they wound up in that very heated, complicated situation. What

I am sorry about is that I was not listened to. After all, I was on that government committee on the talks. Constantly, in various ways, I explained and I warned that you can lose a good thing. There was a well-known case where they wanted to carry the director out on wheels. On the day appointed then, the cart with wheels was put out in front of the director's office. I know the director, a prince of a man, a wonderful professional. The whole thing was set up by a small group of people. A vote was taken against the director. You know how that sort of public vote was taken then. As the minister I announced in the press that I would not recognize the results of any such vote, that the director was going to remain in his post. But in order that there would be no accusations, I went there, and that was the last time I talked to them. In September 1981. I asked them to consider carefully. After all, we know each other. The road on which they were embarking led to catastrophe. But at a certain moment they listened to others. They simply made me sorry because they did not listen to me. They listened to the others, who could stir their emotions.

[Question] But when these staff were going through all this, the people whom after all you know well, the foremen, directors, engineers, managers, at that time they bore the main brunt of the political struggle in the plants, and they had to fight for discipline, against strikes, chaos, and anarchy, and they faced carts on wheels and wheelbarrows.

[Answer] I was with the staff the whole time, and the whole time I lived through these months and hours with them. I think that 95 percent -- and I am not exaggerating here -- behaved themselves in an extremely responsible way, that is, they tried to stabilize things, to restore order, but a few people's nerves just could not stand it. The most optimistic thing about it is that they quickly restored their psychological balance.

[Question] But are you not afraid that after that experience, after a certain spontaneous explosion, that staff will not naturally be opposed to what the reform brings, what it calls for, opposed to independent trade unions and a self-government?

[Answer] Generally I have no fears, although part of the staff is resistant, not just because of those causes you are talking about. And why are you surprised at their opposition?

[Question] I am not surprised, just concerned.

[Answer] I am an optimist, because although they are resistant they are rationalists. They have also learned about the ineffectiveness of the old system of giving orders from their own experience. They will exercise caution, but they will implement the reform and follow the conclusions about the creation of self-governments. The resistance is breath in the cold air. We have to know about this, and we are trying to help them and create conditions for their fears to be proved unjustified.

[Question] The conviction as to the reform must also be the fruit of a certain experience. For the moment the self-government is just a little shoot, and the trade unions a mere hope.

[Answer] I am convinced that you fail to appreciate the changes taking place. There is already more than mere hope.

I recently attended an open party meeting at the Polkowice mine. I belong to the organization. They were all over me! For various matters. They also discussed the subject of unions, and party members started to say that you could bury the idea. Somebody encouraged them to talk, promising that something would be taken care of for them. But this made them upset, and that is a good sign, because they wanted to see these unions without all the agitation. My intuition tells me that things will start to go well on this matter beginning in the spring. And I think they will for other matters too.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

10790

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ROMANIA

UNITY, INDEPENDENCE FROM DACIAN ERA TO PRESENT STRESSED

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[Article by Ilie Ceausescu: "From Burebista's Centralized and Independent Dacian State to the Romanian Socialist State - Unity and Continuity"]

[Text] In its multimillenia history, the Romanian people have struggled with legendary decisiveness in order to maintain their existence and ensure their continuity on the territory on which they were born and developed despite historical vicissitudes. As stressed by the secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, "the history of mankind and, therefore, the history of the Romanian people, is the history of the development of the forces of production and social relationships, the history of class struggle, of struggle against oppression and foreign domination and for national liberation and independent development, and the history of continuing confrontations between the old and the new."¹

From the most ancient times, the Romanian people have risen up with an endless energy against those who interrupted their peaceful pursuits and who treaded upon their home, their ancient land. No one and nothing were able to budge our forefathers from their ancient homeland. With incomparable strength, they defended their lands, language, customs and entire existence. In revealing this truth, Alexandru Vlahuta was to write: "Ferocious storms passed over us. Through them all, we held together and we did not give up and here we stayed. Like the reed, we bent before the wind, but we did not break. We remained the masters of our lands. Only the good lord knows with how much blood we paid for this land, a land precious to all Romanians, precious for its beauty and wealth, precious for the great and lofty events that have taken place on it."²

When the country was in danger, the broad popular masses, all capable people, men and women, young and old rose up together with the army in the struggle. Establishing a brotherhood with the mountains and the centuries-old forests and with the whirling waters, they did not have a moment of peace and rest until the enemy was defeated and driven beyond the borders. In revealing this truth, Nicolae Balcescu felt, with full justification, that for us "the Romanian was born with the duty to be a soldier and to defend the state in times of need and, when the enemy sets foot on Romanian soil, the entire country must be rise up in arms."³

As attested to by the evidence of the past, among the Thracian tribes, which over the ages were organized into powerful and independent political unions, were the Dacians (or, as they were also called, the Getae), the direct ancestors of today's Romanians. The Daco-Getae carried out their social-economic life in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region. They were organized into numerous tribes or tribal unions and concentrated around certain economic, military, political and religious centers, which they called "dave." Righteous, peaceful, but quick to anger and quick of mind, with unequalled courage, the Daco-Getae passionately loved their land, striking out mercilessly at invaders.

From very ancient times, the land ruled by our ancestors constituted the target of certain acts of plundering and invasion on the part of numerous peoples or populations. The first aggressive action against the Daco-Getic lands noted in the writings of the ancient historians was that of the Persians in 514 B.C. during Darius' expedition against the Scythians. On their march towards the mouths of the Danube, the sole resistance that placed the Persians in difficulty came from the Getae. In 335 B.C., Alexandru Macedon launched his expedition against the Getae on the Muntenian Plain. Arrian states that on the left bank of the Danube there were 4,000 mounted troops and 10,000 foot soldiers from the Getae, a group that constituted a sufficiently powerful force. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to cross the Danube, Alexandru Macedon forged the river and began his offense "through the planted fields, ordering the foot soldiers to advance towards the uncultivated lands, slashing the wheat with their curved swords." The hostilities against the Getae were carried out with difficulty. By way of a diversionary action all along the river, the Getae attempted to carry out maneuver to swing around behind the front lines of the Macedonian army, an act which demonstrated a good understanding of military art, great courage and initiative. This maneuver did not succeed, however, with the Getae being forced to withdraw in an organized manner from the city they were defending.⁴

Among the series of battles between the Getae and the Macedonians, there also is the military action of 326 B.C. when General Zopyrion, named the governor of Pontic Thracia by Alexandru Macedon, undertook an expedition to the left of the Danube, an expedition that ended as a catastrophe for him. The Macedonian army was attacked and defeated by the Getae on the Bugeac Plain.⁵ The complete defeat of the Macedonian army was a significant moment in the consolidation of the Getae's power on the Danube and it reinforced their independence. In 292 B.C., Lisimah, the Macedonian king of Thracia, crossed to the north side of the Danube and began a new campaign against the Getae led by Dromihete. Lisimah's army was much larger, a fact which led him to believe that a victory over the Getae would be sufficiently easy. After crossing the Danube, Lisimah's army was followed step-by-step and harassed constantly by the Getae. At the right moment, the Getae, as they were, encircled the arrogant Macedonian army, forcing it to surrender. Lisimah, together with his generals, were captured and taken to the Helis castle. The difficulties of this campaign against the Getae were clearly shown by Diodor, who related the words of king Dromihete when he addressed Lisimah, warning him that the Getic lands are "lands where no foreign soldier can escape under the free sky."⁶

The most significant historical process on a worldwide scale in the second century B.C. from a military and political point of view, one with broad implications on all planes, was Rome's expansion to the northeast. This event caused the Geto-Dacians to be permanently concerned with strengthening their defense capabilities and to find the most adequate forms and methods of combat in order to be able to meet at any moment the danger threatening it.

During the period between the second half of the second century B.C. and the beginning of the first century B.C., concomitantly with the popular resistance against foreign invasions, the Geto-Dacian society, which was being created and affirmed as a distinct entity in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region, continued to develop. There was a significant growth in the economy. There was an ever clearer diversification of material production and there was important progress on the level of spiritual affairs. Paralleling the economic, social and spiritual development of society, there was an ever clear crystalization in the awareness of the leaders of the political-military groupings of the idea of the unity of these political and economic communities and the idea of moving to a higher form of political organization. Thus, there was an ever clearer shaping of the need for a state organization specific to that era. According to historical data, the seeds of the Dacian state must be sought around the end of the first century B.C.. During Burebista's era and, later, under the legendary Decebal, the Dacian state reached a high degree of organization, and Geto-Dacian society recorded a level of development and prosperity equal to that of the great civilizations of the time. As noted in the "Program of the Romanian Communist Party," "there was special importance in the Thracian-Dacian statal organization, which reached its zenith during the period of Burebista's reign and that of Decebal."⁷

Burebista's great personality, as well as the powerful centralized and independent state during his time, are broadly demonstrated in the documents of the era. In the ancient historical data and in the newer histories, commendatory statements are made regarding the great king Burebista and the first centralized and independent Dacian state organized and headed by him. Thus, in evaluating Burebista as a great political and military personality of the time and the Dacian state under his control as a well-organized, powerful and vigorous entity in its full expression and prosperity, Strabon, the renown historian and geographer of antiquity, writes in his famous work "Geography:" "Putting aside the distant past of the Getae, the events of our time are the following: Rising to head up his people, who were exhausted from frequent wars, the Geta Burebista lifted them up so much by way of exercise, abstaining from wine and listening instead of ordering that in several years he had created a powerful state and subjected most of the neighboring populations to the Getae. Yes, he even came to be feared by the Romans."⁸ In a famous text, the decree of the Dionysopolitans issued in honor of Acornion, Burebista was appreciated as "the first and greatest king among the kings of Thracia and ruler of all the lands across and beyond the Danube."⁹ In referring to the Dacian state founded by Burebista, the renown American historian Paul MacKendrick stresses that it was one "of the most remarkable creative aboriginal states of antiquity."¹⁰

Being for a long period of time at the head of the centralized and independent Dacian state, with its capital at Gradistea Muncelului, Burebista was concerned with ensuring the proper conditions for the development of the material and spiritual life in the lands where the Geto-Dacians lived. He also introduced discipline and respect for the law into domestic affairs. From a military point of view, the state led by Burebista had a judicious organization with a numerous and powerful army. Burebista's state exercised its sovereignty over a vast territory: in the northwest to the Slovakian Mountains; in the west to the Middle Danube; in the south to the Haemus (Balkan) Mountains; to the southeast to the northern coast of the Black Sea. The great leader of Dacia established foreign relations and military alliances. From his chancery, ambassadors were sent to many states in the world. The high level of development reached by the state headed by Burebista was a direct expression of the conditions of material and spiritual life in the area inhabited by the Geto-Dacians.¹¹

During Burebista's time, in Dacia there was a remarkable prospering of material production as demonstrated, among other ways, by vigorous handicraft, trade and municipal activities. Through hard work and the people's creative spirit, there was an intensification in the exploration for deposits of gold, silver, iron, copper and salt, cities were built, long and lasting roads were built and cultural buildings of an impressive greatness were constructed. In the fields of Dacia, an agriculture that was prosperous for those times was developed. Growing grain, raising cows, beekeeping and viticulture were the basic pursuits of the people. Concomitantly with the development of the material facet and in close connection with it, spiritual culture fully prospered in Dacia. Numerous sources show that the Geto-Dacians contributed not only to enriching the treasury of the spirituality of Dacia, but also worldwide spirituality. Data from diverse ancient sources and material evidence that has come out of archeological research show that the Geto-Dacians had remarkable knowledge and efforts in the fields of medicine, astronomy, philosophy, architecture and music.

Burebista succeeded in organizing a large army, one that would scare any enemy. Strabon writes that during Burebista's era the Dacian state could employ in war approximately 200,000 people.¹² The figure quoted by the ancient historian is not an exaggerated one if we keep in mind the size of the Dacian state, the number of settlements and the demographic situation. In order to defend the territory, the renowned Dacian king, as well as his forefathers, built fortified settlements and castles. The group of Dacian castles in the Orastie Mountains, true works of art and powerful military structures, is graphic proof of the construction potential of the Dacians.

For Burebista, the shining commander of armies and, at the same time, a great politician and diplomat, it had become clear that the power represented by the centralized and independent Dacian state was not to Rome's pleasing, which, by the end of the second century B.C., had come to rule a good part of the Balkan Peninsula. Under the existing circumstances, the king of the Dacians was constantly concerned about consolidating his borders. The centralized and independent Dacian state, being one of the most powerful states of antiquity, attempted to influence Rome's policies. Thus, Burebista intervened in the conflict that took place between Caesar and Pompei, supporting Pompei. Unfortunately, Burebista's

diplomatic activities were destroyed, in part, by unforeseen factors. One of these factors is related to the fact that Pompei's armies were defeated in the celebrated battle at Pharsalos, with Caesar remaining the sole ruler of Rome. As the fierce enemy of the Dacians, he planned a destructive war against Dacia, to which end he concentrated 16 legions in Macedonia - his departure base for the campaign. For his part, Burebista took the necessary measures for defense, without being impressed by the numerical superiority of the Romans. In the end, the military confrontation between Caesar and Burebista did not take place since, in the course of events, a new unforeseen element intervened. Thus, in 44 B.C. on 15 March Caesar was assassinated. In the same year, in the wake of a conspiracy, Burebista was also replaced.

After Burebista's death, other clever leaders who were capable of great deeds led the Dacian people and they contributed to the prospering of Dacia and its defense against expansionist forces. Among this series of illustrious men, Decebal holds first place. In his time, the Dacian society and state reached its zenith of evolution, attaining a high level of development and civilization. This explains the fact that Decebal's state and army were able to deal with the Roman Empire on an equal basis, to give it resounding defeats and to impose upon it very advantageous peace terms for the Dacians, as was the case after the war of 87-88 A.D..¹³

King Decebal was equipped with exceptional qualities. Having unsurpassed political, military and diplomatic abilities, he showed himself to be capable of lucidly and strongly confronting the foreign dangers that faced Dacia. Through everything that he did for the state he headed, Decebal came into the awareness of the Romanian people and the whole world as a legendary hero and as the symbol of fearlessness and the spirit of sacrifice in the defense of his state's independence and autonomy. In his work "Roman History," Dio Cassius notes that Decebal was "very skilled in war plans and clever in carrying them out, knowing when to select the opportunity to attack the enemy and to withdraw in time. Skilled in selecting courses of action, he was a good fighter, he knew how to use surprise and also how to get out of a defeat in good shape. For this reason, for a long time he was an enemy to fear for the Romans."¹⁴

During Decebal's rule, Dacia became one of the key problem areas in Rome's expansionist plans. After the two Roman-Dacian wars in 101-102 and 105-106 and the Romans' conquering of a part of Dacia, there were essential structural changes in Dacia society in the political, economic, cultural, ethno-linguistic and military fields, with some of these having negative, damaging implications while others had a positive nature, especially along ethno-linguistic and spiritual lines. Actually, this brought out a direct blending of the Dacian and Roman civilizations. Although the Romans conquered a portion of Dacia, the Dacian people were not defeated and, furthermore, were not destroyed by the powerful Roman Empire. By adapting to the new conditions, it continued to actively participate in the development of material and spiritual culture in Dacia. At the same time, the Dacians did not accept the humiliating conditions imposed by the Romans, but, by way of a permanent struggle carried out tacitly or openly, latently or actively, they sought and succeeded in getting more humane working and living conditions.

The conquest of part of Dacia and the establishment of Roman rule had, like any conquest and foreign rule, negative consequences and impacts for the Dacian people. These were felt on a number of planes: the centralized and independent Dacian state, which was at a high level of material and spiritual development, was arbitrarily interrupted in its normal course of prosperity, with this prosperity no longer existing. In this manner, the Dacian people were deprived of its principal means for organizing material and spiritual affairs, and it was deprived of the opportunity to maintain and develop its own army as a basic force in defending its ancestors' land and its wealth against the foreign invaders. Through the conquest of Dacia, the Dacian people were deprived of their most precious commodity - independence, a commodity that personifies a people and allows it to be itself.

Documents and ancient historiography show that, along with the advance of the Romans along the Danube and then to the north of the great river, the two great civilizations - Roman and Dacian - blended together and mutually influenced each other, with the Dacian population assimilating the Latin language, being influenced by elements of the Roman civilization and spirituality and giving it, in this way, the Latin characteristics and spirit with which the Romanian people traveled across nearly two millenia. "Descendants of 'the most righteous and bravest of the Thracians,' as Herodot called the Geto-Dacians, as well as of the proud Romans, the Romanian people," the secretary general of the party stressed, "have always distinguished themselves through a love for truth and right, through bravery and fearlessness in combat and through their will to be masters of their own destiny and to forge their future in complete freedom. This also explains the fact that the great migrations of certain Asian peoples into Europe - a phenomenon that greatly slowed the progress of the societies on this territory - were not able to change the spiritual and moral characteristics of our people."¹⁵

The migrating populations that invaded Romanian territory played a retrograde, negative role, constituting a roadblock in the path of the progress of the Romanian people. Furthermore, this also explains the active and long opposition of our forefathers to all the migrating peoples. Through a decisive and firm struggle, our people heroically defended their land and did not allow the invaders to conquer them. Similarly, it must be said that, when there was an increase in the migrations of the Asian peoples after 271, the year of the withdrawal of the Roman army and administration from Dacia, the Romanian people had already gelled, with the process of the Dacian people accepting the Latin spirituality being primarily completed, which, once again, attests to the Romanian people's 2,000 years and continuity on its Dacian land. This reality is thus presented by our great historian A. D. Xenopol: "At the phisiological roots of the Romanian people we again find the old Dacian prototype, preserved with a purity as great as the clarity of the Roman mind, so that today the Romanian people appear as a Dacian trunk topped with a powerful and beautiful crown of Roman branches, leaves and flowers."¹⁶

As has been pointed out, over the period of the 165 years of Roman rule the Dacian people waged a permanent struggle against the invaders. During this

entire time, common understandings and actions were achieved between the exploited and unhappy people in occupied Dacia and the peoples or populations outside of the empire and, first of all, with the free Dacians. This situation of instability is attested to by the countless documents and, clearly, by the fact of maintaining numerous Roman military forces in the region. The existence of free Dacians close to the territory ruled by the empire facilitated the struggle for liberation waged by the Dacian people against the Roman occupation. In the end, the common actions of the Dacians under Roman rule and the free Dacians led to the elimination of Roman rule in Dacia.

Aurelian's withdrawal in 271 left the territory of Dacia as "an unorganized state which was seen to have the ability to fight and resist the invasions of the migrating peoples."¹⁷ Lacking a centralized state as a principal instrument in organizing its affairs and activities and in defending Romanian lands, in a short period of time the Romanian people adapted to the new historical conditions and waged a stubborn and uninterrupted struggle against the migrating populations in order to defend its existence and to ensure their continuity on the territory where they had been born and had developed. It remained the task of the Romanian people to confront, through their own power, the waves of migrating populations. These populations, at a lower level of civilization and with some of them being of an endless cruelty, caused incalculable harm to the Romanian people. "The conquest of a civilized people by a less civilized people," stresses F. Engels, "naturally hinders economic development and destroys numerous forces of production."¹⁸ The invasions of the migrating peoples and the plundering and lawlessness that they brought could not budge the Romanian people. This fact fully demonstrates the vigor, vitality and ability to resist in our forefathers.

Right from the period of the migrations, the Romanian people, uniformly created throughout the territory of Dacia, moved to a high administrative organization on the basis of the new feudal relations of production that had come to be expressed. The documents of the time began to note the first Romanian feudal formations grouped into voivodeships and principalities. The Romanian people adapted their forms of political organization to the historical conditions specific to that era, one dominated by the migration of Asian peoples. In addition to a movement of the centers of economic and cultural affairs from cities to the villages, there was a demographic concentration in the natural inhabitable territories, especially in the mountainous regions of the Carpathians and their hilly areas, in centuries-old forests never touched by a foreign foot which extended down to the Baragan Plain and the Teleorman, and in other regions that were hard to access, such as those along the Danube wetlands and in the Danube Delta which had an impenetrable vegetation. Under these conditions and in similar safe locations, the Romanian people continued their existence and resistance actions against the migrating peoples. This popular resistance was determined by the structure of the Romanian communities and human settlements. It can be understood that in order to be able to hold out on their own territory these communities were forced, by virtue of the cruel circumstances, to create their own system of defense against the migrating populations, showing that, since the Romanians had their own social-territorial and military organization "founded on fundamental agricultural pursuits," they "ensured the life and continuity of these communities."¹⁹

Restricted by repeated and violent actions of the migrating peoples, the Romanian people in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region ever more closed their ranks, with the villages becoming, under these new circumstances, the basic cells of military organization whose power ensured the defense of these communities. In relationship to the situations that had been created, the military formations of the different communities were joined together, then acquiring the mission of defending the group of villages, the valley in which they were located and so forth. All this could be done only by having the entire population participate in the struggle. Under such conditions, the forms of resistance took on the aspect of popular resistance. The popular character of the Romanian's resistance is further seen in their manner of military organization. Under the new historical conditions, "the villages were grouped together by valleys and the valley was also the principle of the oldest higher organization, one that was at the same time political and military."²⁰ This is the beginning "of the military settlement at the first moment of the Romans' abandonment of Dacia."²¹

The main form of popular resistance to the enemy was, therefore, withdrawal from the path of the invaders into the mountains and forests, where they did not dare to venture. The basic cell for organizing the Romanian people into statal forms, within this given historical framework, was the village council of peasants, which was a Dacian tradition. In referring to the community system of organization, K. Marx discussed the status of the Romanian Countries and wrote: "Their means of production was initially based on community property, in its Slavic or Hindu form. A portion of the lands was independently managed by the members of the council as private free property, and another portion - *ager publicus* - was cultivated by them in common. The products of the common work partly served as a reserve for those years of poor harvests or for other eventualities and partly as a public reserve to cover the costs of war or church expenditures, as well as other expenses of the community."²² The village council demonstrated its vitality under Roman occupation and was able to continue to serve as an essential element in the make-up of the new statal structure. The waves of migrating populations did not lead to the dissolution of the village communities, but rather to their consolidation. This is also explained by the fact that the migrating peoples wanted the subjugated peoples to be organized so as to be able to supply them with the goods that they needed.

Incontestable historical data and arguments attest that the factor that allowed the Romanian people to be victorious in their confrontation with the migrating peoples was their high level of material and spiritual civilization, their numerical superiority and the fact that they had lived in this land for thousands of years. On these bases, it was relatively easy for the Romanian people to assimilate portions of the migrating groups which remained on these lands after their main military forces left this region. It is an incontestable fact that one of the basic duties of the inhabitants in the community was that of defending the goods and lives of the people and the community itself from the intentions of certain malicious forces.²³ Keeping this in mind, we should not treat as a figure of speech the conclusion that "history, therefore, finds the Romanians here before all others and not as a shepherd, but as a soldier. As we will see,

he is the continuous defender of these places and he is the source, as well as the explanation, of ever so lasting military accomplishments of the Romanians."²⁴

Evolving along a constantly ascending path, the village communities joined together for the purpose of defense and development and created unions of communities, which also had an ever greater importance of a military nature. In certain geographic and economic regions they spread out into, for example, river valleys or areas enclosed by mountain chains or hills, and they were given the name "lands" - in the sense of a state or a political-administrative organization (Land of the Hateg, Land of the Lovista and so forth). A "land" was headed by a duke or by a voivode whose main function was a military one, that of being responsible for the defense of the voivodeship or the land.

On the current territory of Transylvania, the statal formations created earlier, long before the close of the first millenium. When the Hungarian tribes began their expansion from the west, from the Pannonian Plain above Transylvania, they encountered firm resistance from the Romanian statal formations and all the Romanian people in the western part of the country. Archeological discoveries and all historical development clearly show that the territory northwest of the Carpathians, lands laced by the waters of the Mures, Somes, Tarnava and the Cris rivers, is an ancient Romanian land, a land inhabited, worked and defended from the most ancient times by the Romanian people, the descendants of the Dacian people who lived and created on the current lands of Transylvania. Keeping in mind these indisputable realities and under such conditions, Transylvania became the land of the first Romanian voivodes, as shown by historical sources. These voivodes, at the head of the popular masses, put up a long resistance to the foreign invaders and conquerers. In this region, in the Land of the Fagaras the documentary news from the beginning of the eighth century, reflecting the ancient political realities, attests to a "Romanian land."²⁵ In the minds of the masses on both sides of the Carpathians, the concept of "the Romanian land" meant all the lands upon which the Romanian people rose and developed from the most ancient times and upon which it created a rich material and spiritual culture. "Our people," noted N. Iorga, "always conceived of their country in connection with the entire past and all the lands upon which they lived."

The awareness of the indissoluble unity of the Romanian people and the Carpathian² Danubian-Pontic lands, which they had inhabited from ancient times and long before other European peoples, and the idea of their unity covered centuries and millenia. This fact was unequivocally demonstrated by Joseph II, the emperor of Austria, when he pointed out that the Romanians "are without a doubt the oldest and most numerous inhabitants of Transylvania."²⁶ For his part, Count Teleki, the president of the Austrian Transylvanian chancery, stated in 1791 that "the Romanians are the oldest inhabitants of Transylvania."²⁷

The Romanian people throughout Transylvania forged their history in a complex and contradictory climate. Thus, the voivodeship of Transylvania was created and developed through a difficult and long struggle with the Hungarian feudal lords, a struggle waged for over centuries. The Hungarians' penetration into Transylvania came long after the conquest of Pannonia by the Hungarian tribes. This was carried

out in stages and gave rise to sharp struggles waged by the Romanian people against the new invaders. Countless battles are broadly recounted in the old popular Hungarian songs and ballads which constituted the source of inspiration for "Gesta Hungarorum" chronicles of the anonymous notary of King Bela III. The chronicles offer a detailed description of the invading military actions conducted by the Hungarian tribes against the Romanians in Transylvania. Among other things, "Gesta Hungarorum" provides a broad description of the native Romanian people in Transylvania and its means of living, organization and economic and spiritual development at the end of the ninth century. Being a document of incontestable value for Romanian and world history, it is not surprising that some Hungarian historians contest the authenticity of Anonymus's writings. Regardless, however, of the opinion of such historians, it is a certain fact that in "Gesta Hungarorum," in "Chronicon Hungaricum" by Simon of Keza, in "The Chronicles Described From Vienna," in "The German Chronicles From Hildesheim" and in all the documents of the Hungarian kings broad references are made to the existence of the Romanians in Transylvania and to their manner of living and social and military organization.

From these chronicles it is a recognized fact that the Romanians in Transylvania, led by the dukes or viovodes Glad, Gelu and Menumorut, waged heroic battles and put up a firm resistance to the expansion of the Hungarian tribes. Later, the Hungarian feudal lords waged wars both against the voivode of Transylvania, Julia (1002-1003), and against the voivode Ahtum in the Banat, who, after great difficulty, they were able to defeat. After the death of King Stefan I, the voivodeships of the Romanians in Transylvania and the Banat, profiting from the weakness of the Hungarian kingdom that had been caused by internal crises, reacquired their sovereignty. As a result, in the 11th century the so-called rule of the Hungarian feudal lords over Transylvania is not contested by a single document. "The Chronicles Described From Vienna" note that during this period the invaders were stopped for a long time at Poarta Mesesului. This fact is also demonstrated by the settlement of the Szecklers in Bihor, in other words, at the border. And, also at that time the Latin name of Transylvania appeared - "The land beyond the forests." This denotes the fact that the resistance of the Romanians and their struggle to defend the ancient land were very powerful.

Towards the end of the 11th century and the beginning of the 12th century, the Hungarian kingdom resumed the expansionist actions against Transylvania, actions that lasted until the beginning of the 13th century. They encountered the decisive resistance, however, of the Romanian people and, as a result, had to deal with many difficulties. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Hungarians penetrated Transylvania only in certain more accessible directions: through Poarta Somesului and through the Mures Valley, where they temporarily settled. Some regions in Transylvania, the more exposed ones, were colonized with Szecklers, Germans and Teutons (after a short period of time, they left for Prussia). The rest of the Transylvanian territories, like those in Maramures, in the region of the Apuseni Mountains and others, especially the rural localities

in these areas, remained regions unaffected by the Hungarian expansion. Therefore, naturally in these areas the negative, harmful consequences of this expansion could not be felt.

The fact that the Romanians fought heroically to defend their land was also noted by the Hungarian nobility. For example, in a letter addressed to the special envoy of Emperor Joseph II, Count Jankovich after the suppression of Horea's revolt, it was pointed out: "Our parents, coming from Scitia, conquered this land with victorious weapons and their blood and after they subjugated and enslaved the Romanian parents who today revolted against us they ruled quietly over them, always maintaining a harsh discipline over them, but leaving untouched their manner of living."²⁸ This document clearly shows the massive existence of Romanians in Transylvania at all times, including, therefore, during the time of the Hungarians' arrival in these lands. Similarly, it shows the autonomous, separate development of Transylvania with regards to the Hungarian kingdom.

In order to counteract this Romanian resistance and divide the Romanians, who formed a compact mass, the Hungarian kings brought in Szeckler, Saxon and Teuton colonists, settling them in different points in Transylvania, especially in the border regions. As some historians note, the Szecklers are the descendants of the Huns. They were brought in as colonists by the Arpadian kings at the end of the 11th century and the beginning of the 12th century to the northwestern parts of Transylvania, in the land of the Cris rivers where, later, they were moved to the southeastern corner. They easily assimilated the Hungarian language. From the 12th century to modern times, they operated as an ethnic group separate from the Hungarians, as a distinct entity. The number of Szecklers at the time of colonization was very small. If over 800 years - in other words, until the census of 1930 - they reached approximately 400,000 in number, this was due to a good degree to the fact that the Romanians in the region where they were settled were subjected to a cruel denationalization.²⁹ This explains the fact that after the suppression of the peasant revolt at Bobilna (1437) when the "Unio Trium Nationum" was concluded, this alliance was made up of Hungarians, Szecklers and Saxons and directed against the Romanian people, who were considered as tolerated on their own land and, as an irony of fate, considered as such by those who had come and had been colonized only a short time before.

With regards to what has been pointed out a remark is necessary: the alliance of the three groups of "visitors" that had arrived in the Transylvanian lands, which constituted a joint combat pact against the Romanians, shows the giant force that the Romanians had. Because of the resistance of the Romanians, who represented the absolute majority of the population, this Romanian land preserved its separate, autonomous existence and its institutions. Thus, Transylvania was organized in a political sense as a voivodeship and was headed by a voivode, as had been the Romanian statal formations many centuries before and as they were to be organized later. One of the voivodes of Transylvania, in 1111, was named Mercurius and in 1176 another voivode named Eustatiu was noted.

At the beginning of the eighth century, when the Hungarian expansion covered some of the parts of the territory of Transylvania, the voivodeship was organized into counties headed by comitia that were named by the Hungarian king for the Banat and by a voivode for those in Transylvania, a fact that indicates still another element of the autonomy of Transylvania as a separate aspect from that of the Hungarian kingdom. The power of the voivodeship of Transylvania, including military power, was considerable, equalling frequently that of an independent state. The voivode Roland (1282-1293), for example, dealt with the king of Hungary from the position of a true sovereign.

The organization of Transylvania into voivodeships, the survival of other native institutions (principalities, "lands" and trial according to the customs of the land), the granting of broad autonomy to the Romanian districts and the Saxon and Szeckler centers, and so forth even more strengthened the autonomy of the voivodeship of Transylvania and its independent development. The relations with the Hungarian kingdom were those of vassalage characteristic of the Middle Ages, relations which did not involve the loss of autonomy. It must be remembered that Transylvania, until the 16th century, was not ruled by Hungarians, but was an autonomous voivodeship, which meant a separate entity that depended upon the Hungarian kingdom and had relationships of feudal dependency.

The autonomous, and therefore separate, development of Transylvania with regards to Hungary was recognized by many chroniclers and historians of the Middle Ages, with this also including some Hungarians. Thus, the historian Ladislau Kovary stressed that, differing from Hungary which, during Stefan's era, was directed towards the West, Transylvania, on the contrary, was oriented towards the East, with its population being of the Orthodox religion.³⁰ Along this line, the Hungarian historian Sandor Szilagyi clearly stressed that "Transylvania and Hungary remained two different countries which 'never' fully blended together."³¹ In the second half of the 16th century, in researching the realities in Transylvania the Italian missionary Antonio Possevino expressed his surprise that in the face of all the threats and dangers the Romanians were so steadfast in their laws and Orthodox rites.³² There is a series of incontestable data filled with the truth and stemming from historical reality about the manner in which the real development of the voivodeship of Transylvania evolved. In a situation of suzerainty towards Hungary and with a greater or lesser degree of autonomy, depending upon the circumstances, Transylvania developed until the beginning of the 16th century. This pronounced status of autonomy that Transylvania had was due, without a doubt, to the firm, heroic struggle and popular resistance carried out for a long time by the entire Romanian people. Only in this way can the fact be explained that the Hungarian kingdom did not succeed in annexing Transylvania and transforming it into one of its provinces.

Beginning with the certain elements recorded in all types of documents, native and foreign, one can conclude without fear of error that in Transylvania the Romanians have a continuity of 4,000 years through their direct ancestors, the Dacians, as the great historian Nicolae Iorga stated. When the Hungarian tribes

began their expansion into Transylvania in the tenth century, they found the Romanian voivodeships and principalities and a developed economic, political and cultural life at the level of that era. The Romanian people put up a firm and long resistance to the Hungarian expansionism. Only in the 13th century did the Hungarian kingdom succeed in penetrating in certain directions into Transylvania and conquering certain regions. Because of the Romanians' resistance, the Hungarian kingdom did not succeed in incorporating Transylvania, with Transylvania continuing to function as an autonomous voivodeship with its own institutions and laws under the suzerainty of the Hungarian kingdom.

After the battle at Mohacs (1526), the Ottoman Empire transformed Hungary into a pashalik, with it disappearing as a state in 1541, while the voivodeship of Transylvania, having its own diet and laws, was transformed into a principality under the suzerainty of the Porte, having the same legal system as Muntenia and Moldavia.

In 1599, Mihai the Brave removed Transylvania from under the Ottoman suzerainty, and in 1600 achieved the Great Unification of the three Romanian lands, Transylvania, Moldavia and Muntenia, creating the centralized and independent Romanian state, with few like in in Europe at the time.

As a result of the victories won by the Austrians over the Turks at Vienna (1683), Buda (1686) and Mohacs (1687), Transylvania and Hungary were occupied by Austria, with each having a separate statute. Through the Leopold papers of 4 December 1691, Transylvania became dependent upon the Habsburg Empire, in the form of a principality with its own institutions, laws and princes, recognizing its distinct position with regards to Hungary. This situation lasted until 1867 when the Austro-Hungarian union was achieved through Hungary's renunciation of the principle of independence and sovereignty, since the key positions of the state were already surrendered to Austria, which held the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, internal affairs and war. Through this shameful circus, Transylvania came to depend upon Hungary for some offices, while for foreign, finance, internal and military problems it depended upon Austria. In other words, for only 51 years (1867-1918) Transylvania depended in part upon Hungary, which unleashed upon the Romanian population a cruel policy of social oppression and denationalization. This was put to an end by the national liberation movement fulfilled by the Romanians on 1 December 1918.

To the south and east of the Carpathians, the Romanian people found sufficient energy to organize popular resistance and to preserve their ethnic character, unity and continuity on the ancient lands. In these parts of the country, the Tatar pressures brought about an ardent effort to find the means of resistance south of the Carpathians. Internal and external conditions reinforced the decision of the local Romanian leaders to unite and to create their own political organizations as indispensable instruments to defend the life and existence of the Romanian communities. Basarab I, who became the ruler of Muntenia, won many victories over the Tatars during the period 1324-1328 through repeated surprise attacks, extending his authority east to the vicinity of Chilia. The Romanian lands north of the mouths of the Danube, which Basarab I joined with Muntenia, took his name - Basarabia.

In the fall of 1330, the Hungarian army under the leadership of King Carol Robert de Anjou attacked and conquered the fortress at Severin and then advanced towards Muntenia. When the Romanians adopted the tactic of scorched earth, and the Hungarians were lacking sources of supplies, they were forced to turn back. During the withdrawal, the Hungarian troops suffered a serious loss in the mountains at a place called Posada. The battle lasted 4 days (9-12 November). The proud Hungarian cavalry was caught like "fish in a net," like "children in their cradles" by "a multitude of Vlachs." Positioned in the rocks, the Romanians threw spears and large rocks down on the enemy. The surprise and panic was indescribable. Many prisoners and rich booty were taken, including weapons, clothing, valuable vases, gold, silver and fully-equipped horses. After he was "on the verge of disaster," King Carol Robert managed to escape disguised in the clothes of one of his advisors who had fallen during the battle.

Thus, through a tenacious and long struggle Muntenia succeeded in consolidating its independence, strengthening its defense capabilities, reinforcing its borders and increasing its international prestige.

The independent Romanian state Moldavia was created to the east of the Carpathians through the unification of existing political organizations and through a series of military and political actions similar to those that took place in Muntenia. The unification of the state political organisms on Moldavian territory was supported by the Romanians' resistance struggle waged against the foreign invaders, especially against the Tatars. The voivode Dragoș from Maramures, who distinguished himself in the battles against the Tatars, became the leader of the lands to the east of the Carpathians, but depending upon the king of Hungary. Profiting from the fact that Hungary was involved in a war with Venice, Bogdan from Maramures removed his successor, Dragoș, from the throne of Moldavia and achieved the independence of the Moldavian state in 1359.

Under Bogdan I, the Romanian political organizations to the east of the Carpathians were included in the same state, with the Hungarian kingdom being forced to accept the situation that was created. In this manner, the Romanian state of Moldavia came into being as a result of a broad and complex resistance struggle waged by the broad popular masses to the east of the Carpathians.

Also in the 14th century, Dobruđa, an ancient Romanian land, became an independent state, playing an important political role in the Balkan Peninsula. Assuming the leadership of this land, Dobrotici, one of the leaders of the Romanian population, extended its authority towards the Danube and achieved the organization of its political formations, which became one of the most important powers in the Balkan Peninsula after 1371. In 1388, a large Ottoman expedition threatened to transform the territory between the Danube and the Black Sea into a pashalik. Mircea the Old's energetic intervention saved Dobruđa from Turkish domination and united it with Muntenia.

The creation of independent Romanian states in the 14th century to the north of the Danube and the Black Sea opened a new era in the history of our people. The

shining victories that the Romanian countries won against the Ottoman power led to an increase in their international prestige and allowed them to exist independently under circumstances where the great European states were transformed into pashaliks. Although the Romanian countries existed for a long time as separate feudal states, this did not affect the ethnic unity of the Romanian people, as expressed in the commonality of their language and culture and in the similarities of the economic and social structures throughout the entire Dacian territory. Among them, they permanently preserved close political, economic and spiritual ties and their internal organization (the court, the high offices, justice, the army and other feudal institutions), with these being, for the most part, identical or similar.

The three Romanian principalities, Muntenia, Moldavia and Transylvania, were created and developed, the secretary general of the party stresses, "in the struggle against foreign domination, in order to be unified in a powerful state capable of countering foreign invasions and ensuring independent development. It will forever remain in the memory of our people the legendary struggles waged by Mircea the Old, Stefan the Great, Mihai the Brave and so many others who decisively stood up against foreign domination and for the defense of their own existence and for the affirmation of the Romanian people."³³

Concomitant with the process of organizing and consolidating the Romanian feudal states, the Ottoman Empire succeeded in conquering and transforming the states in the Balkan Peninsula into pashaliks, reaching up to the Danube by the end of the 14th century. Then, the Habsburg or czarist empires were created or developed in the vicinity of the Romanian principalities. The expansionist policies of the great powers represented a grave danger for the independence and unity of our people. Under these types of conditions, the Romanian countries had to create a common front (in a political, military and diplomatic sense) against the aggressions and invasion actions, with the firm struggle for unity, freedom and independence being a defining characteristic of our entire history.³⁴

The efforts of the great Romanian rulers were dedicated to this political credo. These rulers led the resistance of the people against those who wanted the Romanian lands, won shining victories on the battlefields of defense and promoted a wise diplomacy which, together, contributed to maintaining the statal autonomy of the Romanian countries. In this regard, there is significance in the ties established between the three principalities which show not only the need for a common front against foreign aggression, but, especially, the permanent desire to be unified in a single state of all the Romanians. For example, in April 1479, the soldiers in Brasov wrote to Stefan the Great: "It seems that you were selected and sent by God to lead and defend the Ardeal," "our too gracious ruler."³⁵ In 1536, Petru Rares suggested to Ferdinand of the Habsburgs the creation of an anti-Ottoman army, especially coming from the three Romanian countries, an army made up of 45,000 Moldavians, 20,000 Transylvanians, 25,000 Muntenians and 15,000 soldiers from the Empire. These troops were to be led by the Romanian ruler himself.³⁶ And, it was also Petru Rares who proposed in 1542 to the Transylvanians that

together with the Moldavians and the Muntenians, who were to send their soldiers to Transylvania, they should create a diet for their common defense,³⁷ and idea evaluated by N. Iorga as expressing an attempt to have "a true Dacian union."³⁸

In addition to the external factors that called for such a policy, there also were internal-economic and social-cultural factors of appropriate and decisive weight. Of great importance in maintaining the existence and statal unity of the Romanian countries in the ancient Dacian homeland were the ties, on many levels, between the Romanian countries for the cultivation and evolution of their common language and common traditions, since "the idea of the unification of the Romanian countries and the ideals of creating a powerful state on the lands of Dacia could never be killed because they are deeply embedded in the blood itself and the awareness and spirit of all our people!"³⁹

The political, diplomatic, military, ethnic and cultural interdependency of the Romanian principalities represents an essential reality and a constant element in the history of the Romanian people throughout the Middle Ages.⁴⁰ All these economic, political and spiritual, objective and subjective factors constituted all the premises for the unification of the Romanian countries under the rule of Mihai the Brave.

The completion of the first unification of the three Romanian feudal states - Transylvania, Muntenia and Moldavia - into a single Romanian unified and independent state from 1599 to 1600 was the natural and normal result of the economic, political and cultural development of Romanian society and the struggle of the entire people for freedom and unity. The political moment required the appearance of a personality of the caliber of Mihai the Brave - capable of using and bringing about this reality and of carrying out an ideal for which other illustrious predecessors had been militating during their times. Nicolae Balcescu writes that he achieved "the beloved dream of the greatest voivodes of the Romanians. Now, the Romanian has achieved brotherhood with a Romanian and they all have the one and the same country, the one and the same national leadership, as they had not been since the forgotten times of antiquity."⁴¹ This great achievement was part of the broad process carried out throughout Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries when other centralized feudal states were created, such as the French, English and Russian states, on the basis of the same economic, social, political and cultural factors, certainly with certain characteristics specific to each people. These states, however, were not subjected to certain external pressures of the seriousness of the ones that Mihai the Brave had to overcome in the historical act that he carried out, pressures that were, in fact, the decisive cause of the dissolution of the statal union achieved by the great voivode of all Romanians.

Despite all this, the ideal of the unification achieved by Mihai the Brave was transmitted from one era to the next, from one generation to the next, being a dominant factor in the political, military, diplomatic and cultural

thoughts and actions of the great Transylvanian, Muntenian and Moldavian voivodes that followed him: Matei Basarab, Vasile Lupu, Serban Cantacuzino, Gheorghe Duca, Constantin Brincoveanu, Gheorghe Rakoczi II and others. In expressing this truth, Nicolae Iorga pointed out with a justified basis that the name of Mihai the Brave has become a true symbol of the struggle of the Romanians for state unity. Our illustrious historian stressed: "From 1600, not a single Romanian could imagine unification without his giant personality, without his sword or saber raised towards the sky of righteousness, without his picture of a clean and outstanding tragic poetry." Later, the fact that the czarina of Russia herself, Catherine II, foresaw, clearly for Russia's own purposes, the creation of the state "known at other times under the name of Dacia,"⁴² is an expression of the recognition of the objective process of the unified development, in all its aspects, of the Romanian people in the ancient homeland of Dacia. This conferred the guarantee of a powerful state through the awareness of the unity of a people, a reality that had long ago entered into European political awareness.

During the profound transformations that occurred on the general European level in the 18th century, during the social movement and in the innovative political thought that continually developed and was expressed, the Romanian principalities made an original contribution that was supported by their own realities and by the multi-century experience of struggling to maintain their own ethnic being and institutions on their ancient territory. During this period, the feeling of pride towards our past of glorious struggle and towards our national history became predominant in Romanian public opinion. As a result, the movement for emancipation and national unity acquired new dimensions through the "School of Ardeal" and through the cultural and political movements and associations in Muntenia and Moldavia. The words "Dacia" and "Daco-Romanian" became a leitmotif on the cover of the historical and literary publications of the era.⁴³

Carried out under complex conditions, the 1821 revolution led by Tudor Vladimirescu marked the beginning of the modern history of Romania, demonstrating the large revolutionary resources of the popular masses and their high ideals of political unity and independence.⁴⁴ The 1821 revolution was the precursor of the 1848 revolution in the Romanian countries. The program ideas and the powerful ideas that characterized it and that were fully imposed during the preparation for and the carrying out of the 1848 revolution are the ideas of national unity and independence.⁴⁵

The high ideals of the 1848 revolution, for which the broad masses of the Romanian people fought, were to bear fruit after a decade when, on 24 January 1859, the bases of the modern national Romanian state were put in place through an act of will of the Romanian nation.⁴⁶ The domestic policy of consolidating the state, achieved by the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza through a series of reforms and measures of a progressive nature, occurred along with the attention given to strengthening Romania's position on the foreign plane for the purpose of gaining absolute independence and completing state unity.⁴⁷

The 1859 unification marked the country's entry into a new stage of its evolution, furthered the national liberation struggle for the Romanians still under foreign domination and contributed to the acceleration of the rate of development of production forces through the creation of a larger internal marketplace. During the period that followed, the fact was more clearly demonstrated that the progress recorded by the Romanian state in all fields of activity had become incompatible with the anachronism of Ottoman suzerainty and the status of a protectorate of European powers, and that it had demonstrated all the conditions for acquiring its full independence.

The centuries of sacrifice and of uninterrupted efforts aimed at the freedom and progress of the country objectively led to the historic act of 9 May 1877. Expressing the will and aspirations of the entire Romanian people, the Parliament on that day proclaimed by unanimous vote the absolute independence of Romania. The acquisition of state independence, heroically gained on the battlefield of the battle for independence, put an end to the country's political dependency on foreign powers and flatly stated the independent nature of our nation, opening a new era in the existence of the Romanian people and the development of modern Romania on the path of progress and civilization.⁴⁸ The Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878 recognized the new international status of Romania and the reunification of Dobrudja to the Motherland, Dobrudja, the ancient Romanian territory taken away by the Porte in 1417, despite certain powerful opposition and certain plans to diminish the country's territorial sovereignty and integrity.⁴⁹ As noted in "The Program of the Romanian Communist Party," "the acquisition of national independence gave a new and powerful push to the country's economic and social development, exercised a profound influence on the entire historical evolution of Romania on the path of social progress and permitted the ever more vigorous affirmation of our people as an independent nation."⁵⁰ By eliminating the last remnants of Ottoman suzerainty, Romania gained its legal equality with all sovereign states. In the following years, it concluded a series of commercial and political treaties with other countries that were designed to ensure its free and sovereign existence in the international arena. At the same time, the opportunity was created for the Romanian people to develop, under favorable conditions, the struggle for national unification by uniting with Romania those territories still under foreign domination.

At the beginning of the 20th century, social-economic and political development in the area across and beyond the Carpathian Mountain chain, the growth of the forces of production, the consolidation of capitalist relations, the broadening of commercial trade with other countries and the progress of Romanian society raised before the Romanian nation the inexorable need to complete its state unity and to create a unified national Romanian state. V. I. Lenin had noted that in the Balkans state construction in the bourgeois-national direction had not been completed and that a large number of Romanians were still living outside of their state borders.⁵¹

The world war of 1914-1918 made a powerful impact upon the carrying out of the Romanian people's national liberation struggle, as well as that of other peoples under foreign oppression. Having at its basis the struggle of the imperialist states to divide the world and to create certain new spheres of influence, this war was condemned by the revolutionary forces in Romania, as well as in other countries. Romania's participation in the conflict, however, was not determined by intentions involving conquest and territorial annexation, but by the desire to liberated territories inhabited by Romanians and still under foreign rule.⁵²

The war strongly shook the old order, sharpening to a maximum social and national contradictions, bringing about an unprecedented intensification of the struggle of the peoples oppressed by the great multinational empires for social and national liberation. The fall of the czar and the victory of the October Socialist Revolution sounded an ardent call for all the people in the world to achieve their aspirations for freedom and self-determination. In this atmosphere, the eastern part of Moldavia was first declared the independent Moldavian Republic, later, on 27 March 1918, it was united with Romania. At the same time, the Romanian territories that had been annexed by Austria-Hungary experienced broad popular manifestations and demonstrations during 1918 that eloquently expressed the broad masses' aspirations for unity and liberty. The unraveling of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy accelerated the Romanians' struggle for the unification of Bukovina with Romania, an act completed on 28 November 1918. On 1 December 1918, over 100,000 workers, peasants, intellectuals, craftsmen and people of other social categories met in Alba Iulia on the grounds of Cimpul lui Horea to consecrate the natural, objective and progressive act of unifying Transylvania, Crisana and the Banat with Romania. Thus, this concluded the Romanians' nearly 2,000 year struggle for their reunification in a unified national state within the boundaries of ancient Dacia.⁵³

The completion of Romania's national-state unity strongly demonstrates the historical argument that this event was the natural result of a long process and not a consequence of foreign circumstances or certain understandings reached at the negotiating table. The peace treaties of Saint Germain (1919), Trianon and Paris (1920) finalized on an international level a situation that had actually been created by the struggle of the popular masses and the entire Romanian people. The creation of the unified national Romanian state after more than 18 centuries of struggle and sacrifice is an epocal historical achievement of the Romanian people. It had the most profound consequences in the affairs of Romanian society and in the evolution of Romania on the path of progress and civilization. "The creation of the unified national state," emphasizes the secretary general of the party, "brought about Romania's entry into a new stage of development, creating the premises for the more intense development of the forces of production and the acceleration of the country's economic and cultural progress."⁵⁴

It should be mentioned that noting the two millenia-long struggle of our people carried out from the creation of the centralized and independent

Dacian state up to today for the achievement of its high and noble ideals of independence and state unity does not satisfy some historians and pseudo-historians. They are especially irritated by the conclusions that are obvious with regards to our long existence on the lands where we live. Ignoring reality, which is amply shown in historical documents or sources, some of these people go so far as to deny even the fact that we, the Romanians, have any ties with the Thracian-Getic-Dacian peoples. These so-called historians, wherever they may be, have received and will continue to receive the appropriate rebuffs from all Romanians of good will.

At the appropriate times, they received such rebuffs from our illustrious chroniclers, as well as from the chroniclers from the eras closer to us, whose sensibility placed them at all times at the front of actions that constituted decisive turning points in the historical evolution of our people. That is why in a reception speech at the Romanian Academy Liviu Rebreanu said: "Current Romania and the former Dacia are congruent not only with regards to geographic configurations, but also Romanian ethnographic configurations. This fact alone, this eye-opening evidence should provoke thoughts, if not disarm, the apostols interested in Romanian discontinuity in our own country. What arguments of continuity can be more plausible than the existence of the same people, in the same places for more than 2,000 years? Discontinuity would be totally inexplicable. People have been seen to move to another country, people are known to have completely disappeared, but to have a people that disappears, scatters about only to reappear after many hundreds of years in exactly the places from where they disappeared would be a miracle that could happen only in certain allegorical historical books."55

In connection with the theory of those historians who attempt to support the existence, during a certain period, of a void in the Romanian region, the secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party states: "I believe that they received their answer a long time ago. First of all, the more advanced and cultured people themselves from those times answered this question about the inhabitants and voivodeships existing in the Carpathian-Danubian region - and, I think that they were more knowledgeable than some of today's historians who attempt to be all-knowing and deny realities and that which is the result of historical development. The answer to this question was given by Mircea, Stefan the Great, Ioan of Hunedoara and Mihai the Brave; those who defeated Baiazid, those who held out against so many conquerors and those who created the first centralized state of Romanians in Muntenia, Moldavia and Transylvania. They did not come from some other place, they did not fall out of the sky, they were born and lived here on this land and defended it with their blood. They continued their common existence on these lands throughout the hundreds of years, and they organized, developed and fought to live free and independent."56

By achieving the unified national Romanian state in 1918, an act of profound national right was achieved, and, thus, a natural agreement was ensured between the objective reality and inalienable rights of the Romanian people,

including the coinhabiting nationalities. Thus, a natural, necessary framework was created for the full affirmation of the creative spirit of the broad masses even though the ruling classes in Romania, regardless of their ethnic origin, did everything to use the great advantages of the Unification in their own interests. On a foreign level, Romania promoted a policy that pursued the consolidation of the unified national state, coming out in favor of international cooperation based on equality and mutual respect for independence and territorial integrity and supporting any initiative designed to exclude war and the threat of force from interstate relations.

Under the new economic and social-political conditions that were created after the achievement of the unified national Romanian state, the broad popular masses did not stop for a single moment the struggle to consolidate state unity and to acquire democratic rights and freedoms, and against any form of social and national oppression. Under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party, they fought with firmness against social oppression and decisively came out against the expansion of Hitlerist Germany and the revisionist policies of Horthyst Hungary, which represented a potential danger for the independence and integrity of Romania and for world peace. These pressures culminated in the fascist Vienna Diktat of 30 August 1940, by which Romania arbitrarily lost its northwestern part. The entire people, including the working masses of the coinhabiting nationalities in Romania rose up and fought against this unprecedented injustice in the history of relations between states.⁵⁷

The carrying out of the national and social, antifascist and antiimperialist liberation revolution in August 1944, an action with the participation of all the Romanian people, led by our communist party, and the army in its totality, confirmed the justness of the struggle of the popular masses in Romania waged for nearly 2,000 years for social and national right and for independence and the defense of the ancient lands. Thus ended, in full and great success, the Romanian people's epochal struggle for independence and state unity, and it opened new paths for the movement of Romanian society on the path of impetuous development without precedent towards a socialist society. As an act of national dignity, 23 August represents a shining crown to a glorious past of struggle and a remarkable summary of the heroic centuries of struggles and revolutionary battles against internal and foreign exploitation and for social and national liberation. At the passionate call of the Romanian Communist Party, the Romanian army, understanding its responsibility at those crucial moments, continued the battle with full firmness to liberate the country's lands until the total victory over Nazi Germany, enjoying the full and inspired support of all the people.

The national and social, antifascist and antiimperialist liberation revolution opened the path for carrying out the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and for moving to the building of socialism, providing the conditions necessary for certain profound revolutionary transformations in Romanian society and strongly reinforcing the Romanian socialist state. This path was filled with significant and important events.

On the basis of the platform of the National Democratic Front, proposed by the Romanian Communist Party on 26 September 1944, which other progressive parties and groups later supported, and the program for governing of the National Democratic Front published on 29 January 1945, the government presided over by Dr Petru Groza, the first revolutionary-democratic government with a pronounced worker-peasant character, was installed on 6 March 1945. One of the first achievements of this government was the legislation of agrarian reforms, an achievement of special significance, which led to the consolidation of the democratic system and the Romanian state overall. The National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party (October 1945) outlined the specific paths for economic reconstruction, giving, among other things, a principled basis for the policy of industrializing the country. The measures outlined on this occasion by the Romanian communists and, later, their implementation consolidated the country's economy, directly contributing to strengthening the Romanian state. The first post-war parliamentary elections, on 19 November 1945, which were won categorically by the democratic forces with 79.86 percent of the total votes, demonstrated the masses' broad adherence, led by the RCP, to the new system and their decision to further support the policy of the revolutionary transformation of Romanian society.

During the period to which we are referring, in expressing the people's will the democratic government undertook in foreign affairs a series of actions that raised the level of the Romanian state's international prestige. It is appropriate for us to mention in this regard that diplomatic relations were reestablished with the USSR (in August 1945), the United States and Great Britain (in February 1946) and, then, on 10 February 1947 Romania signed in Paris the Peace Treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers, a document that also ratified on an international legal level the null character of the Vienna Diktat.⁵⁸

On 30 December 1947, the monarchy was abolished, with Romania proclaiming itself a people's republic. This act constituted a great step forward along the path of strengthening and consolidating our state, opening the path for creating a new, socialist type of state. In February 1948, through the unification of the Romanian Communist Party and the Social-Democrat Party, the sole party of the working class was created as the leading political force in the state, which, in 1965, naturally reassumed the name of the Romanian Communist Party. Following the nationalization of the main industrial, banking, insurance and transportation enterprises (11 June 1948), we ensured the elimination of the economic power of the great bourgeoisie, thus laying the basis for a socialist economy and creating the premises for moving to the planned management of the entire national economy. By successfully completing the economic plans in 1949 and 1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1960 and 1960-1965, based on the policy of the socialist industrialization of the country, in a practical sense the technical-material basis was laid for the building of socialism in Romania. The conclusion of the collectivization process in agriculture in the spring of 1962 marked the generalization of the socialist production relations in the entire economy.⁵⁹

During this entire period, important revolutionary transformations were achieved in Romania, passing through several historical stages: revolutionary-democratic power was installed; the exploiting classes were overthrown and the socialist revolution triumphed; and the Romanian people, under the leadership of its communist party, laid the bases for socialism on Romanian territory. At the same time, in accordance with these achievements, our state was strengthened and consolidated.

In 1965, the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party took place, which constituted a fundamental turning point in the economic, social, political, diplomatic and cultural-scientific development of Romania, as well as in the style of work and realistic and concrete means specific to the realities of our country for dealing with the problems of building a multilaterally developed socialist society and advancing Romania towards communism. The guidelines established at this forum of Romanian communists directly called for the growth of the role of the party and socialist state in building a multilaterally developed socialist society in Romania and advancing the country towards communism.⁶⁰

On 21 August 1965, the Grand National Assembly approved a new Constitution which proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Romania and which defined the fundamental characteristics, essence, social content and functions of the state and ratified the socialist nature of Romanian society and the unified and independent nature of the Romanian state. In November 1968, at the initiative of the Romanian Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Front was created (since January 1980 the Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity), within which all the social forces of the country were united under the leadership of the party, with this being a representative political organism of a permanent nature. Right from the creation of this organization, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was elected president of the Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity.

The 10th, 11th and 12th Party Congresses and the National Party Conferences outlined the guidelines for the country's development, establishing, at the same time, new and important measures regarding the growth of the role and attributes of our socialist state in carrying out domestic and foreign policies.

During the period since Romania became a socialist state, great and profound revolutionary transformations have occurred in our country which have changed the picture of the country from its foundations. During these years, Romania was transformed from an agrarian country with a poorly developed economy to a country with an industrial-agrarian economy, with a powerful, modern industry and with a socialist agriculture in full development. The secretary general of our party points out: "The most significant historical achievement of this period was the elimination for forever of the exploitation of man by man, both in the cities and in the villages, and the shift of the means of production and all the country's wealth into the people's hands, who became the masters of the national wealth and the fruits of their own labor and who are consciously making their own free, communist future."⁶¹ Throughout this

period, our socialist state continued to be strengthened and consolidated and its activities were premanently improved, with the principles of scientific and collective leadership of society being placed ever more firmly at the basis of all social affairs.

In the process of building the new social order, we can clearly note the period inaugurated by the Ninth Party Congress, the most fertile and fruitful one in the entire history of Romania. The Romanian economy experienced a dynamic, unprecedented growth expressed in the rapid development of the forces of production and the continuing improvement of the organization and leadership of socialist society, social relations and all areas of activity. Today's Romania appears as a socialist country that has had an impressive amount of progress in all economic and social fields and as a country that consistently fulfills its draft plans for multilateral socialist development and whose prestige and authority has continually increased in all the directions throughout the world.

The great successes achieved in building the new system are expressed in ensuring the harmonious progress of the country, in placing industry, agriculture and the other branches of material production on modern bases, in increasing the economic potential of all of the counties, in developing education, science and culture, in improving production relations and the organization of social affairs, in broadening socialist democracy and strengthening worker self-management and in continuing to raise the material and spiritual standard of living of all our people. These achievements are synthetically reflected in the growth of industrial production by 50 times over compared to 1938, in the growth of the social product by over 15 times, national income per inhabitant by over 11 times and the workers total real income by over 6 times, and in the general advancement of the country to new peaks of progress and civilization.

The powerful development of the forces of production in our country and the revolutionary changes that have occurred in production and social relations have brought about changes as well in the structure of Romanian society, in the physiognomy and profile of the social classes and in the relationships between them. One of the great achievements is the fact that our society, where the exploitation of man by man was eliminated for all time, as well as social and national injustices, is today made up of friendly social classes and categories that are animated by the same interests and aspirations and which work closely together for the common cause of building the new socialist and communist order in Romania.

The great achievements obtained by our state during the years of socialism in the development of the country's economic power are the fruits of the untiring activities that are filled with self-sacrifice on the part of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, all the workers regardless of their ethnic origins and the efforts of all the people for the economic-social improvement of the country. The effects of these great achievements are felt,

among other ways, in the sustained growth of the national income per inhabitant, with this income increasing, in 1980 alone, by over 35 percent compared to 1975, and in the continuing growth of the workers' standard of living and the increase in the quality of life for all our people.

During the years of socialism, the Romanian Communist Party has given and is giving special attention to developing and improving state activities and socialist democracy as an essential facet of the work of socialist and communist construction. As a result, Romania has achieved a unified system of leadership of the country by the people and a political, economic and social democracy of a new type in a climate where the initiative, experience and creative abilities of the workers have the optimum framework for expression in carrying out the party's Program for Building a Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society.

One of the great accomplishments of socialist construction in our country, a result of the just policies carried out by our party and state, is the just resolution of the nationality problem in the spirit of the revolutionary, materialist-dialectical and historical concept and the provision of certain equal living and working conditions for all the citizens of the country. This policy finds its expression in the high rate of economic-social development in all the counties. Along with this, the policies also ensured the development and improvement of education and the broadening of the material base for cultural-artistic activities in the languages of the workers of ethnic origins other than our country.

Currently, the Romanian people are in a new historical stage of its development. The "Program of the Romanian Communist Party" outlined as the fundamental objective of the country's development the creation of a multilaterally developed socialist society and the advancement of the country towards communism. In the spirit of the guidelines contained in this program, the 12th Party Congress established as a fundamental objective for the period 1981-1985 the movement of Romania from the stage of developing socialist nation to the stage of a medium-developed socialist country. At the same time, the Congress put before the party organs, the state organs and the entire people the task of achieving during this period a new quality in work and life in all sectors of activity.

The great achievements obtained by Romania in building the new society, as well as the clarity and realism with which the objectives for the country's later evolution were set, powerfully demonstrate the justness of the Romanian Communist Party's scientific policies and clearly show that the party honorably fulfilling its historical mission to lead our people on the path of socialism and communism and the path of a dignified, free and happy life.

In the resolution adopted at the 12th Party Congress, the need was broadly stressed for strengthening the socialist state and increasing its role and attributes for carrying out the domestic and foreign policies established by

the party, beginning with the fact that, in order to fulfill the program of building socialism and communism in Romania under the best conditions, the Romanian people - like all peoples - vitally need peace and quiet. The Congress continued to place in the center of our party's and state's foreign policy the unending struggle against any type of preparations for war and the arms race and for the resolution of the complex problems of today's world by peaceful means through negotiations and for the accentuation of the course of detente and the establishment of a real international security and lasting peace in the world. Being an active detachment of the struggle for socialism, peace and cooperation between all the nations of the world, Romania places at the basis of its foreign policy the principles of respect for national sovereignty and independence, fully equal rights, national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual advantage, the denunciation of force and the threat of force in international relations and the solution of litigious problems by peaceful means. The Romanian state places in the center of its foreign policy the development and strengthening of friendly relations, multilateral cooperation and alliance with all the socialist countries, the extension and intensification of relations with the developing nations and the promotion of relations of cooperation and political, economic, technical-scientific and cultural cooperation with all the countries in the world regardless of their social system.

The friendship visits that have become traditional made by the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania in the different countries of the world, the constructive dialogues that he has had with the most authorized representatives in the countries that were visited and the agreements that were concluded are contributions of overwhelming importance in strengthening friendship and furthering multilateral cooperation between Romania and these countries in the interest of the progress of the work of socialist construction and the general cause of progress and peace in the world. They are, at the same time, graphic proof of the high esteem and appreciation that the Romanian state and the president of the Republic enjoy for their consistently carried out foreign policy, a policy serving the fulfillment of the aspirations for cooperation and peace, independence and progress of all humanity.

From what has been presented above, the fact is convincingly shown that the state with Romanians is over 2,000 years old. During these two millenia, the state of Romanians has passed through different stages of development, just as Romanian society has also evolved from the Dacian state of Burebista to the Romanian principalities of Transylvania, Moldavia and Muntenia, to the modern capitalist state and, later, to the socialist state corresponding to a multilaterally developed socialist society. In these two millenia, the state with the Romanians has experienced in its evolution different twists and turns, with periods of prosperity and periods of restrictions in its activities or even its disestablishment during the period of Roman occupation. However, even during these periods there were forms of political power through which the Romanian people achieved internal relations between the social forces and foreign relations with other peoples, and organized the defense of the

ancient lands and material and spiritual development. Beginning with such considerations, it can be said that the state with the Romanians had a permanence and a continuity throughout more than 2,000 years.

The state unity and continuity of the Romanians for more than 2,000 years constitute an incontestable fact and always was a factor of progress and incontestable proof of the historical rights of the Romanians over the ancient Dacian homeland.

FOOTNOTES

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HUNGARIAN PARTY HISTORY JOURNAL REVIEWED BY ROMANIANS

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 153-156

[Review by Ana Budura of Hungarian party journal PARTTORTENETI KOZLEMEENYEK, No 1-4/1981]

[Text] The journal PARTTORTENETI KOZLEMEENYEK, an organ of the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, contained in four issues that appeared during the course of 1981 a theme dedicated to the contemporary period of Hungary and the history of the struggle of the working class and its political party, as well as contemporary world history and the history of the international workers movement.

Some articles published in this journal referred to problems related to the history of the Social-Democrat Party in Hungary. We have in mind the study done by Ferenc Mucsi entitled "The Struggle for the Achievement of Organizational Reforms in the Social-Democrat Party in Hungary - 1890-1914" and the article signed by Katalin Solt and Endre Szigeti on the subject "The Economic Problems of Socialist Society Reflected in Social-Democrat Literature (1890-1945)," with both articles appearing in issue No 1.

In his study, Ference Mucsi analyzes the tactics of struggle used by the Social-Democrat Party in Hungary under the conditions of the growing workers movement at the end of the 19th century. The author deals with the process of creating the organizational framework of the Social-Democrat Party and its struggle to win the universal vote, considered then to be a principal demand of the masses. The study gives separate attention to the efforts of the Social-Democrat Party [SDP] to organize the workers of different nationalities in dualist Hungary, "where more than half the inhabitants were not Hungarians." In this regard, it is felt that this problem requires an urgent resolution since within the ranks of the nationalities the percentage of the industrial proletariat had begun to increase and the movement of the poor Romanian and Serbian peasants was taking on an ever greater scope.

In analyzing the program adopted by the 1903 Congress of the SDP, the author points out that, although the program recognized the demand for "equal rights for the nationality groups in the country," and took a position against any form of national oppression, it did not go so far as to recognize the nationality groups' right of self-determination and to have a complete state separation for

these nationality groups, and it did not even deal with the demands for granting territorial political autonomy to the non-Hungarian peoples.

The outbreak of World War I, the author concludes, created a new situation for the entire workers movement in Austro-Hungary, putting on the agenda the problem of achieving the right of self-determination for the nations in central and southeastern Europe.

In their report, Katalin Solt and Andre Szigeti propose that through the documents drawn up by the SDP in Hungary they can "outline the economic opinions of the Hungarian social-democrats with regards to socialism, presenting, in light of the Marxist teachings of the time and our days, the evolution of their concepts and their main shortcomings and positive parts." The authors have pursued achieving their proposed purpose through a presentation of the facts, without making, as they themselves stated, a fundamental theoretical analysis of the Hungarian social-democracy concepts concerning the general nature of socialism, the premises of socialism and the paths for moving to socialism, as well as the evaluations regarding the creation of the socialist economy. This type of approach was necessary, according to the authors, because of the specific nature of the Hungarian social-democrat literature in the field of political economics, which "never excelled in the theoretical facet."

In the study entitled, "The Place of the National Youth Committee in the Workers Movement," published in issue No 3, Laszlo Sved examines the subjective and objective factors that blocked the establishment of a social-democrat youth organization of a political nature in the first decade of the Horthyst regime, and he outlines the historical conditions of the establishment of the National Youth Committee. Within this framework, he reviews the beginnings of the ties between the illegal communist youth organization and the legal social-democrat youth movement, where a considerable role was played by the experience that had been accumulated during the previous years. The author shows the efforts that were made by the National Youth Committee during the 1930's to spur the movement along and he positively evaluates the results that were obtained, showing, at the same time, its limits both in an organizational sense and in a political sense. Further, the study analyzes the complexity of the period of the popular front and the influence exercised by the unity of action of the communist and social-democrat youth on the progressive youth, on one hand, and the unified struggle of the working youth upon the whole country, on the other hand.

Two other studies, signed by Dezso Nemes, deal with an analysis of the historical conditions within which the Biatorbagy coup took place in September 1931 and the goals pursued by the authorities in staging this coup ("From the Biatorbagy Coup to Martial Law" in No 1 and "Matuska - 'The Sole Assassin'" in No 2). The first study presents the idea that the attempt close to the locality of Biatorbagy on the night of 12 September 1931 was the work extreme right elements in the ruling circles of the Horthyst

regime put into action for the purpose of creating pretexts in order to be able to introduce martial law and eliminate the revolutionary workers movement. Dezso Nemes recreates the political circumstances of the attempt and follows step-by-step the preparations to dynamite the railroad line and the manner in which the government circles sought to channel propaganda in order to credit the idea of the attempt to the communists. He stresses the fact that the democratic popular opinion in Hungary and abroad put a question mark on the authorities' official version of the events, recognizing that the "attempt" was the work of the ultrareactionary elements to divert attention away from the plots of the forces directed by Horthy and Gombos.

In the second study, the author concentrates his attention upon the "Matuska Case," analyzing his career and his ties with Horthy's military circles and the profascist elements belonging to Gombos, as well as the means by which the government circles manipulated the results of the investigations made by the railroad directorate and the police, placing pressures on Matuska to credit the idea to "the sole assassin." By outlining the contradictory elements of the documents of the time, the author reveals that the "sole assassin" version "was nothing more than an invention of the extremist circles for the purpose of wiping out the evidence that was leading towards them."

From the series of materials referring to the history of the Hungarian workers movement up to 1945, published in the column "Documents," we can note Imre Faust's letters regarding the Hungarian delegation's trip to Moscow where it was tasked with concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union (No 2). These recountings by Istvan Pinter, with a succinct introductory presentation, give the framework of the historical conditions in August-September 1944, within which context the decision was made to create and send off this delegation, stating that for Hungary the opportunity had appeared for getting out of the war "after Romanian and Bulgaria had turned their armies against Hitler, a large portion of Yugoslavia had been liberated and in Slovakia a national insurrection had broken out." In referring to the attitude of the Hungarian Communist Party regarding this delegation, the author points out that the Central Committee "did not agree with this action, or better said, did not sufficiently seriously consider the initiative, being of the opinion that the time had arrived to send an official armistice delegation." As a result, the Hungarian Communist Party refused to take part in the delegation and was against sending one, feeling the action was a waste of time. The author of the introductory note feels that the facts proved the correctness of the communist party's position since, on 28 September, prior to the return of the unofficial delegation, an official armistice delegation left for Moscow. As a result, the delegation that Faust belonged to "neither positively nor negatively influenced the official mission and contributed only to Horthy's conviction that the Soviet Union was ready to begin negotiations."

Also in this column, in issue No 4 of the journal, there is a presentation of a group of political reports sent by the Austrian ambassador to Budapest, Johan Cnobloch, regarding the negotiations carried out by the representatives of Hungarian Socialist Party with Horthy in March and April 1920.

The problems of the period after 1945 have been reflected in a series of studies, of which we will note: "Economic Policy and Economic Development After the June 1953 Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Workers Party in Hungary," by Odon Barla Szabo (issue No 2), "The Turning Point Achieved in 1953 and Hungarian Intelligentsia," by Karoly Urban (in issue No 4), "With Regards to the Administrative Reform of the Parties, 1945-1947," by Gyorgy Gyarmati (in issue No 2), and "The Creation and Beginnings of the Development of the Hungarian Communist Youth Union," by Laszlo Eperjesi (in issue No 4).

In the study signed by Odon Barla Szabo, there is an analysis of the economic and political situation in Hungary during the period 1953-1956 in light of the resolution of the June 1953 Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee of Workers in Hungary. This document was designed to give the most adequate solutions to resolve the difficulties that had been created because of the "incorrect line in the area of economic policy that had been established at the Second Party Congress... which did not take into account the country's sources of raw materials, the efficiency and utility of investments," the difficulties created because of the "errors committed in agricultural policy - expressed in the neglect of agricultural production, the exaggerated hurry towards collectivization and the violation of Leninist principles of free consent," and the difficulties created because of neglecting to satisfy the needs of the workers and of violating the principal behavioral norms by party activists. The plenary session, the author stresses, was called to bring about a radical change in the party's economic policy, expressed in a reduction of the rate of industrialization, and, first of all, in heavy industry, and in a reconsideration of the development plan for the national economy and, related to this, the investment plan.

In the study "With Regards to the Administrative Reforms of the Parties Between 1945 and 1947," Gyorgy Gyarmati outlines the manner in which the government coalition attempted to resolve, under the new political conditions, the task of updating the administrative organisms, "to present the variations offered in this regard by the parties concentrated in the Front of Hungarian National Independence and to pursue the process of creating them and their fate, attempting to mark the manner in which this problem became an integral part of the parties' political struggle for power."

With regards to contemporary world history and the international workers movement, the journal published, among others, these studies: "The Situation of the Spanish Communist Party During the Months After the Defeat of the Republic (March-August 1939)," signed by Ivan Harsanyi (in issue No 1), and "The Evolution of Social Awareness Among the Arabs," by Jozsef Benke (in issue No 2), as well as the reports: "The Political Aspirations of the United

Socialist Party and the New Left (1960-1965)," by Janos Jahancsik (in issue No 3), "The Coup d'Etat in 1932 in Prussia," by Istvan Nemeth (in issue No 1) and "The Workers Movement in Mexico and the Policy of the Popular Front (1935-1938)," by Gyula Horvath (in issue No 4).

The journal also has a column, "News," which contains a series on the scientific activities of the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, presented in symposia, scientific sessions, commemorative meetings and relations of this Institute with similar institutes in different countries and with cultural-scientific institutes abroad. Here, we also find short biographies and obituaries on certain important persons in the Hungarian workers' movement. In this column, in issue No 3, the journal published a summary of the speeches given on the occasion of opening the exposition organized at the Museum of the Hungarian Workers Movement marking the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Romanian Communist Party.

In the column "Reviews," the journal presents, mostly, the latest works of Hungarian authors in the field of history, philosophy and sociology. In issue No 1 of the journal, the column published a review signed by Jozsa Antal on the book "Elek Koblos (1887-1938)" which appeared in 1978 in Bucharest from the Politica Publishing House and signed by M. C. Stanescu and L. Gergely.

In issue No 4, Jozsa Antal reviews the volume "Traditions of Romanian-Hungarian Revolutionary Solidarity, 1884-1946. Documents and Remembrances," which appeared in 1979 in Bucharest from the Politica Publishing House, under the aegis of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the RCP Central Committee. The appearance of this volume, the reviewer stresses, "constitutes proof of the internationalist traditions of the common movement of the two neighboring peoples." Similarly, he notes the manner in which the authors "consciously concentrated their attention upon the converging points of the Romanian and Hungarian revolutionary past," an effort that was expressed in a "useful act which makes a contribution to revealing Hungarian-Romanian relations." A special evaluation is given to the remembrances included in the volume which succeed in completing the picture of the actions of solidarity. These include the 12 stories of the commanders of Romanian units participating in the liberation of Hungary and which the reviewer feels are "studies of the military specialty of high value, which represent the role of the Romanian formations objectively and concretely." "Revealing the practice of affirming the principles of proletarian internationalism in the first half of the 20th century, the volume of documents," the reviewer concludes, "smooths the path of cooperation between the Romanian people and the Hungarian people."

In the review of the collection of studies entitled "The Republic of People's Councils and Our Neighbors," also published in issue No 1 of the journal, it salutes the appearance of such a book which "in a single volume presents the Hungarian readers with opinions and ideas stemming from certain research regarding the events in 1919 in Hungary," that appeared in different countries over a certain period of time. In this context, it was felt that it succeeded

in bringing together an interesting collection "that offers much new knowledge and that permits the creation of a picture regarding the historical idea of certain countries about the turning point year - 1919." With regards to the contribution of the Romanian historians to completing this volume, the reviewer points out that it is a study "that presents the actions of solidarity and the movement of sympathy (in Romania - ed.) with the Republic of the People's Councils."

Each issue also contains a "Bibliographic File" on articles dealing with the subject of the history of the Hungarian Workers Movement appearing in journals and publications in Hungary, as well as a list of foreign books that have become part of the Institute's library.

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CSO: 2700

SWISS SOURCE DISCUSSES DECREE ON EMIGRATION

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 15 Dec 82 p 4

[Article by R. St. (Rudolf Stamm): "Human Life for Hard Currency? Romania's Controversial Emigration Decree. Uncertainty Over Application and Enforcement"]

[Text] A decree of the Romanian Council of State, making permission to emigrate from that country conditional upon payment of a substantial sum of hard currency, was, according to reports, the cause of considerable uneasiness in November. Only a few days before the resumption of the European Security and Cooperation Conference talks in Madrid, where, among other items, alleviation of restrictions on personal liberties was on the agenda, Bucharest has now given signs of a step in the opposite direction. There is nothing new in the fact that communist countries have made the emigration of their citizens contingent upon payment of monetary penalties; such measures are, to a degree, understandable in light of a developing country's desire to recover some part of the costs of specialized higher education already invested in a prospective emigrant. The Romanian decree of 6 November, however, reminiscent of Jacobin penalties imposed upon French emigres at the time of the revolution, went even further in its harshness and contempt for human rights than had all earlier decrees; there was talk not only of restitution for the costs of education but even the costs of medical and welfare benefits and other social privileges. Since an emigrant would be forced to pay the amount in question with Western currency, though possession of such funds is forbidden to Romanian citizens, the new regulations take on the character of a demand upon Western countries for the purchase of the liberty of those persons seeking to emigrate. At this point any sympathy for that country's wish to avoid a massive brain drain ceases.

Moderating Statements

The decree, it was announced at Bucharest's Foreign Ministry, has not yet taken effect nor have its guidelines been fully worked out. According to official statements, it was not economic considerations but rather political ones which moved the Council of State to its decision; what was at issue was curtailment of the emigration of university-trained persons and technicians and not the need to find questionable sources of revenue for the state. The senior representative of Romania's German ethnic minority, State Council member Eduard Eisenburger, asserted that four-fifths of Romanian ethnic Germans who have emigrated to the Federal Republic had been able to establish themselves there in their regular professions; seven percent of the emigrants held doctoral degrees. The measure was said to be aimed at university graduates and specialists and not at persons with lower levels of education. The decree itself, however, does not make this distinction.

Talk of making restitution for social welfare and similar benefits has now abruptly ceased. Participants in the discussion are making a concerted effort to create the impression that Romania designed these measures only as a precaution in the event that the United States would withdraw the country's most favored nation trade status or that West Germany might abandon its interest in an important joint industrial effort with Romania. In short, the decree has been passed off as a foreign policy chess move, which can be renounced once conditions for doing so are favorable. At the moment, either these conditions are auspicious or Romania is obliged to give evidence of a maximum good will.

Normal Processing of Emigration Permits

German and U.S. diplomats in Bucharest, as well as representatives of the rabbinate which is processing Jewish emigration applications, agree that the decree has not, to date, been put into effect. Chief Rabbi Rosen even stated in Germany that Romanian Jews have not been affected by the new regulations. The emigration of Romania's ethnic German minority continues generally at the pace established over recent years; each month some 1,000 ethnic Germans from the Siebenbuerger and Banat regions are allowed to leave the country. At the moment, even those emigration applications filed after promulgation of the decree are being processed. German officials in Bucharest have no knowledge of exit permit fees on the scale of those cited by the International Society for Human Rights (according to which a master mechanic must come up with some 20,000 marks, an engineer 40,000 and a physician 50,000 marks). Nonetheless, such fees appear to have been demanded by Romanian officials from ethnic Germans making inquiries about emigration requirements; with even occasional hints that it would be financially more favorable for the applicant not to deal with the German Embassy. It is not a matter of sheer coincidence that such figures are being given circulation. The anxiety which this has engendered among the population is not unwelcome to Romanian authorities since it produces a major constraint against dealing with the issue further.

Research and Cultural Exchange Programs Stalled

Yet even those in power have their own anxieties. In a state where the right to travel abroad freely is reserved to only a small segment of its citizens, a decree such as the one in question here is an admission of its incapacity to satisfy the professional and personal aspirations of entire strata of its population. Ceausescu's Romanian model of "multi-faceted socialism" has proved itself to have only scant drawing power. Were Romania to open its borders, a massive brain drain would be the consequence. Such fears may also account for the fact that only 20 percent of the invitations issued by the United States to Romanian university graduates during the current year have been taken up; the fellowships made available to Romanian researchers remain practically unused. What this isolation of Romania's research and science from the West will mean for the country's development, is yet another chapter. The country's population has also cause to regret that the state (for financial reasons) has increasingly tended to withdraw from cultural exchange programs with major Western countries and is even unable to raise one-tenth of the costs of certain artistic and cultural events.

SATIRIST CONTRASTS STABILIZATION CAMPAIGN, ACTUALITIES

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 82 p 11

[Article by Vasko Ivanovic]

[Text] At the beginning of December, Alden Clausen, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, visited Yugoslavia.

We hope, sir, that you will understand in the best way that the following comes as a question, or a mild astonishment that is not directed at you, even though your name is mentioned.

From the time of Mr. Clausen's arrival until his departure, our Yugoslav "public information media," by which I mean to say the newspapers, television and radio, published several dozen notes, commentaries, reviews, summaries, articles and photo articles about his stay and travels around our country.

Welcome, sir!

At the Vasa Pelagic school in Belgrade, a surprise was even prepared for him: a revolutionary program was presented in English. Kozarcko kolo [The Goatherd's Circle Dance] and Mlada partizanka [The Little Partisan Girl] were translated into English along with traditional melodies sung by the children.

We hope, sir, that you do not think these Yugoslav educators, pedagogs and peacetime partisan sympathizers thought after all these years to involve you in these romantic partisan recollections. No, sir, that too was not the intent.

These translated partisan songs in school were prepared for the children and parents of the Vasa Pelagic school for the (now past) Holiday of the Republic.

Clausen is satisfied with the cooperation with Yugoslavia.

Thank you, sir!

Clausen said: "Yugoslavia can get out of difficulties."

That is very, very nice. Very nice and encouraging.

Welcome to Mostar, Mr. Clausen!

A lovely city. Sunny, bridge to bridge, in two words a real "bridging place." As far as troubles go, there is no place in the world where roses bloom by themselves, they are always accompanied by thorns, smaller or larger ones; the times are like that, but you will emerge from it. The Yugoslavs are good lads. Everyone can find his way through troubles. There are a thousand ways to get into troubles, but only one way to get out of it.

The following, however, was not said by Mr. Clausen. Nor did any of his collaborators, not a single gentleman at all said it. It came from our comrades of the Federal Executive Council and of the Yugoslav Assembly (the same Yugoslavia with whose cooperation Mr. Clausen is satisfied). Those comrades said: We will overcome these difficulties by our own strength and effort. Our people and workers are prepared for all sacrifices and denials, and we will solve the problems successfully; even more successfully will we overcome our temporary economic troubles and pay our debts.

Bravo, bravo. We, that is, my international financial institution applauds the stringent economic and political measures that the Yugoslav Government has had to take.

Comrade, we will scrap our old ships. We have the most modern equipment for that job, we have modern technology and highly qualified experts. We will cut up those old barks so that the job can be done with a fifth of the strength, that is, scrapping old ships. It looks as though we will start scrapping the new ones that have just come from the shipyards too.

How do you mean?" the reporter asked.

Just so. Yesterday I heard on the radio that in a place 100 kilometers from here they are building another enterprise for scrapping ships, Good Lord!

But that is not your affair, either Mr. Clausen. That was said by the director of the Enterprise for Scrapping Old Ships in an interview with Radio Zagreb.

We can no longer make the old mistakes. We dare not and will not invest in foolish investments, we will not duplicate our capacities.

"Hemofarm" in Vrsac has been making dialysis devices for years, and it completely satisfied our domestic needs. The license for this equipment was purchased from a firm in the FRG.

The "Pliva" company of Zagreb set up another such firm in Trogir, but construction is at a standstill. There is no foreign exchange money to import raw materials.

In Leskovac the "Zdravlje" enterprise is building a plant to make dialysis devices, but its license is from a Belgian company. At the end of July this year "Jugochrom" in Legunovci signed a contract with yet another firm, this time American, for license rights for the same dialysis machines. None of these firms stands a chance in exports, but just about all of them are bound by strict agreements for the purchase of raw materials from the sellers of the license.

The first statement, that we dare not and will not repeat old mistakes, was said by the Party Central Committee, the Republic Presidium, and congresses one, two, three and those that are now under way.

Had that been said by a single person, or just one congress, then one might think that some people had heard wrongly, as though they had heard instead of "we will not repeat our old mistakes" that "we will repeat our old mistakes." Instead of that "we will not build redundant, doubled, duplicate capacities," that we will build tripled capacities, even though there is not enough work for even one factory. But these words come not just from one person or one congress. They have been said and those people heard and understood the position, the line, the program, the law. And who are those people?

This question is also not directed at you, Mr. Clausen.

How could you know what people these days, after all that has happened and that has been said, written and underlined, would still sign up to build doubled and tripled capacities? How could you know, when we ourselves do not know?

The signature of those people is illegible, and their conscience especially is unclear. So that we do not know, while that knowledge is very necessary and we have sworn that we will find out about it.

No, sir, that question as well is not directed at you.

Welcome to Dubrovnik, and in general welcome!

Your Dubrovnik is enchancing. Dubrovnik is incomparable. I will recommend it to all my friends. You can count on that...You are welcome. Your blue, warm sea deserves all praises.

Thank you, sir.

Actually, the winds have stirred up and darkened the sea a bit, and it is a little colder, but it's that time of year. But in a month or so it will be warm as ever. Time and the winds change direction. As far as we are concerned, it will also be warmer, although perhaps it will take several months, because these things are not as banally simple as with the wind, where you blow and you find yourself headed in the desired direction. It isn't, sir, especially if we all blow in different directions.

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